

The Capitol Hill Complex

A Significant Cold War Site on Saipan, Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands



Scott Russell

Front cover photograph. The Naval Technical Training Unit mess and club building just after completion in 1957. Residential units are visible in the background (Northern Mariana Islands Museum of History and Culture).

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To the memory of James B. Johnson (1914-2010),
a longtime friend of the Northern Mariana Islands and her people.

“There, in the middle of the jungle on a tiny island thousands of miles from San Francisco, was a modern town which could shame many better-class U.S. suburbs. Spread over the terraced hillsides were more than a hundred homes with concrete, typhoon-proof roofs. Up-to-date in every respect, they lined lighted, landscaped streets with wide, park-like areas separating each cluster of buildings.” Fred Goerner, *The Search for Amelia Earhart*.

“It was an absurdity, a place-out-of-place, the setting for a comic opera or a Doonesbury cartoon, but Capitol Hill was nonetheless a kind of high-water mark of American power that fought its way ashore on the invasion beaches. It was bridge parties and cocktails and patios and good roads and a breezy hilltop at the end of the world.” P.F. Kluge, *Remembering Saipan*.

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Abbreviations

ADPC	Assistant Director of Policy Coordination
ARFI	Asian Refugee Foundation, Inc.
BOQ	Bachelor Officer Quarters
BPM	Brown-Pacific-Maxon Company
CAT	Civil Air Transport
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CINCPACFLT	Commander in Chief US Pacific Fleet
CIVAD	Civil Administration (U.S. Navy)
CNMI	Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands
CNO	Chief of Naval Operations
COM	Congress of Micronesia
COMGENPOA	Commanding General Pacific Ocean Area
COMNAVMAR	Commander Naval Forces Marianas
DCI	Director of Central Intelligence
DOI	Department of the Interior
DON	Department of the Navy
EO	Executive Order
FECOM	Far East Command
FEF	Far Eastern Foundation
FOIA	Freedom of Information Act
HICOM	High Commissioner
HPO	CNMI Division of Historic Preservation
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
KMT	Kuomintang (Nationalist Party of China)
KPA	Korean People's Army
LORAN	Long Range Navigation
MOQ	Married Officers Quarters
NARA	National Archives and Records Administration
NAB	Naval Air Base
NAS	Naval Air Station
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NAVAD	Naval Administration (Saipan District)
NSAM	National Security Action Memorandum
NSC	National Security Council
NTTU	Naval Technical Training Unit
OMSN	Office of Micronesian Status Negotiations

OOT	Office of Territories
OPC	Office of Policy Coordination
OSO	Office of Special Operations
OSS	Office of Strategic Services
PRC	People's Republic of China
ROK	Republic of Korea
SSM	South Seas Mandate
STS	Saipan Training Station
TTPI	Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands
ULF	Ultra Low Frequency
UN	United Nations
WPBC	Western Pacific Base Command

Preface

My first encounter with the complex of historic buildings on Capitol Hill, the focus of this volume, occurred a half-century ago from the bed of a pickup truck in the company of several other new Peace Corps Volunteers assigned to the Marianas District. We had arrived on Saipan that morning and were being given a round-the-island tour by Peace Corps staff. The complex's manicured grounds came as a surprise after miles of jungle-covered countryside, and its sturdy concrete buildings seemed incongruous with the mostly wood and tin homes we glimpsed on the way to our training facility in Chalan Kanoa.

A week or two later, my group returned to Capitol Hill for a courtesy meeting with High Commissioner Edward Johnston in his wood-paneled office in the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands' headquarters building. At the time, this office was the center of governmental power within the Trust Territory that comprised six separate districts scattered over two million square miles of ocean. Nearby were other offices and a hundred spacious residences occupied by dozens of Trust Territory employees, mostly expatriate Americans, along with a handful of off-island Micronesians who held senior government positions.

During my initial Peace Corps training, I was warned not to associate with "Capitol Hill Americans" since they maintained lifestyles very different from the indigenous Chamorro and Carolinian residents with whom we had been selected to live and work. Trust Territory employees recruited from the U.S. mainland were hired under "prime contracts" that provided attractive salaries and a range of perks, including free government housing and paid vacations, that were not extended to locally hired indigenous employees. The complex served as both the Trust Territory's administrative headquarters and Saipan's most prestigious neighborhood, a transplanted slice of suburban America on the northern slope of Mt. Tapochau.

As I settled into life on Saipan, I was told stories of a shadowy organization, the Naval Technical Training Unit, commonly referred to by its acronym NTTU, that had departed the island a dozen years earlier. Although it purported to be a U.S. naval unit, NTTU had in fact been a front for the Central Intelligence Agency that operated a top-secret training station on Saipan during the 1950s and early 1960s.

For the first several years, NTTU personnel and their families had lived and worked in a collection of World War II-era Quonset Huts along the shoreline at Lower Base, but in 1957, NTTU moved into a new, multi-million dollar administrative and residential complex on what was then called Army Hill. It was a modern, self-contained community with offices, residences, a school, post office, dispensary, restaurant, bar and nightclub, and recreational facilities on landscaped grounds patrolled by armed security personnel.

NTTU employed hundreds of indigenous residents in varying capacities. It was from these former employees and others in the community that I learned of secretive nighttime flights that landed at an old airstrip in Kagman and convoys of covered military trucks that routinely drove through village streets on their way to CIA training facilities in Marpi at the northern end of the island. Details about NTTU's activities were limited but consistent – young Asian men, usually identified as Nationalist Chinese, were being trained as guerrillas to fight against the communist forces of Mao Zedong.

Following NTTU's departure, the complex was transferred to the Trust Territory government to serve as its headquarters. Soon thereafter, the area became known as Capitol Hill. Twenty-five years later, the complex would be passed on to the newly created Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands.

A year after completing my Peace Corps service, I was hired by the Trust Territory government to work in its Historic Preservation program. My office was located on Capitol Hill in a section of a building that formerly functioned as a NTTU warehouse. Over the next five years, my office was frequently relocated – first to the former NTTU dispensary, then to an old Congress of Micronesia legislative office, and finally to the second floor of the headquarters building just two doors down from the high commissioner. At the time, I was ignorant of these details as I viewed post-World War II events too recent to be of any real historical significance and focused my research on topics from earlier periods.

In the late 1980s, while working for the CNMI Division of Historic Preservation, I made my first attempt to acquire primary source documentation on the Capitol Hill complex via a Freedom of Information Act Request to the CIA. By this time, I had come to more fully appreciate the post-war period and hoped to prepare a preliminary history of NTTU once needed documentary materials were in hand. Several weeks later, a letter bearing no seal or return address arrived advising me that the CIA “could neither confirm nor deny the existence or non-existence of records relating to my request” based on exemptions meant to protect their classified “intelligence methods and sources.”

There the matter rested until 2010 when I was selected to prepare a history of the Capitol Hill Complex and to document its extant buildings for possible listing on the U.S. National Register of Historic Places. The CIA subsequently denied a series of Freedom of Information Act requests I submitted in 2010 and 2011, but I was successful in acquiring newly declassified naval documents and non-classified materials from the Department of the Interior that were pertinent to the study. I also acquired photographs and oral historical accounts from individuals who had lived and worked in the complex during the NTTU, Trust Territory and early Commonwealth periods.

Although my formal responsibilities ended when I completed a final project report in 2012, I continued my research periodically for the next twelve years. In spite of support from U.S. Congressman Gregorio Kilili C. Sablan and his very able chief of staff, Bob Schwalbach, the CIA denied my request to view classified documents on site, an arrangement previously granted another historian a decade earlier. I was successful in obtaining a small collection of pertinent CIA documents previously declassified by litigation thanks to mediation services provided by the National Archives' Office of Government Information Services, and information from other sources that allowed me to significantly expand my original project report. I believe that the resulting revised version provides a solid historical overview of the complex and the significant role it played in the history of both the United States and the Northern Mariana Islands during the Cold War period.

I am pleased that my manuscript was accepted by the CNMI Division of Historic Preservation for publication as a *Micronesian Archaeological Survey Report*, as this valuable series was established in 1977 by my long-time friend and mentor, Dr. Thomas F. King. Tom's significant contributions while serving as a consultant to the Trust Territory Historic Preservation Office in the late 1970s laid the groundwork for the historic and cultural preservation programs now flourishing in the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, the Republic of Palau, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and the Freely Associated States of Micronesia.

A more detailed examination of the NTTU period must await the declassification of pertinent documents held by the CIA. My most recent declassification request for an internal CIA history of the Saipan Training Station was denied in its entirety even though the station was decommissioned more than six decades ago. I suspect that litigation ultimately will be necessary to gain access to these documents from an agency that seems determined to keep them secret indefinitely.

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Introduction

This volume presents the results of research undertaken to document the history of a substantial complex of concrete buildings located on Capitol Hill, Saipan, Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI). The Capitol Hill Complex (complex) was built between 1956 and 1957 as a modern, weather-proof administrative and residential headquarters for the Naval Technical Training Unit (NTTU), a pseudo-military organization that served as a front for the secret Saipan Training Station (STS) run by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) from 1950 to 1962.

Following the closure of the STS in July 1962, the complex became the provisional capital of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (TTPI), a governmental organization created immediately after World War II by the United Nations and administered by the United States. During the TTPI years, the complex, expanded by the construction of several temporary buildings, housed government offices, an exclusive multi-cultural residential area, and the Congress of Micronesia (COM), the first pan-TTPI legislature.

With the final breakup of the TTPI in 1987, the complex was transferred to the newly-established CNMI government and used for executive and legislative branch offices and employee housing. Today, the complex no longer serves as a residential area. Most of the former houses have been renovated to function as government offices. The results of research summarized in this volume reveal the significant role this complex has played in U.S. Cold War history as well as in the political, economic, and social life of the Northern Mariana Islands over a seventy-year period.

The author was originally engaged to conduct this project under a 2010 contract awarded by the CNMI Division of Historic Preservation (HPO) to the Pacific Marine Resources Institute, a private, 501(c) 3 organization then based on Saipan. This project called for archival research, interviews with knowledgeable persons, and a field survey of the buildings and structures that make up the complex. Research results were summarized in final report and used to determine National Register of Historic Places eligibility of this site. This report was subsequently submitted to the HPO in 2012.¹

Shortly after submitting the original report, the CIA, for the first time, formally acknowledged the STS.² Encouraged by this development, the author continued researching the history of this secret facility, an effort that went on periodically for the following twelve years. Additional FOIA requests

were submitted to pertinent federal agencies resulting in the acquisition of new primary source documents. Also acquired during this period of extended research were additional photographs and maps, including a set of architectural “As Built” drawings of the original NTTU complex.

Finally, supplemental oral historical information was obtained from seven individuals who had lived in the complex as children, three of whom provided the author portions of unpublished memoirs written by their respective fathers who were assigned to the STS between 1955 and 1962. In light of this new information, the HPO agreed to publish a revised version of the author’s original 2012 report as a volume in its *Micronesian Archaeological Survey* publication series.

This volume contains several sections that include a description of the research methodology employed, the environment setting and land use history of the Capitol Hill area, a detailed historical overview of U.S. involvement in the Pacific with a focus on Saipan during and after World War II, a description of the field survey and the historic features it identified, and an evaluation of the complex’s National Register of Historic Places significance. Endnotes containing citations and supplemental information and an extensive bibliography of pertinent references are also included.

Research Methodology

As called for under the original contract, the author conducted archival research, interviewed knowledgeable persons, and undertook a field survey of the buildings and structures that make up the complex.

Archival research included visits to the following repositories and organizations: CNMI Archives; CNMI HPO; Northern Marianas Humanities Council; Prior Service Trust Fund; Micronesian Area Research Center at the University of Guam; Naval Base Guam Technical Library; Nimitz Museum, Fredericksburg, Texas; and the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) at College Park. Written inquiries and document requests were sent to several other organizations including: the Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library; the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library; NARA at San Bruno; the University of Utah Historical Society; the Illinois Historic Preservation Agency; the Hamilton Library at the University of Hawaii, Manoa; the Harry S. Truman Presidential Library; Maxon Construction Company, Cleveland, Ohio; and Kellogg, Brown and Root, Houston, Texas.

Pertinent information was found in the digitized primary source document collections compiled by Howard Willens and Deanne Siemer including *The Northern Mariana Islands: Original Historical Documents on Development of a U.S. Commonwealth, 1960-1977*, *From the White House: Documents on the Northern Marianas and Micronesia (1945-1995)*, and *Oral Histories of the Northern Mariana Islands: Political Life and Developments (1945-1995)*. These collections are available online via the Northern Marianas Humanities Council's Digital Archive.

Also invaluable to this study, particularly with respect to the NTTU period, were documents from *Civil Affairs and Military Government Primary Program Records, 1899 to 1976* in Record Group 38, NARA, College Park. The author suspects that with the notable exception of Dorothy Richard, who authored the two-volume *United States Naval Administration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands* in the 1950s, historians researching the post-war history of the Northern Mariana Islands have overlooked this very significant collection.

As this complex was constructed at the behest of the CIA to support covert training activities, several Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests were sent to U.S. federal agencies suspected of having pertinent classified records. These included the CIA, the Department of the Navy (DON), and the Department of the Interior (DOI). However, these initial requests failed to produce any records. The CIA asserted that it could neither confirm nor deny the existence or nonexistence of records responsive to my request on the basis of FOIA exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3).

This determination was appealed but subsequently upheld by the CIA's Agency Release Panel on 27 May 2011. The DON referred the author to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers at Ft. Shafter, but this repository held no pertinent records. Finally, the DOI stated that it had no records relating to the author's request but suggested that pertinent materials might be held by NARA, College Park. Additional FOIA requests were made to the CIA, DON, and NARA during the extended period of research following original report submission that resulted in the release of limited but very useful records, some of which were redacted.

Archival research was supplemented by the acquisition of books, articles, and newspaper accounts, from a wide variety of sources. Pertinent information was found in contemporary news articles published by the *Guam Daily News* (later the *Pacific Daily News*), the *Honolulu Star Advertiser*, the *New York Times* and the *Marianas Variety*. Also very helpful were articles in the official TTPI

magazine *Micronesian Reporter* published between 1951 and 1980. Also acquired was a documentary film, *The Shadow Circus*, describing a secret CIA program to train Tibetan guerillas and a NTTU employee handbook purchased on eBay.

Considerable attention was focused on acquiring pertinent photographs depicting the construction and use of the complex by NTTU and its successors, the TTPI and CNMI governments. Aerial photos, in particular, were very helpful in determining how the complex changed over time.

The author interviewed several individuals with first-hand knowledge regarding the use of the complex during the NTTU, TTPI and CNMI periods. Original interviewees included Don Brennan, Doug Brennan, Lorenzo DLG Cabrera, Rosa S. Cabrera, Donna Cruz, Antonia P. Deleon Guerrero, Jose Q. Deleon Guerrero, Dr. P.F. Kluge, Lino M. Olopai, David M. Sablan, Manuel T. Sablan, William Stewart, Carlos Shoda, and Consolacion C. Togawa. Subsequent interviews were conducted via telephone calls and emails with NTTU family members including John Kendrick, Brooke Lewis, Pete McCollum, Eileen Robinson, Sara Schnabel, Elizabeth Strang, and Paula Vallone. In addition to oral historical information, several of the interviewees also provided family photographs dating to the NTTU period.

Also completed was a systematic pedestrian survey of the complex in 2011 which identified, measured, and photographed 137 features. This survey paid particular attention to determining original building/structure configuration and important architectural elements. This was made challenging by multiple modifications that individual buildings had undergone over the years, a process that continues today.

A highlight of the survey was the discovery of a well-preserved residential unit, designated Feature 50, that had undergone little modification. In 2012, this unit was stripped to its concrete shell to ready it for a renovation project. Fortunately, this building was photographically documented before its interior was gutted.

The survey revealed that all concrete buildings associated with the original NTTU complex are extant but that temporary wood and metal buildings from the TTPI period had been removed.³ The survey also revealed that all NTTU-era buildings have been modified to some extent, but that the complex is eligible for listing on the U.S. National Register of Historic Places under Criteria A and C.

Capitol Hill's Environmental Setting and Land Use History

The complex occupies roughly 30 hectares of land situated in central Saipan on the lower northern slope of Mt. Tapochau (elevation 424 meters). Saipan, with a landmass of 123 square kilometers, is the second largest island in the Mariana Archipelago and is the capital of the CNMI. The complex is located within the traditional Chamorro land unit of I Denne which in English translates to “the chili pepper” (*Capsicum frutescens*). Following the American capture of Saipan during World War II, the area was referred to as Army Hill. It became known as Capitol Hill (also Capital Hill) sometime after July 1962 when the TTPI government headquarters was moved to Saipan.⁴

Today, the Army Hill moniker is only known to history buffs, elderly local residents, and a handful of Americans who lived on Saipan between 1944 and 1962. Although fluent Chamorro and Carolinian speakers are familiar with the area's indigenous place name, I Denne is seldomly used to refer to the area that is the subject of this study. Capitol Hill, a designation now six decades old, has become the accepted name for the complex as well as for the immediate surrounding area that has been designated as a village.⁵

The complex's landscape encompasses a north-south trending area of relatively flat land that was partially shaped by heavy equipment during the 1940s and 1950s. The most prominent surviving natural topographic features include a rocky knob at the southern terminus of the parcel and a section of steeper topography in the central eastern part of the complex. Generally speaking, elevation drops from south to north. A steep slope is present along the western boundary of the complex which includes a sizable ravine known as Kannat Laremies. Most of the area enjoys a panoramic view of the western lagoon and fringing reef, and portions of the rugged eastern coastline.

Land records indicate that the complex is located within a portion of a 114-hectare Spanish-era land grant (circa 1880-90s) designated Estate No. 61 originally owned by Jose San Nicholas Alig.⁶ It was most likely utilized for subsistence farming and livestock grazing, particularly during the German and early Japanese periods. During the late Spanish and German administrations, access to I Denne was provided by a bull cart trail that originated just to the north of Garapan Village and ran northeast through Fanaganan, As Rapugao, and Kannat Laremies. Following the occupation of Saipan by the Imperial Japanese Navy in 1914, a wireless telegraphic station was constructed on the ridgeline just to




Figure 1. Map of the Mariana Islands (left) and a map of Saipan Island with place names.




Figure 2. Topographic map of central Saipan showing Capitol Hill and the surrounding area.

the northeast of Capitol Hill. This facility was accessed by a new road that branched off the main Garapan to Tanapag coastal road roughly following the right-of-way of present-day Isa Drive.

In 1931, Alig's I Denne land was allegedly appropriated illegally by the Japanese colonial administration, although it is also possible that Alig leased or sold his land to a Japanese settler or business.⁷ Other lands in the I Denne area were cultivated by both Japanese and local residents, including Antonio Torres Pinaula who raised cattle, chickens and pigs on his land along with a suite of traditional subsistence crops including tobacco, coconuts, taro, yams, and banana.⁸ Japanese settlers cultivated several commercial crops including coffee and pineapple on lands to the west and south of the complex. The I Denne area remained a sparsely populated agricultural area until World War II.⁹

No significant fighting occurred in I Denne during the battle for Saipan, but a Japanese field hospital was reportedly established there and used to isolate and treat badly wounded Japanese military reinforcements whose ships had been sunk by American submarines while enroute to various Micronesian islands. Following the American capture of Saipan in late July 1944, I Denne was used as a residential and administrative area for U.S. Army troops who served as the island's garrison force, and as sites for a large Army hospital and other Army units.¹⁰ It was due to the presence of these troops and facilities that the area acquired its wartime name of Army Hill.

By the end of the war in August 1945, Army Hill was covered by dozens of Quonset Huts and other temporary wood and metal buildings, the most notable of which was a large, well-appointed residential/office complex for the garrison's commanding general. In addition to buildings, the military also constructed an infrastructure system on Army Hill which included paved roads, electricity, and a water system fed by a series of newly-dug wells. Army forces occupied the site for about five years following the war.

Sometime in the 1960s, Pinaula accepted land at another location in exchange for the loss of his I Denne property which remained in government ownership. The Alig family unsuccessfully sued the TTPI government for the return of their property in the mid-1960s.¹¹ It is unclear whether the Alig family was ultimately provided a land exchange for its lost property in I Denne.

These temporary World War II-era buildings were demolished in the mid-1950s to make way for the NTTU complex. This involved substantial earthmoving by heavy equipment to reshape the parcel's

topography to accommodate the complex. A new system of asphalt roads and parking lots were also added at this time along with recreational facilities which include basketball and tennis courts. These features are extant today. In addition, the area also contains facilities built in the post-NTTU period. These including foundations of TTPI-era office buildings, privately owned residences, office buildings housing the CNMI Settlement Fund, and Department of Homeland Security, and a public baseball field.

Primary vehicular access to Capitol Hill is provided by Isa Drive, a major island thoroughfare originally named Cross Island Highway. One end of Isa Drive begins at the Chalan Pale Arnold intersection in Saddok Tasi and winds up the western slope of Saipan's central ridge. It bisects the complex into two primary housing areas - the 1300 block to the north and the 1200 block to the south - along a roughly east-west axis and then continues east, south and finally west where it merges with Chalan Monsignor Guerrero in Dandan. Access to the 1200 and 1300 blocks is provided by an asphalt road system that was constructed as a part of the NTTU complex.

Prior to the 20th century, the land now occupied by the complex was covered by indigenous limestone forest. Japanese agricultural activities commencing in the 1930s resulted in significant forest clearing in this area. When the U.S. military seized the property, much of the remaining vegetation was cleared to make way for facilities construction built upon layers of coral limestone fill. The area was cleared again in the mid-1950s when construction of the complex commenced. Vegetation during the NTTU and TTPI periods was minimal and consisted largely of coconut trees, introduced ornamental species, and grassy lawn areas that were regularly maintained.

Today, dense vegetation has reclaimed portions of the complex including mature stands of Ironwood trees (*Casuarina equisetifolia*) and Tangan-tangan (*Leucaena leucocephala*). This has resulted from a lack of regular maintenance. A few dilapidated residential units and the former mess/club building are largely obscured by vegetation, giving some parts of the complex a seedy, abandoned look. Mature vegetation also obscures some portions of the complex's original viewscape.



Figure 3. A 1921 map of central Saipan showing early Japanese roads. Capitol Hill area delineated in red. The Japanese wireless telegraphic station is depicted on the map just to the northeast of the study area.



Figure 4. An April 1944 view of the I Denne area showing evidence of Japanese land clearing activities. The steep slopes to the west of I Denne remain covered in indigenous limestone forest. Note access road.




Figure 5. A map identifying World War II-era military facilities on Army Hill, 1945.



Figure 6. Headquarters of the Western Pacific Base Command on Army Hill, circa 1945.



Figure 7. A view of the 1200 block in 1957 from the grounds of the mess/club building looking north.



Figure 8. A current view of the 1200 block showing the proliferation of vegetation.



Figure 9. An abandoned former residential unit.



Figure 10. The former mess/club building now abandoned and overgrown in vegetation.

The Complex's Historic Context

The complex is a byproduct of America's roughly 200-year involvement in the Pacific region which started in decades just before the U.S. Civil War and continues today. Over this period, the United States evolved from a fledgling maritime power concerned with pursuing trading opportunities in East Asia to a superpower now challenged by the emergence of a powerful and increasingly aggressive People's Republic of China with its own economic and security interests in the Indo-Pacific region. This overview, which is divided into seven subsections, traces U.S. involvement in the region with a particular focus on events associated with the so-called Cold War period. This term, coined by English author and journalist George Orwell in 1945, describes the post-war confrontation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.¹²

The United States as a Pacific Power

U.S. activities in the Pacific began in the early decades of the nineteenth century with the arrival of American whale ships and, slightly later, Protestant missionaries. Commercial opportunities with the Asian mainland, in particular the potentially lucrative China trade, also lured American businessmen into the Pacific in growing numbers. With increased commercial activity came the extension of American military power. Its earliest and most impressive manifestation was a powerful naval squadron under the command of Admiral Matthew Perry that called on Japan in 1853. While Perry and his fleet of modern steam-powered warships succeeded in forcing a number of concessions from the less technologically advanced Japanese, his visit set into motion a series of events that would quickly lead to the creation of a modern Japanese state intent on emulating the exploits of the western colonial powers.¹³

Although American military interest in the Pacific was interrupted by the Civil War, it was re-energized in 1890 following the publication of Alfred T. Mahan's influential book, *The Influence of Sea Power upon History*. Mahan argued that naval power was the key to success in international politics and that the nation that controlled the seas held a decisive advantage in modern warfare. This book was translated into numerous languages and Mahan's ideas were discussed widely in military circles around the world including Japan and the United States.

One enthusiastic Mahan proponent was Theodore Roosevelt who became assistant secretary of the Navy in April 1897. The powerful American naval fleet that he championed was put to effective use only a year later during the Spanish American War which broke out in April of 1898. This short-lived conflict pitted an emerging industrial and military powerhouse against a declining colonial power centuries past her prime. Not surprisingly, modern American dreadnaughts made quick work of the antiquated enemy fleets at Cuba and the Philippines forcing Spain to sue for peace.

The war ended with the signing of the Treaty of Paris on 12 December 1898 under which Spain ceded the Philippines, Guam and Puerto Rico to the United States in return for approximately 20 million dollars.¹⁴ The United States took Guam to serve as a coaling station for its naval vessels. Spain was allowed to retain her remaining Micronesian possessions, including all of the islands of the Mariana Archipelago north of Guam, but subsequently sold them to Germany in 1899.¹⁵ With its acquisition of Guam and the Philippines, the United States became a Pacific colonial power almost overnight. For the most part, the U.S. did not view German control of Micronesia as a strategic threat in the western Pacific since the islands were never fortified and the handful of German colonial administrators assigned to this isolated part of the empire focused their modest resources on health, infrastructure and economic development.¹⁶





Figure 11. Alfred T. Mahan (left) and Theodore Roosevelt, early proponents of U.S sea power.



Figure 12. A 1901 cartoon titled “Columbia’s Easter Bonnet” illustrated the United States’ emergence as a world power.




Figure 13. A Japanese postcard commemorating the 1908 arrival of the “Great White Fleet” at Tokyo sent by President Roosevelt as a display of U.S. naval might to impress its primary Pacific challenger.

The strategic situation was to change dramatically with the outbreak of war in Europe in the summer of 1914. Japan, an ally of Great Britain, dispatched a powerful naval squadron to Micronesian waters ostensibly to search for two German warships that posed a threat to British colonial possessions in the Far East. The enemy warships were not found, but Japanese marines who accompanied the expedition landed at key Micronesian islands in the Mariana, Caroline and Marshall groups, where they detained German colonial personnel and raised the Japanese flag. Saipan, the administrative seat of the German Marianas, fell to 500 heavily-armed Japanese marines without bloodshed on 14 October 1914.¹⁷




Figure 14. Japanese marines occupy Saipan, October 1914. The battleship *Katori* is at anchor offshore.

Japanese forces expelled German nationals, including administration officials, businessmen and most of the Capuchin priests. Saipan served as the headquarters for a small naval detachment responsible for administering the Saipan District which included all of the islands in the archipelago north of Guam. Soon after, Japanese diplomats began secret negotiations with their British allies with the aim of securing support for Japan's permanent acquisition of German Micronesia.¹⁸

In 1917, Japan sent destroyer squadrons to the Mediterranean to support Royal Navy operations in that theater. In return for this assistance, Great Britain pledged to support Japan's efforts to secure permanent control of German Micronesia following the conclusion of hostilities. The United States, ignorant of these dealings, was firmly opposed to permanent Japanese occupation which it viewed as a serious threat to its strategic interests in the Pacific.

In spite of strenuous U.S. objections, in December 1920 the League of Nations formally approved the allocation of the former German islands to Japan as a Class C Mandate.¹⁹ Under the terms of this agreement, Japan was allowed to fully integrate the islands, referred to as the South Seas Mandate (SSM), into its Empire but was prohibited from constructing military fortifications therein. Japan was also obliged to contribute to the welfare of its new subjects and to submit annual reports to the League providing statistical information related to its administration of the SSM.

The United States subsequently recognized the SSM after Japan agreed to participate in negotiations aimed at avoiding a costly arms race in the Pacific. Although the resulting Washington Naval Limitation Treaty of 1922 placed caps on naval tonnage and maintained the status quo on fortifications and bases in the Pacific thus easing tensions between the two Pacific powers, it did not end suspicions on either side. The situation was particularly acute on Guam, where a small American naval command found itself surrounded by Japanese-controlled islands.²⁰

Following the ratification of the Washington Naval Treaty, and in accordance with the terms of Mandate agreement, Japan established civilian rule in the SSM in April 1922.²¹ It was called the *Nan'yō Cho*, or South Seas government, which had its headquarters in Palau. Saipan became the seat of the Marianas District, which included all of the islands in the archipelago with the exception of U.S.-controlled Guam. Like the Germans, Japanese colonial officials focused on economic development but on a much larger scale than had been attempted by their predecessors. While the Germans had used local labor to support copra production, Japanese development in the Marianas was dominated by commercial sugar production, an industry manned by thousands of Japanese nationals, primarily from Okinawa Prefecture, who came to the Marianas in the 1920s and 30s in search of economic opportunities and a higher standard of living.²²

By the mid-1930s, Saipan possessed four large sugarcane plantations which were connected to a modern processing mill by a network of narrow-gauge railroad lines. Garapan, the island's principal

settlement, had grown from a sleepy indigenous village to a bustling modern town with a population of nearly 15,000 residents.²³ In addition to civilian infrastructure, the Japanese military built an airfield at As Lito and a seaplane base at Puntan Flores. By the end of the decade, the Marianas had become the most profitable district in the SSM thanks to the sugar industry and generous subsidies from the Japanese government. This economic prosperity allowed indigenous residents and foreign immigrants, the latter numbering over 40,000, to enjoy a standard of living unmatched elsewhere in the tropical Pacific.



Figure 15. The Japanese seaplane base at Puntan Flores circa 1934. The CIA would establish its STS here in 1950.

It was also during the 1930s that the Japanese government, now heavily influenced by the military, adopted an increasingly aggressive foreign policy which led to heightened international tensions. As Asia's sole industrial and military power, Japan desired to replace western colonial influence in East Asia with its own. In 1931, Japan established the buffer state of Manchukuo in Manchuria, a move which brought it rebuke from the western powers. Smarting from international criticism, Japan soon thereafter announced its intention to withdraw from the League of Nations effective in 1935. Although League officials discussed how this development affected Japan's legal right to retain the SSM, no

formal action was taken, and Japan continued to administer the islands as it had before leaving the League.²⁴ In early 1936, Japan announced that it would also withdraw from the Washington Naval Treaty which was set to expire in December of that year, an action that was to instigate a new military arms race in the Pacific.

Tensions between Japan and the United States worsened following Japan's full-scale attack on the Chinese mainland in July 1937. Japan, undoubtedly inspired by Great Britain's colonial activities in India, sought to control China and use its natural resources to support military and industrial capabilities on equal footing with the western powers. That same year, the Imperial Japanese Navy adopted the Southern Expansion Doctrine (*Nanchin-ron*) which held that Southeast Asia and the Pacific were within its sphere of interest and critical to the Empire's economy and security.²⁵

Japan-U.S. relations continued to deteriorate following the outbreak of the European War in 1939. In 1940, following Japan's attack on French Indo-China, the U.S. government imposed an embargo that cut off the export of steel, scrap metal and aviation fuel, a move that threatened Japan's substantial military machine. The Japanese government, in turn, signed the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy in 1940 and announced the creation of the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere," a new international order under which Asian countries would share prosperity and peace free from Western colonialism under Japan's leadership.²⁶

In early 1941, President Roosevelt signed an executive order establishing a "naval defensive sea area" around Guam for purposes of national defense.²⁷ This executive order prohibited ships and aircraft from entering the area without the prior authorization of the Secretary of the Navy. This action was largely symbolic, since U.S. military planners previously had reached the conclusion that Guam and the Philippines would be indefensible should war break out with Japan. As envisioned in War Plan Orange, the military's blueprint for defeating Japan, Guam and the Philippines would fall to Japanese forces at the start of a war but would subsequently be retaken by military operations "primarily naval in character."²⁸ This war plan called for the "isolation and exhaustion of Japan, through control of her vital sea communications and through aggressive operations against her armed forces and economic life."²⁹

In spite of last-minute diplomatic efforts, war came to the Pacific on 7 December 1941 (8 December in the Marianas) when aircraft launched from a Japanese carrier group executed a devastating surprise

attack against the U.S. Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. Japanese forces carried out simultaneous attacks on other U.S. and British possessions in Asia including the Philippines, Hong Kong, and Singapore. U.S. military facilities on Guam were also attacked on the opening day of the war by Saipan-based aircraft. The island fell to Japanese marines two days later.³⁰

After staving off defeat in a series of desperate naval battles with superior Japanese forces during the first months of the conflict, the United States quickly expanded its military capabilities in anticipation of the start of offensive operations. U.S. military planners settled on a two-pronged attack to defeat Japan: a South Pacific offensive directed by Army General Douglas MacArthur, and a Central Pacific offensive headed by Navy Admiral Chester Nimitz. Inter-service competition for limited military resources needed for these “mutually supporting” drives was keen, but it was ultimately decided that priority should be given to the Central Pacific drive as it promised “a more rapid advance toward Japan and her vital lines of communications, the earlier acquisition of strategic air bases closer to the Japanese homeland, and its more likely precipitation of a decisive engagement with the Japanese fleet.”³¹

Nimitz directed an aggressive campaign in the vast stretches of the Central Pacific spearheaded by powerful naval task forces made up of fast carriers protected by scores of battleships, cruisers and destroyers. The “island hopping” strategy he employed called for the capture of key Japanese-held islands which were subsequently developed as advance bases. Island hopping, as the name suggests, also involved bypassing other heavily defended enemy islands that were then effectively neutralized without the need for costly amphibious assaults.³² This new strategy was employed first in the Gilberts (now Kiribati) in late 1943 and refined during subsequent operations in the Marshall Islands early the following year.

With the capture of Majuro and Kwajalein atolls in early 1944, the U.S. was ready to assault key islands in the Marianas chain located 3,000 kilometers to the west. War plans called for the capture of Saipan, Tinian and Guam to serve as airbases for the B-29 *Superfortress*, a newly developed very long-range aircraft possessing a bomb capacity of 2,000 pounds. Air power proponents argued that Japan could be defeated by concentrated B-29 raids without the need for a costly invasion of the Japanese home islands. Securing bases in the Marianas would allow hundreds of these new aircraft to commence a sustained aerial bombardment campaign against Japan before the end of 1944.³³ Early B-29 raids flown from crude airfields in India and China had been unsatisfactory from a logistical and security

standpoint. The acquisition of Saipan, Tinian and Guam would allow for secure air facilities to be built, readily supplied, and operated within the bomber's range.

The Japanese high command recognized that the loss of the Marianas, which they considered an integral part of their inner defensive ring, would be catastrophic. Efforts to defend them from the anticipated American attack began in earnest in March 1944. Priority was given to strengthening Saipan which was to serve as the archipelago's defensive lynchpin. Over the following three months, more than 30,000 combat troops, building materials, heavy caliber guns, and aircraft were rushed to Saipan to make it an impregnable fortress.³⁴

Operation Forager, as the Marianas campaign was code-named by the Americans, involved hundreds of combat and support ships and more than 100,000 infantry troops.³⁵ It commenced on 11 June 1944 with a heavy pre-invasion bombardment of Saipan which lasted for three days. The assault phase was launched on 15 June when two divisions of U.S. Marines hit the beach along Saipan's southwestern shore. The landing forces were met by deadly Japanese counter-fire and thousands of American casualties were suffered during the first day of the operation. The Marines were reinforced by an Army infantry division on 17 June.

The ensuing battle, which raged on for nearly three weeks, ranks among the bloodiest and most vicious of the entire Pacific campaign. With surrender an unthinkable option, the outnumbered and outgunned Japanese garrison used the island's rugged terrain to fight a tenacious defensive battle. Saipan was finally declared secure on 9 July when American forces reached the island's northern tip.³⁶ Guam and Tinian also fell to American amphibious attacks following brief but fierce battles. Rota and Pagan, the two other islands in the archipelago with sizable Japanese defensive garrisons, were bypassed and neutralized by aerial bombardment.

The battle for Saipan claimed approximately 14,000 U.S. casualties, including over 3,100 killed in action, or about 20 percent of the combat troops committed. For the Japanese, losses were catastrophically higher. Of its 30,000-man garrison, less than 1,200 were taken prisoners.³⁷ Also killed in the crossfire were hundreds of Chamorro and Carolinian civilians and thousands of Japanese settlers who had lived and worked on the island in the pre-war years. As the battle destroyed virtually all of the island's extensive pre-war infrastructure, surviving civilians were placed in internment camps



Figure 16. East Field in Kagman, 1945. The CIA utilized this airstrip to fly in Asian trainees starting in 1951.

where they were provided food, shelter and medical treatment.³⁸

Even before the fighting stopped, U.S. construction battalions began work on needed military facilities. In line with strategic goals, priority was given to airfield development, but construction also commenced on living quarters, supply and repair facilities, anchorages and docks, bomb storage areas, and basic infrastructure including electricity, running water and paved roads. This work substantially reconfigured Saipan's landscape and transformed the island into a strategic bomber facility and an important advance supply and logistics base.

Isely Field, built at the site of the former Japanese Naval Air Base at Aslito, became the first operational B-29 facility with the arrival of advance elements of the 73rd Bomb Wing in October 1944. Other U.S. air installations included Kobler Field, a smaller bomber facility located immediately west of Isely Field, East Field, a fighter base built in the Kagman peninsula, and the Marpi Point fighter base, located at the extreme northern tip of the island. Over the following nine months, Saipan-based B-29s flew almost daily bombing raids against targets in the Japanese home islands destroying strategic targets and laying waste to urban areas.³⁹

Although the capture of Saipan was primarily a naval operation, island garrison duties were assigned to the Army Garrison Force under the command of Major General Sanderford Jarman.⁴⁰ Headquarters for General Jarman, who also served as Island Commander of Saipan (ISCOM), was established at I

Denne in the area that came to be called Army Hill. Also situated on Army Hill were the 148th Army General Hospital, the headquarters of the 7th Army Air Force, and two Army Engineer battalions.⁴¹ These various facilities comprised scores of temporary buildings, principally Quonset Huts, that covered most of present-day Capitol Hill.

On 25 April 1945, the Western Pacific Base Command (WPBC) was established at the southern end of Army Hill.⁴² This organization, one of three such commands created in the Pacific Theater, was responsible for Army forces on Saipan, Tinian, Guam, Iwo Jima, Peleliu, Angaur, and Ulithi.



Figure 17. An aerial photograph of Army Hill in 1945 showing major installations. (1). 148th General Hospital; (2). 47th Army Engineering Battalion; (3). Headquarters 7th Army Air Force; (4). 1341st Army Engineering Battalion; (5). Army Garrison Forces, also known as ISCOM; and (6). Western Pacific Base Command (WPBC).



Figure 18. Quonset Hut headquarters of the Army Garrison Forces (ISCOM) circa late 1945.

The WPBC's mission was to function as the sole operating agent for the Army Commanding General Pacific Ocean Area in all logistical and administrative matters. It was also responsible for providing logistical support to Navy and Marine forces, as directed. WPBC was supplemented in May of 1945 with the establishment of a separate Island Command Headquarters and the 1109th Pacific Ocean Area Provisional Garrison Force.⁴³

The Navy also had a sizable presence on Saipan and maintained its principal administrative headquarters on Naval Operating Base Hill (now known as Navy Hill) that was located to the southwest of Army Hill. Among the more significant naval facilities on the island was the Tanapag Naval Air Base (NAB Tanapag) which was established at the site of the former Japanese seaplane base at Puntan Flores.

NAB Tanapag possessed two concrete launching/retrieving ramps and dozens of Quonset structures that served administrative, operational, and residential functions for several seaplane squadrons. The Navy was also responsible for administering three large civilian internment camps, a duty assigned to the Civil Administration Unit (CIVAD) whose personnel operated out of a Quonset complex in Susupe.⁴⁴



Figure 19. A view of NAB Tanapag early in 1945. This base would be occupied by the STS in October 1950.

Creating an American Lake

War in the Pacific came to an abrupt end following the atomic bomb raids flown by two Tinian-based B-29s in early August 1945. Over the following months, military operations on Saipan wound down as thousands U.S. service personnel were shipped home in accordance with a points system that gave priority to seniority and combat service.⁴⁵ CIVAD also made arrangements to repatriate thousands of Japanese and Korean civilians who had been housed in the large internment camps in Susupe and Oleai.

With the departure of Japanese and Koreans in March 1946, Saipan's population fell dramatically. Local Chamorro and Carolinian civilians, numbering around 4,500 and now mostly residing in the village of Chalan Kanoa, were left to rebuild their war-devastated island under the administration of the U.S. naval government. Also present was a small contingent of Army personnel, some now accompanied by their families, who resided on Army Hill in the former WPBC complex, naval forces assigned to Tanapag Naval Air Station (NAS), which had been downgraded from a base to a station

after the war, and a few Coast Guardsmen who operated a LORAN station at the southwestern end of the island.⁴⁶

Even before the war had ended, infighting broke out within the U.S. government over the long-term control of Japan's mandated islands. In a memo to President Harry Truman dated 11 August 1945, Navy Secretary James Forrestal stated that his department viewed Guam and the other islands of the Mariana Archipelago as constituting "the keystone of the proposed naval system for future control of the Western Pacific."⁴⁷ Forrestal recommended that the pre-war form of naval government be continued on Guam and extended to Saipan and the other islands in the northern Marianas. Truman approved this proposal three days later. The following month, Truman also granted the Navy Department (DON) control of the islands in the Caroline and Marshall groups "as an interim arrangement pending study and recommendation by the State, War and Navy Departments."⁴⁸

Opposing military control of the islands was the Department of the Interior (DOI) which historically had administered U.S. territories. In a series of memos to President Truman in the fall of 1945, Interior officials made their case for civilian government of former Japanese Micronesia:

"Neither the security nor the prestige of the United States would be served by a policy of military rule; for such a policy would appear more militaristic than that of the old colonial powers, even more militaristic than that of the Japanese themselves whose South Seas Bureau was staffed largely by civilian personnel."⁴⁹

Interior argued that civil administration under civilian control "would be in keeping with the traditions of the American people" and would include provisions "to protect the security interests of the United States."⁵⁰ Truman was urged to develop a policy on this matter "satisfactory to all four departments" [War, Navy, State and Interior].⁵¹

Responding to these differing points of view, in October 1945 Truman ordered the creation of a joint group comprising representatives of Navy, War, State and Interior and tasked it with making a recommendation on this matter "without delay."⁵² The joint group met in early 1946 and by majority vote, recommended to the President that no action on transfer to civilian control be considered "until such time as the status and title of the Pacific Islands concerned should be determined."⁵³ Interior was the sole dissenting voice arguing for immediate transfer to civilian control.

Over the next year, debate on military versus civilian control expanded to encompass outright annexation versus administration of the islands as a trusteeship under the auspices of the newly created United Nations. Senior military officers, particularly the Joint Chiefs of Staff, were convinced that the U.S. must retain undisputed control over the former Japanese mandates by maintaining a system of naval and air bases throughout the Pacific Basin.⁵⁴ Civilian interests were to be subordinated to military requirements so that security and unhampered operations of U.S. military forces and installations could be maintained. This was necessary, in their view, to police a potentially resurgent Japan and to deter expansionist moves by their new Cold War adversary, the Soviet Union.⁵⁵

DOI, on the other hand, argued for civilian control under a trusteeship system. The shortcomings of naval rule of Guam and Samoa were bluntly described by former DOI Secretary Harold Ickes in an article for *Collier's Magazine* titled "The Navy at its Worst."⁵⁶ Naval rule of these islands in the pre-war years, according to Ickes, had "violated, willfully and persistently, many of the tenets of the American Bill of Rights," and Ickes suggested that the DON intended to extend these same abuses to the newly acquired Micronesian Islands.⁵⁷ He concluded his stinging critique by urging the United States "to take the lead in establishing trusteeships on sound lines."⁵⁸

While in agreement with the military's underlying goal – unilateral and complete control of Micronesia to ensure the long term security of the United States – the President and his key advisors understood that the outright annexation of this area would be inconsistent with the U.S. government's publicly stated position on decolonization, an issue that had taken on increased importance within the context of the intensifying Cold War rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union.⁵⁹ There was also serious concern about having the islands administered under a trusteeship arrangement since long-term security might be at risk. The problem confronting Truman was how to ensure effective, unilateral control over these hard-won islands while simultaneously avoiding the indictment of colonialism by other nations.

The solution, originally conceived in 1945 by Under Secretary of Interior Abe Fortas, was a "strategic trusteeship" under which the United States would serve as the sole administering authority.⁶⁰ While the trusteeship concept had been discussed by American officials in general terms since 1943, Fortas' proposal was a new approach that would allow for American security requirements to be met without the need for outright annexation.

In October 1946, the United States unilaterally offered a draft trusteeship agreement to the UN setting forth the terms under which it was prepared to administer the former Japanese mandate. The draft, calling for the TTPI, was approved unanimously by the U.N.'s Security Council in April 1947 and subsequently enacted into law by the U.S. Congress on 18 July.⁶¹ It was to be the sole "strategic" trusteeship created by the UN in the aftermath of World War II, differing from the other ten in that it was overseen by the Security Council rather than the General Assembly. Such an arrangement ensured that the U.S. could veto any actions that threatened its security interests in the TTPI.




Figure 20. James Forrestal (left) and Harold Ickes, protagonists who fought for control of the former Japanese SSM.

That same day, President Truman signed Executive Order 9875 which officially terminated military government and assigned the administration of the TTPI to the Secretary of the Navy on an interim basis. This EO, which reiterated the U.S. government's right to "close any areas for security reasons," was to remain effective until a designation was "made of the civilian department or agency which is to have permanent responsibility for the government of the trust territory."⁶² Navy Admiral Louis E. Denfeld, headquartered in Honolulu, Hawaii, was appointed the first TTPI high commissioner. Saipan became the seat of the Saipan District headed by a Naval Commander.⁶³

Under the terms of the strategic trusteeship, the United States was obliged to promote the political, economic, social and educational advancement of the inhabitants. It was also required to foster the development of such political institutions that might be necessary to obtain self-government or

independence as might be appropriate in accordance with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned, and to report to the U.N. Trusteeship Council on progress made and challenges encountered.

The creation of the strategic TTPI was a part of a larger effort by the Truman administration to reorganize the nation's foreign policy and military establishments to meet the challenges posed by the rapidly intensifying Cold War with the Soviet Union. A critical part of this effort was the passage of the National Security Act of 1947 (PL 80-235) which merged the War and Navy departments with a separate Air Force under a new Department of Defense.

The act also established a National Security Council (NSC) tasked with coordinating policy-making among government departments on issues relating to national security and foreign policy, and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) which was responsible for coordinating the nation's intelligence activities, including collecting, evaluating, and disseminating intelligence affecting national security.⁶⁴ The CIA, in part, replaced the war-time Office of Strategic Services (OSS), headed by William Donovan, which had been disbanded by an Executive Order signed by President Truman on 20 September 1945.

The inter-departmental feuding between Navy and Interior over administrative control of the TTPI continued unabated during 1948 with both sides making their respective cases to the President. Truman, with the acquiescence of the State Department, ultimately chose Interior, a decision that he officially announced in a presidential memo dated 14 May 1949.⁶⁵ The details of the transfer were subsequently enumerated in a memorandum of agreement executed between Navy and Interior and approved by President Truman in August 1949. The MOA called for the appointment of a civilian High Commissioner on or before 1 July 1950 and the transfer of administrative control to Interior by 1 July 1951.

The Early Cold War Period

From 1946 to 1949, U.S. attention focused on the Soviet Union which, according to an intelligence summary prepared in September 1947, was the only foreign power "capable of threatening the security of the United States."⁶⁶ The report viewed the economic collapse of Western Europe and the consequent accession of communist elements there as posing the greatest danger to U.S. security. To

counter this threat, a series of executive and legislative branch actions were taken between 1947 and 1949 including the Truman Doctrine, the European Recovery Program (commonly known as the Marshall Plan), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). By contrast, Asia, referred to at the time as the “Far East,” was near the bottom of this priority list.⁶⁷

By late 1947, the U.S. recognized the need for clandestine capabilities to stem the “vicious covert activities” of the Soviet Union.⁶⁸ As originally established, the CIA was an espionage and intelligence collecting organization, but in December 1947 the NSC transferred to it responsibilities for covert psychological operations. As the situation continued to worsen in Europe, the NSC adopted directive 10/2 in June 1948 which authorized a significant increase in the scope and volume of covert activities.

NSC 10/2 defined covert operations to include “propaganda; economic warfare; preventive direct action, including sabotage, demolition and evacuation measures; subversion against hostile states, including assistance to underground resistance movements; guerrillas and refuge liberation groups; and support of indigenous anti-Communist elements in threatened countries of the free world.”⁶⁹ These operations were to be “conducted or sponsored by the U.S. government against hostile foreign states or groups, or in support of friendly foreign states or groups but so planned and executed that any U.S. government responsibility for them was not evident and that if uncovered, the government could plausibly disclaim any responsibility for them.”⁷⁰

Consistent with the directive, these covert operations were to be planned and implemented by a new top-secret organization, the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), which was placed within the CIA.⁷¹ Secretary of State General George Marshall nominated Frank G. Wisner, a well-connected Wall Street lawyer and former OSS officer, to head OPC with the title of Assistant Director of CIA for Policy Coordination (ADPC). Wisner’s nomination was acceptable to CIA director Roscoe Hillenkoetter and subsequently approved by the NSC in August 1948.⁷² He was given the mission to “roll the Soviets back to Russia’s old boundaries and free Europe from communist control.”⁷³

Although OPC was placed within the CIA, it was to operate independently of other Agency offices, including the espionage-focused Office of Special Operations (OSO), as “efficiency would permit.”⁷⁴ It was the position of NSC that OPC should be within the policy direction of the State Department during peacetime and the Defense Department in times of war. Through an accord with these two departments, Hillenkoetter “agreed that their policies would flow directly through departmental

designated representatives” to ADPC Wisner.⁷⁵ As a result, Hillenkoetter exercised little control over the new office, a situation that characterized OPC’s first two years of existence.

Within a few months, Wisner had identified the major categories of covert operations that OPC would carry out. These included psychological warfare, political warfare, economic warfare, and direct preventative action. He sought results-oriented men to staff the new office, particularly former OSS officers and recent Ivy League graduates who were veterans of World War II.⁷⁶ By year’s end, OPC had a staff of over 300 who operated out of a complex of World War II-era building in Washington, D.C. and several foreign stations. In early 1949, Wisner approached the Economic Recovery Administration, the organization responsible for overseeing the Marshall Plan, and subsequently obtained access to administrative funding that over the next several years gave OPC and the CIA access to hundreds of millions of dollars in what one historian described as “unvouchered funds”.⁷⁷

The combination of Wisner’s aggressive leadership, ambiguous office oversight, a rapidly expanding staff, and nearly unlimited funding allowed OPC to “become involved in every imaginable sort of clandestine activity.”⁷⁸ Most significantly, Wisner began to develop a capability for paramilitary operations which could directly challenge Soviet power in Europe. In the intensifying Cold War atmosphere, covert operations came to dominate the CIA’s budget and manpower at the expense of its intelligence gathering and analytic functions.

Although OPC’s initial objective was to counter Soviet expansion in Europe, developments in the ongoing civil war in China forced the expansion of its operations to the Far East. This war, fought between Nationalists (KMT) led by Chiang Kai-shek and communists (CCP) under Mao Zedong, had been underway since the 1930s. The uneasy stalemate that had existed between the two sides during World War II had ended in January 1947 following a failed 13-month U.S. diplomatic mission led by General George C. Marshall that attempted to establish a unified Chinese government.⁷⁹

In 1948, CCP forces won several key battles forcing Chiang and much of his U.S. supported army to retreat to Taiwan by April of 1949. The following October, Mao declared the creation of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). At this time, the former commander of the Flying Tigers, Claire Chenault, proposed that the U.S. provide military support to surviving Nationalist forces in southern China. He also offered the logistical services of Civil Air Transport (CAT), a China-based airline he had established with Whiting Willauer in 1946.⁸⁰ While officials in the State department were unimpressed,

Chennault's plan appealed to ADPC Wisner who saw the utility of having an airline that could be used to support covert programs in the Far East. Active covert operations on the Chinese mainland were also advocated by General John Magruder, former deputy director of the OSS, in an October 1949 memo to the secretary of Defense.

That same month, Wisner recruited former OSS officer Alfred T. Cox to oversee OPC's China operations from an office in Hong Kong. During his OSS service, Cox had pioneered the development of small groups of trained men who were dropped behind enemy lines for the purpose of working with local resistance groups.⁸¹ In October, CAT began flying OPC missions in support of anti-communist forces in southern China. By year's end, however, OPC and CAT were forced to suspend operations on the mainland following the near total collapse of Nationalist resistance.⁸² The loss of China, an important World War II ally, led to recriminations within the U.S. government and contributed to the rise of a second "Red Scare" in American society.⁸³

In light of these developments, key players in U.S. military and intelligence circles, including Wisner, came to view Chiang and the KMT as corrupt and ineffective, and sought to organize a "Third Force" to challenge CCP control of the mainland. In U.S. intelligence parlance, the Nationalists loyal to Chiang were considered the first force, Communists on the mainland constituted the second force, and those who opposed Mao's rule but who were not aligned with the KMT, thought to number in the hundreds of thousands, were considered a potential third force.⁸⁴

OPC, with the support of Defense and State, began a search to identify a Chinese leader for this Third Force. The initial candidate for this position was Li Tsung-jen, the acting president of the Republic of China and former KMT military commander with a reputation for competence and honesty.⁸⁵ Li was thought to have a loyal force of 200,000 guerrillas who, if properly supported, could be brought to bear against Mao's forces on the mainland. Other likely candidates included Zhang Fakui and Cai Wenzhi both former KMT military commanders who had lost faith in Chiang. Zhang and Cai would play important roles in the Third Force program over the next three years, the former as founder of the program's political arm, the Fighting League for a Free and Democratic China, and the latter as head of the Okinawa-based Free China Movement, the program's paramilitary branch.⁸⁶

A major impediment to establishing OPC operations in this region was General Douglas MacArthur, commander-in-chief of the Far East Command (FECOM) that had been established to undertake the

post-war occupation of Japan and Korea. During World War II, MacArthur had refused to permit OSS operations in areas under his command “as he demanded total control of every outfit in his theater.”⁸⁷ He similarly kept OPC and the CIA out of Japan and Korea until April 1950 when a meeting with Wisner in Tokyo allowed for a modus vivendi to be reached by their respective organizations.⁸⁸ OPC established its first office in Japan the following month.

Korea, China and the Saipan Training Station

As a part of its Far East efforts, the CIA was also working to establish a secret training station on Saipan to support the Third Force program and other planned covert operations in the region, an action that had been approved by State and Defense in late 1949 or early 1950.⁸⁹ U.S. officials knew that Chiang would object to the training and equipping of forces not directly subservient to his regime. Consequently, Taiwan as a base of operations was out of the question, as it would be impossible to hide Third Force activities from Nationalist agents. To get around this problem the CIA selected Saipan in the Mariana Islands to serve as a discrete and secure location for a Far East training station:

“With Japan’s wartime population either dead or repatriated, the chain boasted few settlements of any note; only Saipan hosted anything approaching the size of a town. Even its airfields, which had once been so critical during the war, now fell largely dormant after being vastly overshadowed by the sprawling U.S. military bases in neighboring Guam and the Philippines. For the CIA . . . the tranquility of the Marianas held appeal.”⁹⁰

The idea to use Saipan as a training base may have originated from a contract awarded to the California-based Vinnell Company by the KMT Government in November 1947.⁹¹ Under this agreement, Vinnell served as the KMT’s exclusive agent for the shipping and sale of surplus war equipment and supplies recovered at former U.S. military bases in the Pacific, including Saipan, Tinian and Guam.

The U.S. government made these surplus materials available to Chiang’s forces and the Navy established a camp for Chinese workers on Saipan for this purpose.⁹² Vinnell, which continued operations on the island through the end of 1948, was reported to have established a symbiotic relationship with the CIA during the early post-war period, and it is possible that Agency officials became aware of Saipan’s attractive attributes via Vinnell’s contract work there.



Figure 21. The Vinnell Company's Chinese compound on Saipan, December 1948.

In 1950, Saipan was the seat of the Saipan District which included all of the islands in the Marianas Archipelago north of Guam. It was the district's largest and most populous island and possessed extensive war-time infrastructure including paved roads, utilities, prefab buildings, a protected port, and serviceable airfields. Most of Saipan's small indigenous population of 4,800 resided in the village of Chalan Kanoa located on the island's southwestern coast. The other principal islands in the district included neighboring Tinian (population 350) which was separated from Saipan by a five-kilometer-wide channel, and Rota (population 650) located 130 kilometers to the south. The district also included a string of ten small volcanic islands that stretched to the north of Saipan for more than 400 kilometers. Only two of these "northern islands" were inhabited by a combined total of about 300 indigenous residents who were engaged in copra production.

On 10 May, a few days after his return from the Tokyo meeting, Wisner briefed Hillenkoetter on the progress that had been made to establish the Saipan base.⁹³ The following week, there were further discussions on this matter, including the approach the CIA would take with DOI, the department slated to assume administrative responsibilities for the TTPI in mid-1951. High-ranking naval personnel were also briefed on these efforts. Shortly thereafter, Wisner advised Hillenkoetter that State and Defense wanted Hillenkoetter to discuss this matter with DOI secretary Oscar Chapman. Wisner was asked to provide a "brochure of information" to Hillenkoetter in advance of this meeting.⁹⁴ Given that the relevant CIA files are still classified, it is unclear how much information regarding the planned

Saipan facility was shared with Chapman. It is clear, however, that the CIA intended to continue operating the STS after Interior assumed administrative control of the Saipan District.

Just a month later, Communist North Korean forces (KPA) attacked South Korea (ROK) thus beginning the Korean War (June 1950-July 1953). This action, which caught both the CIA and FECOM by surprise, was quickly condemned by the U.N. Security Council, and U.S. troops from Japan were rushed to Korea to prevent a quick North Korean victory. During the first two months of the conflict, U.S. and ROK forces were pushed south by the advancing Communist troops. Responding to these developments, Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman General Omar Bradley argued that Korea was the place "for drawing the line" against communist expansion.⁹⁵ In August 1950, President Truman and the Secretary of State obtained the consent of Congress to appropriate twelve billion dollars to pay for the military expenses associated with defending Korea. UN Security Council Resolution 82, which condemned the invasion, paved the way for the participation of combat and support troops from other countries under the UN banner.⁹⁶

The tide of battle in Korea changed dramatically in September 1950 following daring amphibious landings by U.N. forces behind North Korean lines at Inchon. These troops, commanded by General MacArthur, spearheaded a rapid drive north against disorganized North Korean resistance. Just when complete victory over KPA forces seemed within reach, the situation changed again when tens of thousands of communist Chinese forces entered the battle in November. UN troops, surprised and overwhelmed, were quickly pushed south by the Chinese onslaught.

By December, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff warned President Truman that the enemy was capable of driving the UN forces off the peninsula, a view shared by MacArthur. The PRC's entry into the war was an extremely alarming development and there was growing fear that China might attack Taiwan, threaten Hong Kong, and extend massive aid to Ho Chi Minh in French Indo-China. Truman declared a national emergency on 16 December saying "[t]he increasing menace of the forces of Communist aggression requires that the national defense of the United States be strengthened as quickly as possible."⁹⁷

Some senior military officers and politicians believed that the U.S. should not be engaged in a ground war in Asia and they urged the President to authorize the use air and naval power against targets on the Chinese mainland. Truman rejected this advice to avoid triggering a general war with the PRC, a

potential conflict that Omar Bradley later termed “the wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time and with the wrong enemy.”⁹⁸ Instead, Truman ordered MacArthur to hold Korea if at all possible and took steps necessary to prevent the conflict from spreading. He also approved plans by the CIA to launch covert operations against China aimed at disrupting communist supply lines and forcing Mao to divert troops and resources away from Korea.⁹⁹

The Korean conflict had a significant impact on both the CIA’s organization and operations. The Agency was criticized for failing to provide advance warning of the KPA attack and in October Truman replaced the ineffective Hillenkoetter with General Walter Bedell Smith, General Dwight D. Eisenhower’s wartime chief of staff. Soon after, Smith, who was known for his brusque and demanding manner, argued persuasively to the NSC that OPC should report directly to him thus ending the office’s quasi- independent period. Smith took other steps to reorganize the CIA to better coordinate its espionage functions while maintaining his predilection for covert operations.¹⁰⁰ The war also resulted in the proliferation of operations in both China and Korea, many of which were paramilitary in nature originating from requests by the NSC.

Orders establishing the STS, which the CIA codenamed OQKODIAK, were relayed in a secret memo dated 28 October 1950 from Admiral Arthur W. Radford, Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT) and TTPI High Commissioner, to Commander William R. Lowndes, the Civil Administrator (CIVAD), Saipan District.¹⁰¹ This memo advised CIVAD that a portion of the northern part of island, roughly the same area that just two months earlier had been placed off-limits due to the danger of unexploded ordnance, was to be set aside for the exclusive use by the Asian Refugee Foundation, Inc (ARFI).¹⁰² According to the memo, the Foundation was a humanitarian society with offices in San Francisco and although its existence had not been kept secret, “certain departments in the National Government, including CINCPACFLT, have a special interest in its activities and their interest in the Foundation is in a highly classified status.”¹⁰³

CIVAD was advised that it would not be permitted to enter the restricted area except to perform specific services in accordance with the wishes of the ARFI manager. Further, CIVAD was “not to concern himself with the usual processing of personnel, immunization, immigration, plant and animal quarantine, customs or police security check insofar as the refugees,” nor was CIVAD authorized to inspect any equipment, material or supplies that might be brought in by the Foundation.¹⁰⁴ Refugees, on the other hand, were not permitted outside of the restricted area except for travel to and from the

airport or the harbor landing points. Other details relating to ARFI's use of Saipan were to be worked out between the Foundation's manager, L.L. Duke, and CIVAD staff.

Radford's memo specified that ARFI personnel were to utilize buildings at NAS Tanapag in accordance with arrangements previously made with CIVAD.¹⁰⁵ This former World War II-era seaplane base, located along the shoreline north of Puntan Flores, possessed dozens of Quonset Huts and other prefab buildings that formerly housed residences, offices, shops and warehouses. The base had been decommissioned in July 1950 in accordance with recommendations made by a naval survey party four months earlier.¹⁰⁶ The closure of NAS Tanapag, together with the departure of all remaining Army personnel of the WPBC a few months earlier, dealt a serious blow to Saipan's nascent post-war economy. The resulting "economic nightmare" forced many local families to rely on subsistence farming and the risky practice of collecting brass from abandoned stockpiles of wartime ordnance located in the northern end of the island for sale as scrap.¹⁰⁷

A few advance OPC personnel began arriving on Saipan in October and at least five local employees were hired by the Foundation over the next two months.¹⁰⁸ At this time, ARFI brought in two radio operators who were responsible for sending and receiving encrypted communications utilizing CIVAD radio facilities on a temporary basis. Sometime in early 1951, ARFI was replaced by the Far Eastern Foundation or "FEF", another CIA front organization. Exactly why this name change took place is unclear, although it may be related to the planned implementation of the Third Force program. Surviving TTPI employment records indicate that the first local employees were hired by FEF starting in April 1951 and that it continued operations through most of 1953 at which time it was replaced by a third and final front organization.¹⁰⁹

In accordance with an agreement reached by CIA Director Smith and MacArthur in January 1951, the CIA gave initial priority to organizing escape and evasion networks (E&E) in North Korea to aid downed UN pilots. One early operation supported by the STS was codenamed TPFOCUS.¹¹⁰ Although this program remains classified, it may have involved the training of Korean operatives to establish E&E networks or to conduct intelligence gathering and paramilitary missions in the north.¹¹¹

OPC also began ramping up operations to train both Chinese Nationalist and Third Force personnel. Nationalist training was based out of Taiwan under the cover of Western Enterprises while the Third Force recruiting program operated out of Hong Kong using the Far East Development Company as its

cover.¹¹² The newly established STS, which accommodated the training of both Nationalist and Third Force personnel, was augmented with logistical facilities at the Atsugi Air Base complex in Japan, and, later, at Camp Chinen in Okinawa. Third Force recruiting and training operations were code named HTMERLIN.¹¹³

The presence of the STS on Saipan had no outward effect on the impending transfer of administration from Navy to Interior which was set for 1 July 1951. In June 1950, the Navy publicly announced that it had no plans to maintain any military bases in the TTPI with the exception of an airfield on Kwajalein “needed for military and commercial air traffic.”¹¹⁴ In January 1951, roughly six months behind the schedule established in the Navy/Interior MOA of 1949, President Truman appointed his old Senate colleague, Elbert D. Thomas, as the first civilian TTPI high commissioner with the personal rank of ambassador.¹¹⁵ Two months later, a party of TTPI officials, led by the deputy high commissioner, undertook an inspection tour of the territory to collect information needed to plan the transfer.¹¹⁶



Figure 22. High Commissioner Elbert Thomas (holding flag) and staff at TTPI headquarters in Hawaii, 1951.

Based on information collected during this visit, Thomas sent a memo to the DON secretary in March 1951 recommending that a permanent capital for the TTPI be established at Army Hill on Saipan.¹¹⁷ Should approval be granted, Thomas recommended that a temporary capital be established at the old island commanders' quarters on Naval Operating Base Hill (known today as Navy Hill). With assistance from a Navy Construction Battalion and a budget of \$175,000, Thomas expected to have the temporary capital ready for occupancy by 1 July.¹¹⁸ Construction on the new capital on Army Hill would commence once an appropriation had been authorized.

At roughly this same time, the DON advised its CIVAD units in the TTPI regarding actions required to carry out an efficient transfer of administrative functions to Interior. The various CIVADs throughout the TTPI were instructed to plan an orderly withdrawal so that all naval personnel, "except very few in critical positions requiring civilian relief, will be out by 30 June" 1951.¹¹⁹ CIVADs were also advised that since Interior planned to operate with a reduced number of American personnel, it might be necessary for them to "employ and train indigenes as relief of some Navy personnel."¹²⁰ There is no evidence that CIVAD officials on Saipan implemented such training in the lead up to the transfer.

In anticipation of the changeover, the Saipan community hosted a farewell party for naval personnel on a Sunday afternoon in early May 1951. The occasion, held at the Chalan Kanoa ball field, was celebrated with an island-style meal, band music and speeches by CIVAD and local dignitaries including Chief Commissioner Elias P. Sablan and Judge Ignacio V. Benavente. As might be expected, these speeches paid tribute to the naval government which had run the affairs of the island for more than six years:

"At this time, our hearts are filled with joy for having you as guests at this poor party; but this joy is mingled with sadness on account of the expected departure of all Navy personnel and the subsequent cessation of the Naval Government in Saipan. You will be gone from our island but your memories will continue to live in our hearts for many years to come."¹²¹

On 29 June 1951 President Truman signed Executive Order 10265 formally transferring administration of the TTPI from the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of the Interior, effective 1 July. In accordance with this order, Interior secretary was obliged to keep the Secretary of State informed of activities in the TTPI affecting U.S. foreign policy. In a statement issued at the signing, Truman noted



Figure 23. Army Hill residence built for Gen. Sanderford Jarman as it appeared in 1948 when used by the WBPC.



Figure 24. Office complex behind the commanding officer's quarters in 1948. The complex visible in the background is the former 148th General Hospital then in use as housing for WPBC staff and families.



Figure 25. The WPBC compound looking south. Commanding officer's quarters are visible on hill, 1949.




Figure 26. Officer's quarters in the WPBC area, 1949. High Commissioner Thomas intended to use these buildings for his planned TTPI headquarters. Commanding officer's residence visible in background.

that Interior's experience promoting the political, economic and social advancement in the U.S. territories would serve as "reassurance to the people of the United States and of the Islands concerned that sound policies looking toward their welfare will be carried forward without interruption."¹²²

Two days later, DOI secretary Chapman formally announced the transfer during which he thanked the Navy for "its high standards of public service."¹²³ Chapman noted his faith in the ability of "Trust Territory islanders to develop self-governing institutions out of their own traditional cultural patterns," and pledged that Interior would "fully support this advancement as well as the efforts to protect and develop the land and other resources of the islanders."¹²⁴ With the implementation of EO 10265, Interior finally prevailed in its longstanding and often acrimonious battle with the Navy for administrative control of the TTPI.

To fully implement the transfer, high commissioner Thomas appointed civilian administrators to head the five TTPI district governments. Henry Hedges, a "Chicago adventurer and lecturer" was selected to serve as administrator of the Saipan District.¹²⁵ Hedges was a well-known public speaker and was considered to be an expert on the "South Seas" thanks to a series of documentary films he made in Tahiti in the late 1940s. He arrived on Saipan in June 1951 and set up his residence in the former CIVAD housing area on the beach in Susupe.¹²⁶



Figure 27. Henry M. Hedges (left) the first civilian administrator of the Saipan District and Elias P. Sablan who served as the mayor of Saipan for over a decade following World War II.

The few records relating to his service on Saipan and newspaper articles from his hometown of Chicago suggest that Hedges was a colorful and energetic administrator who pursued economic development opportunities including cattle ranching and commercial agriculture.¹²⁷ Prior to assuming his duties, Hedges was given a classified briefing on the STS and, presumably, its CIA affiliation.

As Hedges was settling in on Saipan, the first of the Third Force trainees were recruited in Hong Kong under the guise of employment with the Far East Development Company on Guam.¹²⁸ During the latter part of 1951, the first two groups of recruits, numbering 127 and 182, were flown to Saipan via Guam aboard CAT aircraft where they landed at the former East Field fighter facility in Kagman.¹²⁹ From there, they were transported in covered trucks to Quonset Huts at FEF's compound at Puntan Flores. A CAT pilot who flew Third Force trainees to Saipan during this time provided the following description after landing at East Field:

“We reached their [CIA] camp via a narrow road. We crewmen were given separate rooms in a corrugated-metal Quonset hut on a beach. Customers [CIA personnel] some with their wives, lived in larger Quonset Huts. A central building, decorated with shells, was a dining room and bar where we found casualness and camaraderie. Guerrillas of a few other free nations in training had their own ethnic mess halls, which the customers enjoyed sampling.”¹³⁰

These initial groups were trained by twenty CIA instructors who were assisted by eight interpreters. Also present was a small group of Chinese who served in support roles such as administrators, laborers, cooks and barbers. In addition to ideological instruction, many recruits were trained “in paramilitary skills including parachuting, communications, explosives, firearms, and guerrilla tactics” on a model similar to the one used to train CIA personnel at Camp Peary, Virginia, a facility Agency personnel dubbed “The Farm”.¹³¹ Training activities were undertaken in a secure area at the northern end of the island. Most of the men in these first two training groups were destined for missions in Manchuria, while others received additional training at the CIA station in Okinawa.

In spite of its top-secret status, the STS and its operations were soon threatened with exposure by a variety of parties. In September 1951, Zhang Fakui advised the CIA that he had reason to believe that a communist plant from the Ta Hwa watch factory in Hong Kong was among the second group of trainees. He assigned his Saipan-based deputy to investigate the matter.¹³² Two months later, a suspected Nationalist agent, posing as a barber at the STS, was identified. During that same month,

district administrator Hedges was questioned by Knight Aulsbrook who served as attorney general on the staff of Carleton Skinner, Guam's first civilian governor. Aulsbrook was interested in the Far Eastern Foundation which he suspected was involved with "training Chinese guerrilla warfare personnel for future use against the Communist regime in China."¹³³ Hedges reported his encounter through channels and Wisner was directed to discuss this matter with high-level DOI officials. Shortly thereafter, Aulsbrook's inquiries ceased and Skinner appointed a CIA staff agent as his police chief presumably to serve as the Agency's eyes and ears on Guam.¹³⁴



Figure 28. A Quonset Hut in NAS Tanapag two months before the station was decommissioned.

Adding to the CIA's security concerns were high commissioner Thomas' persistent efforts, supported by DOI secretary Chapman, to establish the TTPI's headquarters on Saipan. Thomas previously had sought authorization and funding for this purpose in light of Saipan's proximity to trans-Pacific communications lines and its substantial infrastructure. DON officials, however, quickly opposed this move on both military and security grounds. From a military point of view, there was a consensus that in the event of a general emergency, Saipan would again become an advanced military base "of very great importance." From a security standpoint, they were concerned that the CIA's ongoing operations on Saipan and their possible future expansion to Tinian would:

“require security measures which may prove to be embarrassingly restrictive in the conduct of the civil administration of a UN trusteeship even under present conditions. Should there be a need for locating other highly classified projects in the Western Pacific, these two islands offer possibilities that would be difficult to duplicate.”¹³⁵

Given that DOI would soon be responsible for administering the TTPI under the provisions of Executive Order 10265, the Navy’s legal authority appeared tenuous. To strengthen its case, the CNO requested the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to study the matter and to prepare a recommendation for the Defense secretary’s consideration. This task was completed in May with the issuance of JCS 1231/18 which concluded that the use of Saipan as a capital site was “unacceptable from a military point of view.”¹³⁶ Marshall formally relayed this conclusion to Interior in a letter dated 18 May, but Chapman refused to be deterred and threatened to raise the matter with President Truman should the Navy continue to object.¹³⁷ This dispute simmered unresolved well into 1952 during which time Thomas was obliged to maintain his headquarters in Hawaii while awaiting a final decision.

The Korean War provided a new impetus for the Third Force program as it was seen as a way to divert PRC resources in Korea and to foment anti-communist resistance on the mainland. These aims were to be achieved by airdropping small teams of specially trained Chinese operatives in Manchuria where they would “link up with local guerrilla forces, collect intelligence and possibly engage in sabotage and psychological warfare, and report back by radio” on a model developed and utilized by the OSS in Europe during World War II.¹³⁸ Airdrops would be the responsibility of the CAT which flew these missions from Japan under the code name Operation Tropic.

The full implementation of HTMERLIN was delayed by “resource constraints” and it wasn’t until April 1952, nearly two years after the start of the war, that the first four-man team was airdropped into Southern China by a CAT aircraft.¹³⁹ It was never heard from again. A second team, led by Chang Tsai-wen, was inserted by CAT airdrop into the Jilin region of Manchuria in July 1952. “Team Wen,” as this foursome was named, quickly established radio contact and was resupplied by air the next month. In September, another agent, Li Chun-ying, was parachuted in to serve as a courier between the team and the controlling CIA unit located outside of China. At this point, the operation seemed to be proceeding according to plan.¹⁴⁰

In early November 1952, the CIA control unit received a radio message from Team Wen advising that it had established contact with a local dissident leader and that operational documents had been acquired. Arrangements were subsequently made to extract the courier and documents using a ground-to-air pickup technique referred to as “air-exfiltration.” This method used

“two poles placed in the ground, with a rope suspended between them. This rope was attached by a line to a harness worn by the agent. A C-47 made a low pass, trailing a long cable with a grappling hook that snagged the rope. A special winch reduced the initial shock at the moment of pickup, and then reeled the agent aboard.”¹⁴¹

The four-man crew assigned to undertake this challenging mission included CAT pilots Norman Schwartz and Robert Snoddy, and winch team members John Downey and Richard Fecteau both of whom were CIA staff agents. Downey and Fecteau were last minute replacements for CAT personnel, although the circumstances leading to their participation in this mission, which violated CIA security procedures, are still unclear.¹⁴² Their C-47 Skytrain departed from Korea on the evening of 29 November and, after an uneventful flight, arrived at the pickup point around midnight.

After receiving the proper recognition signal from Team Wen (codenamed STAROMA) and completing a dry run, Schwartz brought the plane in at low altitude to complete the pickup. The pilots were unaware that Team Wen had been compromised and that they were flying into a trap. Seconds later, the aircraft was hit by fire from two camouflaged anti-aircraft guns manned by PRC troops. The crippled plane crashed nearby, killing both pilots on impact. Downey and Fecteau, who sustained only minor injuries, were captured, interrogated and sentenced to long prison terms.¹⁴³

The loss of this aircraft, which compromised a top-secret operation, proved to be a traumatic episode in the early history of the CIA.¹⁴⁴ The Agency attempted a cover-up by claiming that the crew had been lost at sea during a routine commercial flight from Korea to Japan, while the U.S. government staunchly denied subsequent PRC claims that Downey and Fecteau were CIA operatives. The incident was to remain a highly classified matter for more than a half century.

The tragedy did prompt the CIA to conduct an assessment of its training protocol during which two lessons were learned. First, Agency officers with close links to a covert action plan would no longer fly insertion or extraction missions. Downey had been responsible for selecting members of Team



Figure 29. An artist's rendition of the disastrous STAROMA extraction mission in Manchuria, 1952.



Figure 30. Downey and Fecteau in a Chinese prison, 1952. They remained imprisoned until the early 1970s.

Wen and had visited them during their training on Saipan. As a result, he was familiar with all aspects of the operation. His subsequent capture and interrogation provided the Chinese with an intelligence bonanza regarding the Third Force program, no doubt including Saipan's role as a secret training facility. The second lesson learned was that during training, groups should be kept segregated to avoid trainees from learning details of each other's missions, a precaution not employed during early training on Saipan.¹⁴⁵

These changes to the training protocol, however, did not address the root problems that ultimately doomed HTMERLIN to failure, specifically an inappropriate operational model and unreliable intelligence. Early covert operations on the Asian mainland copied the exploits of OSS teams that operated in Nazi-occupied Europe during World War II. The success OSS achieved was in large measure due to the support its agents received from cooperative resistance groups, "a situation that did not prevail in China."¹⁴⁶ Additionally, the program was based largely on fabricated intelligence provided to the CIA by paid informants operating out of Hong Kong and Taiwan. In the words of one former CIA operative:

"Desperate for information, the CIA had linked up in the early 1950s with . . . disaffected Chinese because they claimed they had reliable intelligence networks on the mainland. But the Third Force elements stranded outside the mainland were high on reporting and low on access. We discovered that, like Taiwanese intelligence, they didn't have credible sources on the mainland. The CIA had been 'had.'"¹⁴⁷

The ineffectiveness of these operations is supported by information from communist sources, as well. According to statistics released in 1954, PRC officials claimed that of the 212 CIA-trained agents parachuted into China between 1951 and 1953, 111 had been killed and 101 taken prisoner. Many of those taken prisoner had "surrendered on arrival."¹⁴⁸ In spite of a striking lack of results, the Korean War "established the CIA's jurisdiction in the Far East and created the basic paramilitary capability that the Agency employed for twenty years."¹⁴⁹

At the same time Third Force teams were being dropped into Manchuria, the CIA was moving behind the scenes to quash Interior's plan to establish the TTPI's headquarters on Saipan. The first available documentary evidence for this comes from testimony provided by DOI secretary Chapman during a senate hearing held before the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs in April 1952. When asked

by a senator about the Interior's plans to establish a TTPI headquarters within the territory Chapman offered a guarded answer:

“This is an open hearing. I cannot tell you one of the reasons why we have been asked not to establish the island headquarters in one of the trustee islands at the moment. I would like to give it to the Committee.”¹⁵⁰

A few months later, a draft executive order entitled “Transfer of the Administration of the Portion of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands which includes the Islands of Tinian and Saipan from the Secretary of the Interior to the Secretary of the Navy” was transmitted by U.S. attorney general James McGranery to President Truman. In his 4 September 1952 cover letter, McGranery stated that the President “was well informed of the facts which led to the suggestion of its issuance by the director of the Central Intelligence Agency” and that, with the exception of minor revisions in form and language, no substantive changes to the draft had been made.¹⁵¹

The edited draft executive order (EO) was also provided to other government officials including the secretaries of State, Navy and Interior. State and Navy raised no objection to the proposed EO, but Interior was adamantly opposed to its execution. Although not fully briefed on the reasons behind the EO, Interior assumed that they related to national defense.¹⁵² This being the case, Interior argued, such interests could be accommodated under the Trusteeship agreement, specifically Article 13, which authorized the U.S. to close any area in the territory for security reasons. Interior also pointed out that under the terms of an existing agreement with the Navy, its administrators allowed no person, ship or plane to enter the TTPI without the approval of the DON secretary.

In Interior's view, a return to military rule would have a number of drawbacks including isolating the people of Saipan and Tinian from the rest of the TTPI, reversing a portion of the President's civil rights program, thwarting economic development within the territory, and the increasing the cost of administration. Interior also warned that the implementation of the EO would frustrate its desire to establish a headquarters for the TTPI at either Saipan or Tinian and open the U.S. government to “severe criticism” in the United Nations. For these reasons, DOI urged the President not to implement the draft order but rather to instruct concerned agencies to seek a solution “within the framework of a unified civilian government of the Trust Territory.”¹⁵³

Despite Interior's compelling arguments, Truman signed Executive Order 10408 on 10 November 1952. This vaguely worded document asserted that "the purposes of the trusteeship agreement [could] best be effectuated by placing in the Secretary of the Navy the authority and responsibility" for administering Saipan and Tinian.¹⁵⁴ The order went into effect on 1 January 1953.

The ink was barely dry on EO 10408 when the Navy, in the last months of the Truman administration, moved to have it amended to include the other islands of the Saipan District after realizing the practical implications of having the district administered by two departments.¹⁵⁵ On 30 December, Chapman, with only days left in his tenure as Interior secretary, wrote a short letter to his Navy counterpart stating that he concurred with the proposed amendment, although he remained opposed to EO 10408.¹⁵⁶ Early the following month, Chapman wrote to the outgoing president to once again argue against the transfer of the Saipan District to DON which in Chapman's view would not advance U.S. security interests.¹⁵⁷ His letter contained a draft of an alternative executive order for Truman's consideration that would return Saipan and Tinian to his department but it was rejected. Perhaps due to the change of administrations, no final action was taken on the proposed second executive order for seven months.

To implement its new orders, the Commander of Naval Forces Marianas (COMNAVMAR) on Guam sent a small team of naval officers to Saipan to take temporary command on 1 January 1953. A month later, Commander Robert D. Law Jr. arrived on Saipan to assume his duties as head of the U.S. Naval Administration Unit, Saipan District (NAVAD).¹⁵⁸ Law, who had previously served as the navy's civil administrator of Truk (now Chuuk) and governor of the eastern Carolines from 1949 to 1951, was to head a staff of 12 officers, 80 enlisted men and a dozen civilians. Henry Hedges, who had served as Saipan administrator for the past 18 months, was transferred to Pohnpei and many of his staff members were reassigned to other districts in the TTPI.

To officially mark Law's arrival, two separate ceremonies were conducted on 10 February. The first was a military ceremony held in the morning at the NAVAD building during which Commander Law read his orders and relieved acting administrator Lt. Commander James B. Johnson before an assembled group of Insular Constabulary and naval personnel. Later that morning, an invocation was given by Father Arnold Bendowske of the Mt. Carmel Catholic Church and Reverend Clifton Ford of the Baptist Mission. This was followed by a civilian ceremony in the afternoon at Chalan Kanoa Village attended by island residents. The change of administration was officially ushered in with a call to colors sounded by Insular Constabulary's bugle corps and the raising of the U.S. and UN flags.

Mayor Elias P. Sablan then formally welcomed the navy back to Saipan after a nearly two-year absence.¹⁵⁹

This unexplained administrative change did not escape the attention of curious newsmen in the region. For example, a reporter for the *Honolulu Advertiser* speculated that

“[a] secret military project apparently lies behind the recent transfer of Saipan and Tinian islands to Navy control, although there has been no official announcement to that effect. This mysterious approach to the transfer has led to speculation that anything from guided missile research and atomic bombs to the building of a secondary line of Pacific defense south from Japan would explain the move.”¹⁶⁰

The article noted that Chapman had fought against the transfer but “could not block it.” Interviews with TTPI officials in Honolulu revealed that they had been advised informally that a security reason was behind the move. “Just what that involves,” one official remarked, “I don’t know, but I’ve been in government long enough to know that it’s just as well I don’t know.”¹⁶¹ Tight lipped navy officers interviewed said that they had not been told why the transfer was made, but a representative from Pacific Fleet headquarters told the reporter “you could speculate that it involves security.”¹⁶²

The return of naval rule in January 1953 occurred at a critical juncture in the Korean conflict. Negotiations for an armistice had been conducted on and off since June of 1951. With the lines stalemated and UN forces suffering significant casualties, these negotiations were again suspended in October of 1952. After defeating Adlai Stevenson in November, president-elect Dwight Eisenhower left on a secret three-day trip to Korea where he met with U.S. combat troops, both officers and enlisted men, to assess the situation on the ground.¹⁶³ The visit reinforced his view that as a limited war, the conflict was unwinnable and its continuation would only result in more U.S. casualties and a permanent stalemate. His priority became to end the conflict through diplomacy, although pressure on the battlefield would be necessary to force the North Koreans and Chinese back to the negotiating table.

In February 1953, *Time Magazine* in its “National Affairs” section reported on alleged leaks from the Eisenhower administration which it suspected were part of a psychological offensive against “the Communist enemy in the Far East.”¹⁶⁴ It enumerated possible U.S. actions that included a naval blockade of the Chinese coast, allowing Chinese Nationalist commando units to train on the “tightly

sealed-off Pacific Islands of Saipan and Tinian,” and equipping Chiang’s air force with advanced U.S. fighter-bombers.¹⁶⁵

The following month, the risqué men’s magazine, *People Today*, ran a similar article titled “Clues Hint New Pacific Fronts” which provided additional purported details of planned U.S. military operations against China with a focus on Saipan:

“Hush-hush strategic moves now astir in the Pacific are sure to bring dramatic military developments soon. Hottest area – the Marianas, particularly Saipan and Tinian, abruptly taken over 1 January 1953 by the Navy from Interior and now under the strictest security. President Eisenhower fired nearby Guam’s Governor Carlton Skinner, who wanted to make his island a major commercial cross-road center which would have meant many foreigners around. More persistent rumor is that Chinese Nationalist troops are training on Saipan and Tinian, flown in by General Chennault’s airline. Airlift missions may start soon to build up left-over Chinese Nationalists in North Burma for ‘underbelly’ attacks on Mao.”¹⁶⁶

While most of this information undoubtedly was made public through administration leaks, it is unlikely that the use of Saipan as a locale for agent training would have been revealed in such a manner. At the time, the CIA, unaware that HTMERLIN personnel Downey and Fecteau were alive in a Chinese prison, must have assumed that the existence of the STS remained secret. A more likely source was Carleton Skinner or one of his staff. Skinner, who was aware of the possible agent training on Saipan since 1951, was unceremoniously removed as governor of Guam reportedly due to his poor relationship with COMNAVMAR officials who viewed his policies as a security risk. Regardless of the source, the public exposure of this information must have been an unsettling development for CIA officials.

With the Navy back in administrative control, the Far Eastern Foundation was replaced by the Naval Technical Training Unit or NTTU in late May 1953. NTTU was a pseudo-military organization established on paper by the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) with the stated mission “to provide technical training in connection with experimental and research projects.”¹⁶⁷ It included both CIA staff and contract agents and military personnel who were on temporary assignment to the Agency.¹⁶⁸ According to a knowledgeable local resident,

“these people were kind of different; they would talk to us but they always kept things to themselves. They had fatigues on and were experts in demolition, experts in this kind of equipment. They were not the civil service kind of persons . . . and, hell, they were good athletes.”¹⁶⁹

The navy was reportedly unhappy with its role as front, but did its best to shield operations of the “Sponsoring Agency” from outside scrutiny.¹⁷⁰ It accomplished this by requiring all would-be visitors to secure security clearance as a pre-requisite for entering Saipan and Tinian.¹⁷¹ This daunting bureaucratic procedure was a time consuming and usually futile exercise. Travel by local residents was also discouraged, a situation that resulted in both inconvenience and the loss of economic opportunities.¹⁷²

NAVAD also took responsibility for UN Visiting Missions that came to the islands every three years to monitor the performance of the administering authority on behalf of the Trusteeship Council.¹⁷³ Official itineraries developed by NAVAD ensured that UN officials were on Saipan only briefly and never given the opportunity to visit areas utilized by the CIA. For example, an itinerary for a Visiting Mission during this period was as follows:

Time	Activity
1200	Arrive Saipan
1215	Depart Airport for Intermediate School
1220	Arrive School for program
1250	Visit Classrooms
1300	Depart School for Golf Course (lunch)
1430	Depart Golf Course
1435	Visit Vicente Deleon Guerrero chicken/cattle farm
1445	Depart farm
1450	Pass Navy Cattle Stockade
1455	Arrive Catholic Church
1505	Depart Catholic Church
1515	Arrive Lake Susupe to see Tilapia
1520	Depart Lake Susupe
1525	Arrive Civic Center (pass by New Elementary school classrooms, Post Office, Bank of America)
1525	Visit Farmers Market and Dispensary
1530	Meeting at congress hall with congressmen, commissioners and Saipanese leaders for discussion
1645	Conclude meeting (if time permits visit representative stores and other farms)
1700	Arrive Kobler and Depart for Guam ¹⁷⁴




Figure 31. Map of central Saipan showing the boundaries of those portions of the island utilized by the Naval Technical Training Unit. Depicted here are I Denne (showing the original configuration of roads on Army Hill), Kagman, and the Tanapag Harbor Reservation the northern end of which would come to be called "Lower Base." Also visible is the southern portion of the Marpi area which was utilized as one of two training areas on the island. Note "Construction Contractor Camp (Noy 13931)" which was utilized by Brown-Pacific-Maxon (BPM) as a residential compound for its Filipino and U.S. workers. The Naval Operating Base included NOB Hill, commonly referred to as Navy Hill. Beginning in 1954, it served as the residential area for the Naval Administration (NAVAD).




Figure 32. Map showing the boundaries of the Naval Technical Training Unit training area in Marpi, the Army Hill administrative and residential headquarters, Tanapag Harbor Reservation, and the northern portion of the Kagman training area.

The Navy did its part but there was little interaction between NTTU and NAVAD in the field. While NTTU personnel shopped at the Navy commissary and sent their children to the military dependents school on Navy Hill, by necessity they segregated their professional and social lives from those of their military counterparts. A notable exception to this rule involved regular golf outings at Saipan's nine-hole course during which NTTU and senior Navy officers socialized while on the course and during drinking sessions that followed at the clubhouse.¹⁷⁵

This segregation was made easier by NTTU's isolated enclave at Puntan Flores which was off-limits to all non-NTTU personnel and dependents with the exception of local civilian employees. NTTU's interactions with the indigenous community were more common given the number of local workers on NTTU's payroll and the frequent opportunities for socializing during community functions.¹⁷⁶

At the time NTTU was established, the CIA was at the peak of its independence and authority in the field of covert operations. Only the Director of Central Intelligence and the President had authority to approve, manage, or curtail operations. Like his predecessor, newly elected President Dwight Eisenhower who assumed office in January 1953, also viewed covert operations as an important component of American foreign policy, one that offered the government "plausible deniability." But unlike Truman, Eisenhower came to rely heavily on the National Security Council (NSC) system to formulate and execute military, international and internal security affairs.¹⁷⁷

The NSC, which met regularly on Wednesday mornings, was made up of five statutory members: president, vice-president, secretaries of Defense and State, and the director of the Office of Defense Mobilization. Depending on the subject matter under discussion, NSC meetings were also attended by a dozen or so senior Cabinet members and advisors. The CIA director was often called on to provide the group briefings on worldwide developments affecting American security. The final products of these discussions were NSC Actions which were normally endorsed by the president. Once approved, NSC decisions were passed on to the Operations Coordinating Board, an organization created by Eisenhower to coordinate and implement all aspects of national security policy.

Among the first issues considered by the NSC under the Eisenhower administration was Taiwan (then called Formosa) and Communist China. Combat in Korea had ended thanks to an armistice signed in July 1953, but unfolding developments in Indochina threatened to reduce non-communist capabilities in Southeast Asia while expanding those of Communist China. In response, U.S. policy makers sought




Figure 33. NTTU identification tag issued to Rosa Roberto Sablan Cabrera. She worked in the Receiving and Shipping Section at Lower Base from 1954 to 1962.



Figure 34. Pedro Igitol, left, and Lino M. Olopai, NTTU security personnel, outside of their Lower Base office circa the late 1950s

to offset the unfavorable military imbalance and to strengthen the “constraining forces” that could be “brought to bear on the Communist flank.”¹⁷⁸

U.S. policy with respect to Taiwan and China was officially articulated in NSC 146/2 endorsed by President Eisenhower on 6 November 1953. NSC 146/2 called for a wide range of actions including integrating Taiwan into the U.S. Far East defense position, increasing Nationalist Chinese defensive capabilities, and encouraging governments of allies and non-aligned nations to recognize the Nationalist government in the United Nations.

Also included in NSC 146/2 were two covert programs that were to be directed by the CIA. The first involved providing assistance to the National Government to develop and support “anti-communist guerrillas on the mainland of China.”¹⁷⁹ The second CIA program involved maintaining “discreet contact with anti-Communist Chinese groups outside Formosa which continue to reject cooperation with Chinese National Government, and without making commitments of U.S. support, encourage such groups actively to oppose communism.”¹⁸⁰ In spite of a spotty track record, the CIA succeeded in securing official NSC endorsement of its covert Chinese operations which had been initiated during the Truman administration. Although the ineffective “Third Force” program was terminated in July 1953 and most of its trained personnel eventually integrated into Chiang’s army, Nationalist agents as well as those from other Asian nations continued to be trained on Saipan.¹⁸¹

On 17 July 1953, the pending issue of transferring the remaining islands of the Saipan District to naval control was resolved when President Eisenhower signed EO 10470. In accordance with its terms, the 10 islands to the north of Saipan were placed under NAVAD administration. In commenting on a draft of this order, new CIA director Allen Dulles noted that while his Agency had no current plans to utilize “land or facilities on Mariana Islands [redacted text, possibly ‘to the north of Saipan’],” he believed that the proposed transfer would be “to the best interest of national security, and provide stronger internal security for this area . . .”¹⁸²

Rota, which had been slated for transfer in an earlier draft of this EO, was left under TTPI administration at the urging of high commissioner Frank Midkiff and DOI Secretary Douglas McKay who viewed the island as a “toehold” from which the TTPI could eventually reclaim administrative control of the Saipan District.¹⁸³ When advised of this action, Rota’s indigenous community vigorously protested during a meeting with COMNAVMAR and in a formal written petition sent to Admiral

Radford in Hawaii. A petition of protest was also presented to the UN Visiting Mission a few years later. The anxiety and hardships caused by this separation would continue to affect Rota residents for the next nine years. Administering the island would also result in significant difficulties for the cash-strapped TTPI government which soon came to regret its toehold strategy.

With the islands north of Rota now securely under military control, the CIA moved to upgrade its administrative and training facilities on Saipan. At the time, NTTU, like its predecessors, operated out of a complex of mostly World War II-era Quonset Huts located along the shore at Puntan Flores. These decade-old wood and tin buildings, undoubtedly weakened by termites and corrosion, were extremely vulnerable to high winds and waves generated by tropical storms that frequently tracked through the islands. After destructive storms hit Saipan in 1953 and 1954, planning was initiated to construct a modern, weatherproof administrative and residential complex for NTTU at the former WPBC headquarters area on Army Hill, as well as new training facilities in the Marpi and Kagman areas. These storms also prompted NAVAD to move its administrative and residential complex from the former CIVAD/Interior facilities in Susupe to Navy Hill. A new Navy hospital that serviced the community was also built in this area. NAVAD's move, which involved refurbishing World War II-era Quonset Huts, was completed by the end of 1954.¹⁸⁴



Figure 35. NAVAD housing on Navy Hill, circa 1958. These residences were repurposed World War II Quonset Huts. The former Japanese lighthouse and U.S. World War II communication facility is visible in background.

The NTTU project was discretely undertaken as a work order under Navy contract NOy 13931 “Post War Construction – Marianas Area.”¹⁸⁵ This multi-year, multi-million dollar contract had been let by the Bureau of Yards and Docks on 15 June 1946 and was considered by the Navy to have been “a great impetus in the development of permanent naval facilities and the reconstruction of Guam.”¹⁸⁶ The contractor, Brown-Pacific-Maxon Construction Company, was an amalgam of three firms: Brown and Root of Houston, Texas, the Pacific Bridge Company of San Francisco, California, and Maxon Construction Company of Dayton, Ohio.

The senior partner of this firm, Brown and Root of Houston, Texas, headed by George Brown, had extremely close ties with Senator Lyndon B. Johnson. Brown and Root landed its first big federal contract in the 1930s with the assistance of then Congressman Johnson who used his influence with the Roosevelt administration to have the firm approved for a damn construction project after-the-fact. In return for this and future help, Brown provided large contributions to support Johnson’s various political campaigns.¹⁸⁷ The NTTU project, with a reported budget of approximately 30 million dollars, was lost among scores of large-scale military projects completed under NOy 13931 over the course of its 10-year life.

Brown-Pacific-Maxon, or BPM as the firm was commonly called, employed thousands of Filipino workers recruited under an agreement with Luzon Stevedoring Corporation, known as Lustevenco, which was headquartered in Manila.¹⁸⁸ Before being allowed into Guam under one-year labor contracts, these men were required to undergo rigorous background checks performed by the Navy and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Once on Guam, they were housed in large labor camps that were established at several locations around the island. A large majority of BPM’s work was undertaken on Guam. Projects there included the construction of a wide range of permanent military facilities as well as the reconstruction of Guam’s civilian infrastructure that had been devastated by the war.

In late 1955, BPM dispatched 500 workers to Saipan to start the “NTTU Rehabilitation Program.”¹⁸⁹ The work was overseen by J. Russell Marshall who served as BPM’s project manager. BPM established its base camp in a complex of 83 World War II-era Quonset Huts at Fanaganan, an area adjacent to the prewar town of Garapan. To ensure security, the camp was surrounded by a fence that restricted access to BPM workers. The camp maintained segregated facilities for its Filipino and American employees. Design work for the project was most likely completed by Pacific Island Engineers (PIE) which was made up of three firms: Frederick R. Harris, Blanchard and Maher, and Keller and Gannon.¹⁹⁰ PIE’s



Figure 36. The BPM compound at Fanaganan (center left) as viewed from Mt. Tapochau in 1956.

designs featured typhoon and earthquake resistant buildings of pre-cast concrete that had large, louvered windows to allow for maximum natural ventilation.¹⁹¹ Reportedly, the complex was designed so that it would not be visible from the sea.¹⁹²

The main component of this project was the construction of a complex of buildings on Army Hill to serve as NTTU's new administrative and residential center. BPM's first task was to demolish dozens of World War II-era Army buildings that covered the project site. This was followed by earthwork and the installation of water and sewer lines. A new asphalt-topped road system, complete with concrete curbing and drainage, was also built.

Once preliminary site work was completed, building construction commenced. The complex included a two-story administrative headquarters, a residence for the chief of station, 91 residential units for married junior and senior officers, an apartment for bachelor officers, a ten-bed dispensary, a community building (that housed a post office, library, kindergarten, and barber shop), two warehouses, and a gas station/motor pool compound.¹⁹³ The area containing the administration building, warehouses, and gas station/motor pool was protected by a chain link security fence nine feet in height (2.74 meters) topped with three strands of barbed wire.



Figure 37. Residential units under construction on the 1200 block in 1956. Note crane used to erect precast sections.



Figure 38. A view of newly completed residential units on the 1200 block. Power lines have not yet been strung. Also visible in background is the administration building, warehouses, and motor pool.



Figure 39. The mess/club building shortly after completion. It is situated on a lot formerly occupied by the WPBC commanding officer's residence. Residential units in the 1300 block are visible in the background.



Figure 40. A view of the two-building Community Center in 1960.

As this complex was to serve as a self-contained living area for NTTU personnel and their families, it also included recreational facilities consisting of a gymnasium (which also served as an auditorium, movie theater and snack bar), a spacious club and restaurant built on the hilltop that was previously occupied by General Sanderford Jarman's residence. The precast sections of these various buildings were fabricated on Guam and shipped to Saipan by barge.¹⁹⁴ Concrete sections were then erected with the aid of cranes and foundation slabs poured.

BPM also completed facilities at NTTU's training sites in Marpi and Kagman. Each discrete training site included a training building (that also served as the trainer's residence and communal dining room), a one-story trainee bunkhouse, and a toilet/shower building, together with associated utilities and communications.¹⁹⁵ The training and toilet/shower buildings were made of precast concrete. The bunkhouse had a slab on grade concrete foundation and walls and roof of wood and corrugated metal. These three-building complexes were situated some distance from each other to ensure operational security among training groups.



Figure 41. A training compound in Kagman in 1963. The training building is at right, the toilet/shower at left, and the bunkhouse is in the background. At the time of the photograph, the compound served as a TTPI employee residence.




Figure 42. A map showing NTTU training facilities in Marpi, circa 1960.




Figure 43. A map showing NTTU training facilities in Kagman, circa 1960.



Figure 44. Aerial view of northeastern Marpi in 1956.



Figure 45. Aerial view of Kagman in 1956. Note operational airfield and training compounds to the north. NTTU sites have been obscured.

The NTTU Project, which ran for 16 months, was completed in March 1957. The planned move of personnel to their new residential quarters on Army Hill was completed days earlier than originally planned when a typhoon threatened to inundate their existing residences at Puntan Flores.¹⁹⁶ As the storm neared, they were awakened in the middle of the night, given keys, and ordered to proceed to the safety of their new concrete residences. The former housing area at Puntan Flores was abandoned, but offices, warehouses, and shops there remained in operation. After the move, NTTU personnel referred to this area as “Old Base” or “Lower Base.”¹⁹⁷ The latter term eventually prevailed and became the area’s place name, a designation that is still used today.

Nearly 800 BPM workers, including both U.S. and Filipino personnel, departed Saipan at this time. Interestingly, the author found only one person who clearly remembered these employees who lived and worked on Saipan for eighteen months.¹⁹⁸ It might be assumed that the presence of a sizable group of foreign workers living in a small, close knit island community would have stood out. This lack of memory undoubtedly resulted from the circumstances under which BPM employees were required to live and work.

The men resided in a fenced camp which formed a self-contained community possessing its own administrative organization, including a police force and clergy.¹⁹⁹ BPM employees worked six days a week. They were bused to their work sites early in the morning and transported back to the camp at the end of the day. Their very limited interactions with the local community came during brief weekly shopping trips to five authorized stores in Chalan Kanoa Village during which they were accompanied by BPM officials, and at informal baseball games that reportedly were held on a public diamond located just to the west of the BPM compound.²⁰⁰ Hours were long and discipline strict.

A glimpse of the harsh realities of camp life is revealed in two newspaper articles that ran in the *Guam Daily News* in 1956.²⁰¹ The first article describes the alleged mistreatment of a BPM worker at the hands of the Saipan Constabulary in May. According to the article, Luis D. Misa, a camp policeman, was arrested by the Insular Constabulary in Chalan Kanoa Village after he missed the shuttle bus back to camp. A BPM official noted that the company prohibited Filipinos from going to the “villages unless they were escorted and only as far as the shopping center.”²⁰² Misa spent three days in jail before he was claimed by camp officials. He was then sent to Guam for repatriation to the Philippines reportedly at the insistence of the Navy. While on Guam, Misa brought his situation to the attention of Philippine Consul B. A. Umayam who subsequently filed an official protest with Navy officials. Although a




Figure 46. An early site map of the NTTU complex dated July 1955. Minor changes would be made including relocating the warehouses southward and rerouting the entry road to the chief of station's residence



Figure 47. BPM employees on a rare day of leisure outside Mt. Carmel Church in Chalan Kanoa.



Figure 48. Saipan Style Center in Susupe circa 1956. It was one of the few retail establishments BPM employees were authorized to visit during chaperoned shopping trips.

thorough investigation was completed, the newspaper ran no follow up stories on the incident, thanks to pressure brought to bear by COMNAVMAR on Guam.²⁰³

A second article reported on the ouster of the camp's Catholic priest, Father Generoso Taguian a few months later.²⁰⁴ According to unnamed sources, Taguian and four other BPM employees sought permission to celebrate Quezon Day, then a national holiday in the Philippines, with a picnic outside the camp. When their request was denied by BPM officials, the men sought to celebrate inside the camp. According to Taguian, BPM then accused the men of instigating a strike, an action for which they were to be returned to the Philippines. BPM denied that the men were terminated over the holiday. According to company officials, the priest left on his own volition while the other men were being terminated for breaking company regulations. All five men were returned to the Philippines shortly thereafter.

These articles, which surprisingly escaped naval censorship, describe a typical "company town" environment in which employees were expected to work hard, follow the rules, and keep quiet. Any confrontation with BPM officials would surely result in immediate termination and a one-way ticket home. Working conditions were undoubtedly made more difficult by the "strict government supervision" under which BPM reportedly operated.²⁰⁵

With the completion of the Army Hill complex, NTTU personnel and their families now resided in "a modern town which could shame many better-class U.S. suburbs."²⁰⁶ According to an eye-witness, the complex was

"up-to-date in every respect, [houses] lined lighted, landscaped streets with wide, park-like areas separating each cluster of buildings. Near the town's center, we passed a complex which included a library, soda fountain-snack bar, barber shop and theater-auditorium. The permanent concrete structures surrounded a large parking lot simulating contemporary shopping districts to the extent of marked exits, entrances and parking stalls. Carefully tended lawns circled each home with precisely spaced palm trees bordering connecting sidewalks. Though louvered windows of the house I could see attractively decorated living rooms and kitchens with the latest appliances. New automobiles were parked in carports and driveways. Women's, children's along with men's clothing hung on lines behind garages."²⁰⁷

NTTU's recreational heart was a spacious restaurant and bar/nightclub (known as Club Toppa Tappi) situated on a hilltop which overlooked the complex:

“It was immense. It was a night club and restaurant belonging on the outskirts of Las Vegas. A sixty-foot canopy decorated with colored lights stretched from street to entrance. Large glass and steel double doors opened into a spacious lounge. Two cocktail bars, stocked with every brand and kind of liquor, were at either end of a commodious dance floor which also featured a bandstand equipped with microphone and spotlights. To the left of the main entrance was a huge dining room with sliding partitions which could be used to divide the area for meetings and other activities. A good part of the sprawling complex was provided with picture windows and sliding glass doors which looked upon a beautifully landscaped patio and afforded a fabulous view of the island's western shore and the sea beyond. The club obviously was designed to remove most of the pain from even a prolonged stay on Saipan.”²⁰⁸

The residents of the STS enjoyed free housing and utilities and access to repair and maintenance services whenever they were required. The pace of living was relaxed and clothing, typically consisting of shorts, tee-shirts and rubber sandals, was casual. As Saipan was considered a hardship post, NTTU personnel received a 30 percent salary bonus.²⁰⁹ Life was made easier by local housekeepers who were bussed to Army Hill each day to cook, clean and care for children.²¹⁰ The monotony of small island life was broken by regular shopping trips to the commissary and exchange on Guam via government transport, either by air or aboard NTTU's ship the *Four Winds*, weekend outings at Micro Beach which was exclusively reserved for NTTU use, deep sea fishing trips on the NTTU picket boat, frequent rounds of golf at the island's nine-hole course, and yearly trips to Japan and Hong Kong.²¹¹ For daily recreation, residents could play basketball, tennis or badminton on a cluster of courts near the Community Center while their children entertained themselves at an adjacent playground.

There were, however, drawbacks to living and working on a small island in forced isolation from the larger community. One NTTU chief of station referred to it as

“ . . . incestuous living. In some sense it is like prison life. The inhabitants work, play, eat and sleep together, figuratively. Minor disagreements in the office or between spouses are exacerbated by the limited opportunities to get away from each other, and heated by gossip and



Figure 49. NTTU personnel and family members enjoying an evening at Club Toppa Tappi, circa 1959.



Figure 50. A view of the lounge area of Club Toppa Tappi in 1960.



Figure 51. NTTU personnel after a fishing trip, 1960. From left, chief of station Spencer Taggart, Sam Currie, Norman Larum, Jim Whitt and Don Brennan.



Figure 52. Families enjoying a day at Micro Beach which was reserved for NTTU use, circa 1960.



Figure 53. MV *Four Winds*, the NTTU ship that carried cargo and passengers between Guam and Saipan.



Figure 54. NTTU dependents arriving at Saipan aboard Southern Air Transport, a CIA proprietary airline, circa 1961. NTTU called its regular Thursday service to Saipan the “November Flight.”



Figure 55. NTTU personnel and local caddies at Whispering Palms golf course, circa 1959.



Figure 56. NTTU parents enjoy a student performance at the gym/auditorium.
This venue also served as a movie theater and indoor basketball court.




Figure 57. The BOQ building in 1961 at which time the lower floor served as the dependents school.



Figure 58. A teacher standing in front of the dependents school, 1961. At this time, all teachers were the wives of NTTU personnel. The school was named in honor of Harold C. Agerholm, USMC.

the development of factions. I spend a good part of my time adjudicating or resolving such friction, many so petty that they should not have been considered.”²¹²

This friction was undoubtedly exacerbated by alcohol which according to several former NTTU staff and family members, was regularly consumed in considerable quantities at Club Toppa Tappi, the STS’ preferred watering hole, and at frequent beach outings.²¹³

Secure within their comfortable, modern enclave, NTTU employees and their families were at the top of a three-tiered socio-economic structure. Below them were the officers and men of NAVAD who were responsible for running the local government. While they received decent pay and the normal perks associated with military service, NAVAD personnel lived and worked in World War II-era Quonset Huts and carried out their administrative responsibilities with modest annual budgets. At the bottom of the economic pyramid was the indigenous community residing in homes, largely fashioned from salvaged materials, and supported by family members who were able to land low-paying government and private sector jobs. Most of those who did find wage work were employed by NTTU in a variety of capacities including security personnel, messengers, office and construction workers, craftsmen, lifeguards, and vehicle operators.²¹⁴

According to a contemporary government source, by the late 1950s the STS’ previous focus on paramilitary training was waning and its services were expanded

“to fulfill a variety of training requirements including intelligence tradecraft, communications, counter-intelligence and psychological warfare techniques. Training is performed in support of CIA activities conducted throughout the Far East area.”²¹⁵

As in previous years, trainees arrived by air usually in the dead of night at East Field, a World War II-era fighter strip situated at Kagman on the eastern side of the island.²¹⁶ Since the field had no lights, NTTU security crews placed flare pots along both sides of the runway to guide incoming aircraft.²¹⁷ Once on Saipan, trainees were blindfolded, loaded into covered trucks, and transported to the self-contained training facilities in Marpi and Kagman, both of which were capable of accommodating 50 to 75 individuals. These areas were fenced off and protected by roaming security personnel. They contained “numerous segregated compounds where groups of trainees from various nations could spend several months in isolation.”²¹⁸ According to one CIA staff agent assigned to the STS in the mid-

to late 1950s, training facilities included “a European-type fortified border, firing ranges, Asiatic-type villages, demolition range, observation posts on top of the cliffs, old Japanese bunkers and command posts, and a restricted airfield.”²¹⁹

A case officer noted that CIA personnel, “did not even let two classes from the same country know one another.”²²⁰ In some cases, classes consisted of only one or two individuals. “There were no standard lessons. Each cycle was custom tailored.”²²¹ Trainees came from several countries including China, Korea, Laos, Cambodia, the Philippines, and Vietnam, among others. According to one source, a Thai class had been trained as frogmen and a group of Vietnamese had been “preened to form their own version of the CIA.”²²² Another group from Indonesia received training to destabilize the Sukarno government under an operation code named HAIK.²²³ By this time, NTTU personnel also provided off-island training to individuals and groups at CIA stations throughout the Far East region.

Virtually in every case, primary source documents relating to these various operations are still classified and few details about them are known. A notable exception is a training program developed for Tibetan agents who were to serve as the CIA’s “eyes and ears” in their home country.²²⁴ This operation was originally proposed by Gyalo Thondup, a brother of Tibet’s supreme spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama, following the Chinese invasion in 1950. His appeal for assistance was subsequently rejected by government officials in Washington who viewed Tibetan resistance as being too weak to effectively confront the Chinese.

This assessment was to change in the summer of 1956 after Communist troops destroyed an ancient Buddhist monastery at Litang, an act that united Tibetan resistance against the Chinese occupation. A few months later, in December 1956, Thondup met with CIA officials to again appeal for U.S. support. By this time, the CIA had come to the realization that its ongoing operations against China had failed in “sparking a coordinated anti-communist resistance movement.”²²⁵ Tibet promised to be different, and the CIA agreed to train a special six-man team that would be responsible putting together “a current and accurate picture of the resistance” in their homeland.²²⁶ Once this report was in hand, the CIA would determine what support would be needed to develop and sustain an effective Tibetan resistance movement. This initial group would also be responsible for training new recruits to serve as anti-communist guerrilla fighters.

The six men subsequently chosen for this mission – Anthar, Wangdu, Lhoste, Tsewang, Dedrup and Dreshe – were smuggled out of Tibet by way of Pakistan in December 1956. After a medical exam in Okinawa, the men were flown to Saipan on a CAT aircraft. At Saipan, they were met by Roger McCarthy who headed the Tibet operation which went by the code name STCIRCUS. McCarthy, a gregarious 30-year-old, had joined the CIA in 1952 as a communications specialist with Western Enterprises.²²⁷

Promoted to case officer, McCarthy had arrived on Saipan in 1956 and had “just completed a paramilitary training cycle for six members of the Lao intelligence service prior to the arrival of the Tibetans.”²²⁸

McCarthy noted the challenges confronting the trainees:

“Oh, the changes they were experiencing were unbelievable. We’re talking about Tibet, a country where the average altitude is fourteen thousand feet, as opposed to Saipan, an island a few feet above sea level. From cold and dry - Tibet - to hot and humid - Saipan. And unfortunately, the only thing we could provide for their comfort was electric fans in their small dorms. The heat of the day alone was a huge adjustment for them, as was the heavy training schedule they had. But they were incredibly adaptable men.”²²⁹

Due to their complex mission, the trainees were required to learn not only communications and reporting skills but also guerrilla warfare techniques and tradecraft. Under normal circumstances, such a training course would require a full year, but the Saipan Station was advised that it must be completed within four months.²³⁰ This task was made more challenging by the trainees’ lack of formal education and their very rudimentary skills in reading and writing.

To meet the deadline, the CIA assembled three separate training teams each responsible for a specific skill set. One focused on espionage tactics, another on Morse code and the use of the RRS-1 shortwave radio, and a third covered the basics of guerrilla warfare and paramilitary operations.²³¹ Training was facilitated by two Tibetans, Thubten Norbu and Jentzen Thondup, who served as translators. Thubten, the eldest brother of the Dalai Lama and an important religious figure in his own right, had fled Tibet in 1950 to avoid arrest by Chinese officials. Jentzen Thondup was Thubten’s long-time personal servant. At the start of training, the Tibetans were given Americanized names. Wangdu became Walt,

Tsewang was called Sam and Lhotse was called Lou. For reasons of security, trainers were known to the Tibetans by only their first names. McCarthy was Mr. Roger.

With the start of training, it became clear that the Tibetans were unfamiliar with certain essential concepts such as the twenty-four-hour clock or how to accurately quantify distances and numbers, and CIA instructors found it necessary to augment classroom work with practical field demonstrations. In order to clarify construction of ground signals for aerial resupply, for example, trainers assembled scaffolding atop the island's northern cliffs. Below, firepots were arranged on the beach so the Tibetans could visualize how they would appear from the air."²³²

A more serious problem came to light during radio training. The men only possessed rudimentary reading and writing skills in their native tongue and there was concern that additional language training would be necessary to allow them to transmit coherent radio messages. This challenge was addressed by the recruitment of Geshe Nagawang Wangyal, a Mongolian Buddhist monk and Tibetan language expert, who agreed to travel to Saipan to assist with language training.²³³ Wangyal and Norbu also oversaw the development of "a special vocabulary to describe things not in the Tibetan language. In this way, both the Tibetans and the CIA could understand the messages."²³⁴

During their stay on Saipan, which they called Dursa or "Island of the Dead," the Tibetans were rarely allowed to leave their isolated corner of the training base which included a single classroom and sleeping quarters.²³⁵ For security reasons, no cooks or cleaning crews were permitted on site and, as a result, these mundane chores were assigned to the men. While the six trainees readily assumed this responsibility, it did not sit well with Norbu who, as an incarnate and brother of the Dalai Lama, was accustomed to servants and deferential treatment. At one point, he refused to eat his meals because they were the same as those served to the men, but he later grudgingly agreed to cooperate when it was explained to him that his action might adversely affect training.²³⁶ Another crisis arose when Lhotse came down with a bad case of dysentery. By chance, his illness coincided with a visit by CIA director Allen Dulles who was on a tour of Agency facilities in the Far East. Reportedly, Dulles' personal physician, who accompanied the director on his trip, administered a new drug which quickly had Lhotse back on his feet.²³⁷

Following the completion of training in mid-September, plans were made to get the team back into Tibet via covert air drops. This phase of the mission which was code-named STBARNUM, included




Figure 59. CIA staff officer Roger McCarthy on Saipan, 1957.




Figure 60. Wangdu Gyatotsang, left, leader of the Saipan-trained Tibetan team and Geshe Wangyal, the CIA's Mongolian translator.



Figure 61. STCIRCUS demolition training the in the Marpi area, 1957.



Figure 62. A NTTU staff officer poses with a bazooka during STCIRCUS weapons training, 1957.

parachute training in Okinawa during which the team learned to use specially modified chutes and rigging.²³⁸ CIA officials also identified two landing zones in Tibet where the men would be dropped. The first insertion mission, launched from East Pakistan, was successfully carried out in October utilizing an unmarked B-17 manned by a Polish crew.²³⁹ The two men landed safely and established contact with local resistance groups. A second insertion mission was completed in similar fashion at another drop site a few weeks later. The CIA now had their “eyes and ears” in Tibet. Although the program was to run for several more years, the Agency decided to train future Tibetan agents at Camp Hale in Colorado which was “more similar to their home environment than the tropical climates of Saipan.”²⁴⁰

In September 1957, TTPI high commissioner Delmas H. Nucker met with DOI secretary Fred Seaton to propose that Rota be transferred back to naval control given the difficulties the TTPI had experienced administering the island over the past four years. Nucker summarized his thoughts on the matter to Interior officials in the following fashion:

“An analysis of the background [information] favors the reabsorption of Rota into the Northern Marianas unit. Here Rota definitely belongs from a cultural, a linguistic, an economic, and a geographical view. From a standpoint of family ties and social identity, the Rotanese consider themselves one of the Northern Marianas people. There is no question also that the transfer back to the Saipan District would relieve us of a perennial logistic and administrative problem whose difficulties increase rather than decrease with time.”²⁴¹

The following month, Interior informally raised this possibility in a letter to rear admiral William B. Ammon of COMNAVMAR. Ammon in turn advised the CNO that he had no objection to the transfer provided sufficient personnel, funding and equipment were made available to his command.²⁴² COMNAVMAR was ordered to prepare an estimate of funds and personnel needed for this purpose and to investigate its desirability from an administrative, military, and logistical standpoint. He was also tasked with determining the wishes of the Rota community regarding this possible administrative change.

COMNAVMAR’s staff estimated that administering Rota would require five naval personnel and 45 local employees supported by an annual budget of \$80,000.²⁴³ A discussion with the Bureau of Ships raised the possibility of using Rota as a site for VLF (very low frequency) communications in the

Western Pacific, although the deployment of this new technology was not imminent. The proposal, via the high commissioner, was also presented to the Rota Council whose members subsequently voted unanimously to be integrated with the Saipan District “irrespective of whether administered by the Navy or Interior.”²⁴⁴

In April 1958, Seaton formally raised this matter with his naval counterpart Thomas Gates in a letter that justified the transfer as necessary for facilitating the economic and political development of Rota. The CNO considered the pros and cons of assuming responsibility for an island that it correctly viewed as a “high-cost administrative headache” for DOI.²⁴⁵ Noting that while the transfer would have some minor benefits for the Rota community, it concluded that the cost of assuming this responsibility would come at the expense of higher priority naval operating forces. In line with this analysis, acting DON secretary William B. Franke advised Seaton on 3 May that while Rota’s reunification with the Saipan District had “certain desirable features,” associated disadvantages to the Navy and the U.S. government as a whole made the transfer undesirable at that time. He suggested that appropriate DON and DOI staff jointly revisit this proposal on an annual basis.²⁴⁶

Fifteen months later, in October 1959, Seaton again wrote to Franke regarding this matter. He noted that during a recent meeting, members of the Trusteeship Council expressed to him their desire to see Rota reintegrated into the Saipan District.²⁴⁷ They also made known their hope that the U.S. would eventually return the district to civilian rule. Consistent with the Council’s wishes and the justifications outlined in his April 1958 letter, Seaton requested the Navy to either assume responsibility for administering Rota or to return the Saipan District to Interior control.

Seaton’s request was quickly considered by CNO, CINCPACFLT, and COMNAVMAR. While assuming administrative responsibility for Rota remained a nonstarter, it was the consensus view that transferring the Saipan District to Interior was an attractive possibility that would relieve the Navy of a costly administrative burden.²⁴⁸ Once transferred, the annual appropriations for NAVAD could be redirected to support other higher priority naval operations in the region.

During initial consultations on this matter between the CNO and CIA in December, the latter posed no objection to the transfer but expressed its desire for the Navy to continue providing existing support services to NTTU including communications, commissary and naval exchange functions, the dependents school, and post office.²⁴⁹ The CNO objected given that such an arrangement would result

in little savings to the Navy, although it offered to provide certain services to NTTU in emergency situations. The CIA subsequently dropped this request and agreed to continue NTTU operations under Interior's administration and logistical support. Agency acquiescence on this matter may have resulted from an internal recommendation made earlier that year to close the STS due to a declining demand for its services and the high cost of its operations and maintenance.²⁵⁰

With necessary CIA approval in hand, Navy undersecretary Fred Bantz replied to Seaton in a letter dated 17 December in which he advised the secretary that his department was prepared to transfer administrative responsibility for the Saipan District. He recommended that transfer details be worked out by staff members of their respective departments at the "earliest practicable time."²⁵¹ Seaton was further advised that Rear Admiral Glenn R. Donaho, vice chief of CNO, would serve as the Navy's point of contact for this matter. Inter-command memos indicated that the Navy intended to implement the transfer by 1 October 1960.

Bantz' letter was received with surprise and consternation by DOI officials, particularly those in the Office of Territories. The Office's deputy director, William Yeomans, telephoned CNO staffer Captain L. Gordon Findley on 29 December and advised him that the transfer of the Saipan District to Interior was not what was intended by Seaton's letter. Rather, it was a "play on words" to force DON to accept responsibility for Rota.²⁵² Was the Navy seriously proposing to proceed with the transfer, he asked? Findley, who had been involved with the administration of Saipan since its capture during World War II, advised Yeoman that the DON was indeed serious and that after Interior had obtained a new executive order and worked out other necessary details, the Navy would "decommission its station on Saipan, haul down the flag, turn over the keys, and leave bag and baggage."²⁵³ Findley personally reported the gist of this conversation to Donaho that same day.

With its bluff called, Interior agreed to consult with Donaho on the matter. During a meeting with CNO staff on 11 January, high commissioner Nucker voiced his "concern and reluctance" regarding the prospect of the TTPI assuming this responsibility. He reiterated Yeomans' confession that Seaton's letter was intended to force the DON to take over Rota but that it had "backfired."²⁵⁴ Nucker was provided a short briefing on matters pertaining to NTTU and advised that DON desired to complete the transfer no later than 1 October 1960. Later that month, Office of Territories' director Anthony Lausi advised the CNO that Yeomans and Henry Surles of his staff would serve as the liaison officers for the proposed transfer noting that both had Top Secret clearance.

On 23 February 1960, high commissioner Nucker travelled to Saipan in the company of Admiral Waldemar F.A. Wendt, COMNAVMAR and Captain Findley for the purpose of meeting with local leaders and inspecting NTTU's facilities.²⁵⁵ The first item of business was a courtesy meeting with members of the Saipan Legislature, Mayor Ignacio V. Benavente, and seven district commissioners. Recent rumors of an impending administrative transfer had caused concern and anxiety among Chamorros and Carolinians regarding the impact such an action would have on the community.²⁵⁶

Both Nucker and Wendt reassured Saipan's leadership that no final decision had been made regarding the transfer, stressing that the ongoing discussions between DON and DOI were amicable and that the people of Saipan would be kept abreast of developments. A majority of local leaders present expressed their desire to have the Navy continue administering the district, as they feared that a return to Interior rule would be detrimental to the local economy. One dissenting opinion was offered by legislative member Antonio A. Diaz who expressed his concern regarding Saipan's poor economic situation, noting that "a military unit [was] not equipped to run [a] civilian population."²⁵⁷



Figure 63. Saipan's leaders in the 1950s and early 60s wrestled with complex issues arising from the STS.

Also discussed was a local initiative, supported by most of the district's Chamorro majority, to integrate the Saipan District with Guam, a possibility that was troubling to both the Navy and CIA from a

security standpoint. This topic was the talk of the island and largely popular, but opposed by Chamorro businessmen wary of competing with their larger Guam counterparts and members of the Carolinian community who were fearful of becoming an even smaller minority.²⁵⁸ These divisions were also present within the legislature although several lawmakers and the mayor expressed their desire to join Guam as soon as possible. Both Wendt and Nucker emphasized that such a move would require substantial evaluation and approval of the UN before any action could be considered.

Following this two-hour meeting, Nucker, Wendt and Findley travelled to Army Hill where they were given a tour of the NTTU complex by deputy chief of station, Walter Kuzmuk. A summary of the tour was recorded by Findley:

“Ninety-one 3-bedroom houses, an administration building containing 40 offices and several large conference rooms, a post office, recreation area, library, 8-bed dispensary, large mess, motor pool, warehouses, emergency standby power plant, one-million-gallon water storage tank, telephone exchange, and club. At present there are 88 U.S. employees on Army Hill plus their dependents, 345 Saipanese are on the payroll, in addition to about 60 maids (personally employed), for a total of approximately 500 in all. The average annual wage was reported to be \$1,250.00, making a yearly native payroll of about half a million dollars.”²⁵⁹

The group also toured NTTU facilities at Lower Base. During discussions that followed the onsite inspections, Nucker was briefed on the cost of maintaining the Army Hill complex, Lower Base and the training facilities in Marpi and Kagman. This information was summarized as follows:

	Army Hill	Lower Base	Marpi/Kagman
Building/Grounds Maintenance	\$167,000	\$26,000	\$62,500
Electrical Power	41,100	25,640	8,260
Maintenance and Operations	4,920	3,072	996
Telephone	1,349	154	91
Water	6,190	2,680	211
Road Maintenance	202	601	4,327
Fire and Security Trails	800	337	1,935
Total	\$221,561	\$58,404	\$78,320* ²⁶⁰

Nucker and Wendt returned to their respective offices on Guam that same afternoon while Findley spent the next four days in Saipan and Tinian where he met with NAVAD staff and local officials and visited public facilities. After returning to Guam, Findley accepted Nucker's invitation to accompany the high commissioner on a four-day visit to Chuuk, Pohnpei, and the Marshalls to observe TTPI operations in these districts. During this trip, Nucker related to Findley that

“he had advised the DOI that his organization was not geared to handle the responsibilities on Saipan should Army Hill [i.e. NTTU] remain activated. On the other hand, should a move be in the offing, his budget would have to be increased by at least \$300,000 annually if his organization was to occupy the buildings and utilize the area. He indicated that he had no desire to leave Guam and absorb such large housekeeping responsibilities. Mr. Nucker inferred that he more or less blamed himself for getting Interior into this predicament of assuming responsibility of the Saipan District. He had relied on information given to him by the former COMNAVMAR which was that the Navy would never give up the administration of Saipan District so that pressure could be placed on the Navy to take over the administration of Rota.”²⁶¹

The high commissioner's trip reinforced Interior's prevailing view that it was unprepared to assume responsibility for the Saipan District. Its position was reiterated to Navy officials during a series of informal telephone discussions between Findley and Office of Territories director Lausi over the ensuing four months. By June, it was DON's understanding that Interior had indefinitely tabled its transfer request.²⁶² No further action was taken on this matter for over a year until a new administration in Washington and increasing UN criticism forced it back to the front burner.

In June of 1960, NTTU's normal routine was interrupted by the arrival of Fred Goerner, an aggressive radio journalist from California who came to Saipan to investigate the disappearance of the famous American flyer Amelia Earhart.²⁶³ Goerner became suspicious when he learned that Saipan was under military control and that his visit required the approval of naval officials in both Washington and Guam. His affiliation with CBS made it difficult for the Navy to block his trip and he was ultimately granted permission. Upon arrival on Saipan, he was advised by the head of NAVAD, Commander Paul Bridwell, that he must not visit the north and east sections of the island.

Goerner elected to stay in Chalan Kanoa Village to be close to his principal local guide and informant, Jose Matsumoto. His interviews with local residents, to collect eyewitness accounts to corroborate the



Figure 64. Fred Goerner, middle, with Juan G. Reyes, Josefa R. Sablan, Msgr. Oscar Calvo and Fr. Arnold, 1960.

story that Amelia Earhart had been held on Saipan in the 1930s, were facilitated by Catholic priests including Fathers Arnold and Sylvan. Over the course of his stay, Goerner was told other more contemporary stories that aroused his journalistic interest:

“The word ‘Chinese’ was not entirely new to me on Saipan. I had heard it several times from natives we had questioned. They had talked of having seen Chinese soldiers in the jungle on the north end and east side of the island, the areas I had been told I could not visit. Other natives had seen Chinese being transported by bus from a landing field on Saipan’s east coast. The letters NTTU had been frequently voiced, and finally I heard from someone what that meant: Naval Technical Training Units [sic]. I had also seen a number of Americans, not a part of the Naval Administration group, shopping in the Navy Commissary. These people had to be living in my no-man’s-land on the island.”²⁶⁴

After returning to the states, Goerner pursued various leads relating to the Earhart story and also made inquiries regarding the mysterious operations underway on Saipan. Thanks to some highly placed sources, Goerner learned that Saipan had been returned to naval rule in 1953 and that shortly thereafter a 30 million dollar contract had been awarded to the Brown-Pacific-Maxon Company for construction of “five or more major facilities on Saipan.”²⁶⁵ Goerner managed to track down a former BPM security officer who had spent twenty months on Saipan beginning in 1955, and was told that the firm had built permanent, concrete buildings, some with foundations 25 feet (7.6 m) deep, using hundreds of laborers from the Philippines.²⁶⁶

While Goerner was pursuing leads, his employers at CBS were following up with Navy officials regarding his request to visit Saipan for a second time. After learning that his security clearance had been denied, CBS appealed saying that “it seemed extraordinary that a newsman cannot visit a UN Trust Territory, particularly when the governing authority is his own nation.”²⁶⁷ It took a personal appeal from CBS vice president, Ted Coop, to top officials at the Defense Department to get this decision overturned, thus paving the way for Goerner’s return to Saipan in September 1961.

Not long after Goerner had settled into his quarters on Navy Hill, he reportedly received a call from Robert J. Schmitz, NTTU’s new chief of station who had arrived on Saipan earlier that year to replace Spencer L. Taggart.²⁶⁸ Schmitz invited him for cocktails and conversation in a section of the island that Goerner had not been permitted to visit previously.²⁶⁹ Goerner was driven up Army Hill in a NTTU car where he was shocked to encounter a modern town situated on a hill with a breathtaking view of the harbor and lagoon. He was taken to NTTU’s spacious club/restaurant where he met Schmitz who in Goerner’s opinion gave the appearance of a “middle-aged commando, used to giving orders and receiving total obedience.”²⁷⁰

When asked what he knew of NTTU, Goerner said that he thought it was a front for a CIA program to train Nationalist Chinese guerrillas. Schmitz refused to confirm Goerner’s suspicion and asked for his promise not to report on NTTU’s operations until being authorized to do so. Goerner was subsequently briefed by a CIA officer in California who promised to allow him to be the first to break the Saipan story at the appropriate time.

When the promised authorization failed to materialize, Goerner wrote an article about his Saipan adventures that appeared in the January 1964 edition of *Argosy*, a popular men’s magazine. In addition

to his search for Earhart, Goerner also provided details about NTTU and identified Schmitz by name. Caught off guard, Schmitz, who by this time was stationed at Camp Peary, ordered a staff member to buy all of the available copies of *Argosy* in the Washington, D.C. area.²⁷¹ Two years later, Goerner sent Schmitz a personally inscribed copy of his book *The Search for Ameila Earhart*, a courtesy that obliged Schmitz to explain his relationship with the author to the CIA's security staff.²⁷²

Provisional Capital of the TTPI

Goerner's second trip to Saipan occurred eight months after the inauguration of President John F. Kennedy whose narrow victory over Richard Nixon ended eight years of Republican rule. On the eve of his inauguration on 21 January 1961, Kennedy was briefed by outgoing President Eisenhower on a range of national security issues including covert operations. Although CIA operations in the Far East were discussed, much of the briefing focused on a daring operation, code named JMARC, to overthrow Cuba's Communist leader Fidel Castro.

JMARC called for an amphibious landing of anti-communist Cubans along the island's southern coast. These men, with the support of covert American airpower, were to fight their way inland and then lead a popular uprising intended to topple the Communist government. The STS was identified as a backup site for training JMARC guerrillas but it is unclear if it was used for this purpose.²⁷³ The subsequent "Bay of Pigs" invasion launched in April 1961 turned into a complete fiasco. The 1500-man invading force, deprived of promised air and naval support, was quickly crushed by communist Cuban forces loyal to Castro. President Kennedy was furious with this embarrassing failure and reportedly vowed to "splinter the CIA into a thousand pieces and scatter it into the winds."²⁷⁴

Another challenge confronting the new Kennedy administration was the current state of the TTPI. While seven of the original eleven UN trusteeships had ended, little progress had been made in the TTPI thanks to tiny operational budgets and administrators who were reluctant to change Micronesia's traditional subsistence economy. Adding to this situation was the STS which had been in operation for over a decade. These and other issues were formally noted by a UN Visiting Mission that traveled through Micronesia in February and March of 1961.²⁷⁵

In its official report to the UN Trusteeship Council, the four-member Mission identified a number of problems that it believed were inhibiting progress including an administration split between Navy and




Figure 65. Members of the 1961 UN Visiting Mission in New York prior to their departure to the TTPI. From left, Jean Adriaenssen (Belgium), Geoffrey Caston (United Kingdom), Maharajakrishna Rasgotca (India), and chairman Carlos Salamanca (Bolivia).

Interior, a lack of economic development, insufficient funding for education, and the absence of a territory-wide legislature. The mission was also concerned that the TTPI's administrative headquarters was located on Guam rather than within the territory itself.²⁷⁶

Perhaps the most serious issue raised by the mission was a growing separatist movement on Saipan as evidenced by local legislative resolutions calling for the future annexation of the Saipan District to the United States.²⁷⁷ It was the Mission's position that this movement was being fueled by the separate administration of the district:

“The fact that the United States Government is putting into Saipan, which is already better off comparatively, more money than into other districts and its budget is separate from that of the rest of the Territory. Examples of the consequences of this are: employees of the Administration of Saipan are better paid; schools in Saipan have better facilities and qualified teachers; [and] it has better roads. While the Mission notes these things with satisfaction, it wishes to point out that such financial discrimination can have the result of future encouraging Saipan's feeling of separateness from the rest of the Trust Territory.”²⁷⁸

Of course, the principal source of the prosperity enjoyed on Saipan was the STS. In 1960, for example, nearly 400 Saipanese were employed by NTTU, roughly ten percent of the adult population. Their annual salaries totaling roughly \$500,000 (equivalent to approximately \$5,275,000 today), permitted a standard of living that was impossible to duplicate in any other district of the TTPI.²⁷⁹

To remedy this situation, the Mission recommended that the U.S. consider “placing the Saipan District, together perhaps with Rota, under the authority of the High Commissioner” so that a common administrative policy might be applied to all parts of the TTPI.²⁸⁰ The mission also recommended that the headquarters of the TTPI be moved from Guam, where it had been since 1954, to a location within the territory. The Mission believed that such a move was an “important step towards creating in the Territory a feeling of national unity and identity which would assist substantially in the achievement of the Trusteeship Agreement.”²⁸¹ The Mission’s critical report, which was submitted to the Trusteeship Council in May, provided ammunition to the Soviets in their propaganda battle with the United States. It also exposed the U.S. to accusations of colonialism by a growing number of newly established countries.

While this report was largely dismissed by DOI which held the UN in low esteem, State Department officials believed that the Mission’s criticisms were generally valid and that a new policy for the Trust Territory was in order. The President, who had a personal interest in the Pacific that dated back to his wartime experience in the Solomon Islands, agreed, although he was cautioned by DCI Dulles not to disrupt the security status quo given the growing threats in the Far East. In 1958, Kennedy, then a senator, had expressed his desire to see Hawaii granted statehood, a development he hoped would allow the U.S. to consider its responsibilities in Guam and Micronesia, including gaining a “better understanding of the peoples of those areas, their needs and aspirations.”²⁸² By doing so, Kennedy believed that “Asia and America, East and West, could meet together on free and equal terms” to the benefit of both the United States and to world peace.²⁸³ The status of the TTPI was to become an important issue in his administration.

Among the first actions taken by the Kennedy administration in regard to the TTPI was selecting a new high commissioner. M. Wilfred Goding, a long-time DOI staffer, was sworn in on 1 May 1961.²⁸⁴ He replaced Delmas Nucker, an Eisenhower appointee, who had submitted his courtesy resignation in March and subsequently taken a position in the OOT. According to a knowledgeable Interior official,

Goding was “slow of speech, slow of action, and not a big government activist who had to be pushed into all of the major programs of redevelopment in the early years of the Kennedy administration.”²⁸⁵

Goding arrived on Guam on 8 May and was on the job less than two weeks when he met a high-ranking U.S. government delegation that included Richard F. Taitano, the new director of the Office of Territories, Assistant Interior Secretary John Carver and his aide Robert Mangon, and Jonathan Bingham, U.S. Representative to the U.N. Trusteeship Council.²⁸⁶ In addition to attending inaugural ceremonies for the new governors on Guam and American Samoa, the group also visited the various districts of the Trust Territory on a fact-finding mission. They were briefed for the first time on the operations of both NAVAD and NTTU while on Saipan.²⁸⁷




Figure 66. High commissioner Wilfred Goding, second left, and staff meet with Robert Mangon, Jonathan Bingham, and John Carver on Guam in May 1961.

On 6 June, following their return to Washington, D.C., Carver and company participated in a meeting convened at the State Department to discuss issues raised by the Visiting Mission. In addition to State and Interior representatives, the meeting included two CIA officials and the ubiquitous Captain Findley.²⁸⁸ The principal topic of conversation was the future status of the Saipan District. Findley provided background on this topic noting Interior’s 1959 position that it was not prepared to assume responsibility for NTTU. The CIA expressed its preference for a continuation of the status quo,

although it was prepared to operate under an Interior administration provided sufficient logistical support was given by the Navy. Carver, based on his recent trip through the TTPI and the Visiting Mission's report, suggested that the Navy consider assuming responsibility for transportation and communications throughout the TTPI to augment Interior's limited capabilities.²⁸⁹

Three days later, Carver wrote to Navy secretary John B. Connally advising him that his department was prepared to assume administrative responsibility for the Saipan District with the exception of "bases and reservations" [i.e. NTTU] established for military purposes which he believed should remain with the military departments concerned.²⁹⁰ He also formally requested Connally to consider the possibility of providing TTPI-wide logistical assistance. Per the desire of the State Department, Carver was hopeful that a joint Interior/Navy statement could be released to UN on this matter before the upcoming UN Trusteeship meeting. Connally replied by endorsing a single administration for the TTPI and pledging to assist Interior in every way feasible, but he advised Carver that the Navy would be unable to provide logistical support on the scale envisioned by Interior.

Later that same month, Goding traveled to New York to represent the TTPI at a meeting of the UN Trusteeship Council during which he addressed the various findings presented in the Visiting Mission's report. He assured the Council that the United States had made progress on many of the issues raised including the matter of divided administration:

"The United States delegation has also been glad to hear the views of the Visiting Mission and members of the Council with respect to the desirability of unifying the administration of the territory under the high commissioner. As we have already stated to the Council, this matter has been receiving most careful attention at the highest level of our Government and I can now further say that the departments concerned are agreed in principle that the administration of the territory should be unified. The detailed steps for bringing about this unified administration are now in process of being worked out."²⁹¹

The details regarding how to establish this unified administration were hashed out over the following six months during a series of meetings held in Washington among representatives of the affected departments including the CIA. In July, Kennedy's new DOI secretary Stewart L. Udall, appointed Taitano to represent his department in these negotiations.²⁹² During his first meeting that same month, Taitano raised the question concerning the expected tenure of NTTU operations and was advised that

the CIA “had no current plans” to terminate the STS.²⁹³ Concerned about assuming the associated logistical responsibilities currently provided by the Navy, Taitano asked that no formal announcement be made regarding the transfer pending his further discussions with Carver.

A follow-up meeting was held three days later during which Taitano was advised that NAVAD was to be decommissioned by July 1962 and that Interior would be expected to assume its logistical responsibilities for NTTU.²⁹⁴

During a meeting in early August, William Vance of the CIA’s Far East Support Division advised Interior that while NTTU’s future on Saipan was unresolved, due to the current situation in the Far East “and recent White House activity generated by [General Maxwell] Taylor,” it was the consensus that the STS would continue operations.²⁹⁵

Vance also stated the CIA would not be concerned about security at its housing and administrative complex on Army Hill following the transfer but that the training areas in Marpi and Kagman would continue to be “out of bounds” and patrolled by NTTU security personnel.²⁹⁶ Taitano asked about the availability of quarters for Interior personnel on Army Hill and was told that although a few units might be provided, NAVAD’s Quonset complex on Navy Hill would be the best option for housing new TTPI headquarters personnel following the Navy’s departure. Taitano also reiterated that Interior would be unable to provide substantial logistical support to NTTU following NAVAD’s departure. The CIA representatives agreed to resolve logistical responsibilities which they expected would be dealt with “at a high administrative level” between the Agency and Interior.”²⁹⁷

In September, Kennedy addressed the UN General Assembly for the first time. At the suggestion of the State Department, he chose to focus a portion of his talk on colonialism, a topic of considerable interest particularly among the new UN member countries. As noted in a State Department background paper prepared for the President in advance of his address, “. . . the development of the United States trust territory has suddenly come to critical notice as, near the end of the colonial era, the United States is revealed to everybody’s surprise as among the last of the colonial powers.”²⁹⁸

Although Kennedy did not mention the TTPI in his address delivered on 25 September 1961, he did use the opportunity to challenge the Soviet Union on the topic of colonialism:

“Let us debate colonialism in full – and apply the principle of free choice and the practice of free plebiscites in every corner of the globe.”²⁹⁹

By doing so, he challenged the United States to apply these same principles to its own territories including the TTPI.

Immediately after Kennedy’s UN address, the National Security Council drafted a presidential directive for the secretaries of State, Defense and Interior to review existing policy in the TTPI and to recommend an appropriate program to meet the President’s stated goal. National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy, who headed this work, understood that there would be bureaucratic resistance to a change in policy within the executive branch. Defense and Interior were both happy with the status quo, although the latter still smarted from losing administrative control over the Northern Marianas. Of the major players, only State, fearful that charges of colonialism in the UN would get in the way of other more important international issues, desired a new political status that “would mute, if not eliminate, such criticism.”³⁰⁰

Deliberations among the three departments over the following months resulted in two basic assumptions:

“First, for defense and security reasons the United States would continue its present level of control over the Trust Territory in the future. Second, the United States would develop an alternative to trusteeship status within five years, because of the changed composition of the United Nations, the increase in Micronesian political self-consciousness, and the likelihood that only one or two trusteeships would remain by that time. If these assumptions were accepted, it followed that a closer (and presumably permanent) relationship between the Trust Territory and the United States was in the national interest.”³⁰¹

As these high-level events unfolded, negotiations over the transfer of the Saipan District continued among DOI, DON, and the CIA. In October, Taitano advised Donaho’s staff that DOI was wrapping up its discussions with the CIA and that “few if any problems” remained.³⁰² It seems likely that these negotiations were facilitated by encouragement from the White House and State Department. By November, DON was “fairly certain” that Interior would agree to assume responsibility for the Saipan District by 1 July 1962. There was discussion within DON regarding the desirability of including

language in the transfer document that would reserve the right for the Defense Department to acquire any land in the district that might be required for future military use. As noted by one naval administrator “under Del Nucker and Wil Goding, we have no need to worry [but] an anti-military Hicom or despot-type could really foul things up.”³⁰³

On 20 December, Connally wrote to Udall advising him that a proposed transfer date 1 July had been informally agreed to and sought his confirmation so that pertinent naval commands could commence needed planning work.³⁰⁴ DON was also keen to receive confirmation that Interior intended to move the TTPI’s headquarters from Guam to Saipan.

The uncertain status of the STS was clarified on 4 January 1962 during a meeting between CIA and CNO officials. Vance advised Findley that NTTU would commence leaving Saipan on or about 1 April and that the official closure of the STS would take place by 1 July.³⁰⁵ Vance also stated that for security reasons, the CIA preferred COMNAVMAR to assume the responsibility of transferring to Interior NTTU’s buildings, facilities and equipment for the new TTPI headquarters. Findley noted that DON had received no written confirmation that Goding would relocate his headquarters to Saipan but suspected that pressure from Washington and the United Nations would force him to do so.³⁰⁶ To facilitate the property transfer, the CIA agreed to prepare a complete inventory of NTTU’s holdings. As the closure of the STS would be facilitated by the *Four Winds* and the CIA’s proprietary airline, Southern Air Transport, only minimal logistical support from NAVAD or COMNAVMAR was anticipated.³⁰⁷

These details were shared with staff of the Office of Territories four days later during a meeting at Admiral Donaho’s office.³⁰⁸ Nucker and Milner were present to represent Interior and high commissioner Goding. Also in attendance were three CIA representatives, Donaho and three of the admiral’s senior staff. Vance explained the desired arrangement for transferring NTTU property via COMNAVMAR, noting that with the exception of some new vehicles and refrigerators, all of NTTU’s equipment was being written off. In reply to a question posed by Donaho, Nucker stated that high commissioner Goding had been directed (presumably by Carver and Taitano) to move his headquarters to Saipan and “take over such buildings as he could, effective 1 July 1962.”³⁰⁹ It was Nucker’s understanding that Goding would use all of NTTU’s equipment either at his new Saipan headquarters or at other office locations within the TTPI.

Although the reasons for the closure of the STS have never been made public, it is clear from the meeting records that no final decision was made until early 1962. Richard Taitano stated that during his 1961 visit to the TTPI, he and Carver had informed Navy and CIA officials of their intention to recommend the closure of NTTU, although there is no mention of this in the available primary source documents.³¹⁰ Another Interior official understood that the closing of the STS resulted from

“. . . the blowing of the CIA cover. At least that’s what we always understood. My understanding is that the CIA facility in Saipan was serving what was seen in the pertinent circles as a useful purpose. CIA, Defense and maybe State, I don’t know who was involved, but CIA essentially . . . But it was apparently an important ingredient to Defense policy at the time, and it no longer worked once everybody knew it existed . . .”³¹¹

Given that the existence of the STS had been known in both foreign and domestic circles since at least 1951, it seems unlikely that a blown cover was a significant factor in its closure, although one source suggests that the CIA warned President Kennedy of this possibility should the Navy be replaced on Saipan.³¹² It is clear that the closure announcement came as a complete surprise to the STS’s chief of station Robert Schmitz:

“In early 1962, we received an unexpected blow, the decision to close the facility by 1 July. The subject had been aired once or twice before, but was never considered at topside. However, our new Director [John McCone] surprised all who had an interest. We had to keep the decision to ourselves until an agreement was reached with the Navy and Interior departments regarding the disposition of the physical plant and materiel.”³¹³

President Kennedy selected John McCone, a conservative Republican from California, to replace Dulles as DCI in late November 1961 as a consequence of the failed Bay of Pigs invasion.³¹⁴ Several months earlier, the president had secured the services of General Maxwell Taylor to “take a close look at all practices and programs in the area of military and paramilitary guerrilla and anti-guerrilla activity” that fell short of all-out war with the aim of strengthening U.S. operations in these areas.³¹⁵ Taylor’s work was mentioned by Vance in August 1961 as being a factor affecting a final decision on the fate of the STS. Taylor completed his work by the latter part of 1961 and issued a top-secret report that served as the blueprint for subsequent U.S. actions in Southeast Asia.³¹⁶ It is likely, given Kennedy’s reported animus toward the CIA and the need to implement major changes to the TTPI’s

administration, that the president issued a directive closing the STS sometime in the weeks following McCone's appointment which was made known to key officials in early January 1962. Although definitive documentation is lacking, it is quite possible that STS' closure was not fully supported by the CIA just as the subsequent termination of World War II-era security restrictions on Guam was opposed by DON leadership.

With the thorny issue of NTTU now resolved, High Commissioner Goding and Rear Admiral John S. Coye, COMNAVMAR issued a joint press release announcing that the Saipan District would be transferred from Navy to Interior Department administration effective on 1 July. Goding also noted that Saipan had been designated the first provisional capital of the TTPI "in keeping with the desires of this administration to advance the political development of Micronesia."³¹⁷ To make specific plans for the future administration of the district, Goding stated his intention to send a survey team to Saipan to confer with Navy administrators on this matter. Both decisions came as a surprise to residents of the Saipan District as they were made without any consultations with the local community.

A few months later, President Kennedy signed top secret National Security Action Memorandum 145 (NSAM 145) entitled "New Policy for the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands."³¹⁸ This two-page document, dated 28 April 1962, started with a clear rejection of the policies that had guided the administration of the TTPI over its first 14 years. The old policy was to be replaced with one that would provide for a "greatly accelerated program of political, economic and social development."³¹⁹ NSAM 145 found it unlikely that the Trust Territory would ever become a viable independent nation due to its small population and lack of resources and accesses to markets. Accordingly, the President concluded that it was

"in the interest of the United States that the Trust Territory be given a real option at the appropriate time to move into a new and lasting relationship to the United States within our political framework. This then should be our goal. If it is to be accomplished, the people of the Trust Territory must become an educated people, prepared to exercise an informed choice, which means a choice by people capable of weighing the realistic alternatives. There is an urgent need for the initiation of programs leading to the improvement of education as a first step."³²⁰



Figure 67. A view of the former NTTU complex. Although this photograph was taken in 1969, with one minor exception, it shows the complex as it appeared at the time of its transfer to the TTPI.




Figure 68. Goding, surrounded by senior staff, announcing that Saipan will serve as TTPI's provisional capital beginning July 1, 1962.



Figure 69. Deputy High Commissioner Benitez meets with members of the Saipan Planning Committee on Guam in early 1962.

Kennedy ordered that a task force, comprised of assistance secretaries of State, Interior and Defense, be created to develop a specific course of action so that the goals of NSAM 145 could be achieved by the target date of 1968. The following month the President signed Executive Order 11021 that transferred the responsibility of the Northern Mariana Islands to the Secretary of the Interior thus unifying the entire TTPI under civilian administration.³²¹ The effective date of this EO was 1 July 1962. In addition to reuniting the territory under a single civilian administration, the Kennedy administration also worked with congress to increase the TTPI's annual funding ceiling which had been set at 7.5 million dollars.

At about this same time, Goding created the Saipan Planning Committee to oversee the transfer of TTPI headquarters from Guam to Saipan.³²² The committee was chaired by Deputy High Commissioner Jose A. Benitez and included representatives from the Navy and key TTPI headquarters staff. In announcing the creation of the committee, Goding stressed that the existing wage scale on Saipan would be maintained and that current Saipanese employees would be given consideration for jobs in the new district administration as well as on the headquarters staff.³²³ The new jurisdiction, encompassing all of the islands of the Marianas archipelago with the exception of Guam, was to be called the Mariana Islands District.

The decision to designate Saipan as the provisional capital resulted from the availability of the modern, typhoon-proof complex recently vacated by the NTTU.³²⁴ Although Truk (now Chuuk) made more sense from a geographical standpoint (being roughly at the center of the territory) and had served as the headquarters for the TTPI's communications center and its judiciary, it lacked the physical infrastructure needed to accommodate the scores of personnel who would be relocating from the previous headquarters on Guam. According to a senior Interior official

“I don't know whether [Interior] took an initiative or whether the CIA simply said, here are all these buildings, do you want them. And Interior was overjoyed, because pretty obviously we had had a funding problem throughout and here we had right in the Trust Territory, wrong location, being at one end instead of in Truk, but nevertheless it was still in the Trust Territory, a point that had been made by the 1961 visiting mission.”³²⁵

The formal “turnover ceremony” was held at Hopwood Intermediate School on Saipan on the morning of Sunday, 1 July attended by hundreds of Saipan residents, presidents of the five TTPI district

congresses, and various military and TTPI administrative officials.³²⁶ The ceremony opened with music by the U.S. Navy Band and invocations by Father Arnold Bendowske and Pastor Henry Cruz. The first speaker, Naval Civil Administrator Commander Paul Bridwell, provided an overview of American rule of the Northern Marianas and expressed his gratitude to the people of Saipan for their “discipline and honorable manner.”³²⁷

Rear Admiral Coye accompanied by a Marine honor guard, then read Executive Order 11021 issued by President Kennedy which reunited Saipan, Tinian and the northern islands with the rest of the TTPI. The final speaker was High Commissioner Goding who formally accepted the administrative authority of the Marianas on behalf of the Secretary of the Interior. He noted that the new Hopwood School, built as a cooperative project between the Navy and the local community, was a fitting venue for the transfer ceremony. The culmination of the event came when Admiral Coye’s two-star blue flag was lowered and replaced by the High Commissioner’s banner, a process “which signified the actual change of command.”³²⁸

The former NTTU complex was officially designated as the provisional TTPI capital three days later on July 4th. The occasion was marked by the reading of congratulatory messages from a number of U.S. officials including President Kennedy, United Nations Ambassador Adlai Stevenson, Attorney General Robert Kennedy and Dwight Heine, the highest-ranking Micronesian in the TTPI administration. The President took the opportunity to reiterate his support for progress in the TTPI:

“I take great pleasure in extending to you and to the people of the Trust Territory my greeting and good wishes on the occasion of the establishment of the temporary capital of the TTPI on the island of Saipan. This Administration has reviewed with sympathy and concern the desires of the people for a capital within their islands and for more social and economic growth in the Territory. I pledge to them the continuing support of this Administration in bringing these desires to realization.”³²⁹

High Commissioner Goding also noted that the transfer of administrative headquarters of the TTPI to a location within borders was in keeping with the administration’s desire to advance political development of Micronesia:




Figure 70. High Commissioner Goding speaking at the transfer ceremony at Hopwood Intermediate School, July 1, 1962.



Figure 71. Goding and Admiral Coye of COMNAVMAR at the transfer ceremony.

“The designation of a provisional capital within the Territory will facilitate the growth of self-government and will allow the people of Micronesia, through the principle of self-determination, to select in the future a permanent seat for their government.”³³⁰

The two-story former NTTU headquarters building was taken over by the High Commissioner and his key department heads. The barbwire-topped security fence that surrounded the building was removed after a few months and “Headquarters Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands” was painted in large block letters above the double entrance doors. Married headquarters staff, both Americans and Micronesians, moved into the 91 comfortable three-bedroom houses which were surrounded by neatly trimmed lawns, while single employees were assigned quarters in a two-story apartment building that had served an identical function during NTTU days. The High Commissioner occupied the largest house, originally built for the CIA station chief, which sat atop a small hilltop just to the northwest of the headquarters building.³³¹

The other former NTTU buildings were soon occupied by various government offices as headquarters personnel from Guam, the U.S. mainland, and Micronesia began to settle in. The former NTTU club/restaurant, referred to as “Toppa Tappi,” subsequently became the “Mariana Islands District Community Club” and continued to serve in a recreational capacity for a number of months before being taken over for use by the territorial legislature.³³² In addition to the buildings, TTPI headquarters also inherited NAVAD’s Quonset buildings at various locations around the island and more than a million dollars of materials and supplies courtesy of NTTU.³³³

The *Sunday Star-Bulletin and Advertiser*, a Honolulu newspaper, published the first news regarding the new capital’s link to NTTU:

“When Saipan became the new ‘Capital of Micronesia’ on July 1, that Mariana Island was emerging from a decade behind one of the thickest walls of secrecy ever erected around any area of the U.S.”³³⁴

The article described in general terms NTTU operations, the skills foreign agents acquired during their training, and the role the Navy played in keeping the operation secret. It also described the “modern faculty town built for professors of espionage” and its subsequent acquisition by the TTPI preventing the complex from becoming an “ultra-modern tropical ghost-town.”³³⁵ This now-it-can-be-told-story



Figure 72. Entrance to the new TTPI headquarters building in early 1963.



Figure 73. The headquarters parking lot in early 1963. The NTTU security fence is still in place.

also commented on the 100,000 tons of unexploded ordnance scattered throughout the Marpi area, a situation that was to be addressed by the TTPI's new safety director. Interestingly, the author made no mention of the CIA in his article.³³⁶




Figure 74. A newspaper illustration depicting former NTTU operational areas including the Army Hill complex labeled “Faculty Town.”

High-level attention on Saipan continued with the arrival of Interior Secretary Stewart Udall in mid-July. Udall's party was met at the airport by TTPI officials and local political leaders and, following a brief welcoming ceremony, transported to headquarters by motorcade. Entrances to villages along

the motorcade route had been decorated with palm fronds and flowers and residents lined the streets to welcome the high-ranking visitors.

After a quick tour of the new provisional capital, Udall met with the High Commissioner, Deputy High Commissioner and five district administrators to brief them on important developments in Washington. These included the recent increase in the TTPI's budget ceiling and efforts by the administration to lift the restrictive security regulations that were seen as a major impediment to economic development. Udall then conducted a brief inspection of the Marpi area presumably to get a first-hand look at the ordnance problem that required the government to restrict public entry into this area. His Saipan visit concluded with a luncheon at Club Toppa Tappi hosted by the high commissioner and attended by various local dignitaries.³³⁷



Figure 75. DOI secretary Udall with TTPI officials at the Club Toppa Tappi, July 1962. Note original windows.

As a part of its revamping of the TTPI's administrative policy, the Kennedy administration initiated two actions that were to significantly affect Micronesians over the next two decades. In August 1962, President Kennedy announced that he had rescinded Executive Order 8683 which had established the Guam Naval and Airspace Reservations. As a result of this action, Navy security clearances were no longer required to enter the Territory of Guam. The President also ordered the Secretaries of Defense, State and Interior to prepare revised procedures to facilitate the free entry of U.S. citizens, investment

and flag vessels into the TTPI.³³⁸ The President intended these actions to “foster responsible political development, stimulate new economic activity, and to enable the people of the Islands to participate fully in the world of today.”³³⁹

The administration also was working behind the scenes to have congress increase the TTPI’s annual budget ceiling which had been stuck at a paltry \$7,500,000 since 1954. Most of previous years’ appropriations had gone to cover the cost of expatriate employees from the U.S. mainland, leaving little for education, health, or political development of the TTPI’s indigenous inhabitants, prompting critics to comment on squalid “tin towns” that spoiled otherwise beautiful tropical landscapes.³⁴⁰

Another important development undertaken to address UN criticisms was the creation in 1962 of the Council of Micronesia, a twelve-member “advisory body” that was tasked with providing recommendations to the High Commissioner for the creation of a TTPI-wide legislature.³⁴¹ The Council conducted its first two meetings in Palau in September and October 1962, during which it elected a drafting committee composed of six members, including Vicente N. Santos from the Marianas District. The Council met again at TTPI headquarters on Saipan in January and again in March 1963 to complete its recommendations that would ultimately result in the creation of the Congress of Micronesia (COM) in 1964.³⁴²




Figure 76. Goding meets with Council of Micronesia members in the former NTTU gym/auditorium building in March 1963. Court markings are still visible on floor.

In spite of this high-level attention, little progress was made in the TTPI over the months that followed. To the contrary, a NSC staff member who had the opportunity to travel to the TTPI in early 1963 found the situation there “truly appalling.” He recommended that it was time for the White House to take vigorous action if the administration was to avoid serious problems with the U.S. Congress and the United Nations.³⁴³

This led the President to issue NSAM No. 229 that directed task force departments (Interior, State and Defense) to issue a report on the TTPI.³⁴⁴ Two reports were received. Interior’s effort was an uninspired summary of its slow progress which it blamed on a reluctant U.S. Congress. State’s report, on the other hand, spelled out in detail the likely international consequences should the U.S. fail to quickly produce tangible benefits for TTPI residents. The report asserted that in order to meet the proposed 1968 plebiscite date, “a coordinated crash program of economic, social and political development” had to be implemented.³⁴⁵ State’s plan envisioned affecting positive changes in education and economic development before the next scheduled UN Visiting Mission in 1964 and recommended that the President appoint a single individual to coordinate the executive branch agencies dealing with Micronesia and to presenting the administration’s position to the appropriate congressional committees

State’s more urgent approach carried the day and led to the President to issue National Security Action Memorandum No 243, dated May 9, 1963, that appointed economist Anthony Solomon to an eight-person mission to investigate and to make recommendations regarding the TTPI. The Solomon Mission spent six weeks in the TTPI during which time it visited all six districts. Following his return to the U.S., Solomon prepared a report that addressed three broad issues: a proposed capital investment program for Micronesia, political development leading to a plebiscite no later than 1968, and better administration of the TTPI before the plebiscite.³⁴⁶

The Solomon report recommended a significant increase in capital investment funds and annual TTPI operating costs which it believed were necessary for improving the standard of living and to encourage a favorable vote during the plebiscite. The report stated that a significant increase to economic development programs was not warranted given the TTPI’s very limited ability to use such funds effectively in light of its meager resources and tiny markets. On the political issue, Solomon recommended that the U.S. offer Micronesians two choices – independence or permanent affiliation with the United States.

During his trip through the districts, Solomon did not encounter serious opposition to permanent affiliation. Only a small percent of the population, which he estimated to represent two to five percent, supported independence. The report found that the major obstacle to the development of the TTPI was “the creaky functioning of the quasi-colonial bureaucracy in the Trust Territory government,” a conclusion which was hotly disputed by High Commissioner Goding.³⁴⁷

In late October 1963, President Kennedy directed State and Interior, in cooperation with other government departments to “carry out recommendations in the report that are feasible and acceptable for implementation.” The president also asked to be advised by the end of November of “the actions taken or contemplated with respect to the report.”³⁴⁸ The President never had the opportunity to receive this advice as he was tragically assassinated in Dallas on 22 November. Following President Kennedy’s death, progress on implementing the report’s recommendations ground to a halt.

Much of the resistance to the report came from Interior which disagreed with Solomon on economic development issues, the use of contractors, the appointment of district political officers, and the timing of the plebiscite. Although the State Department officials were still keen on pushing forward with the report, Interior officials knew that little progress would be made since the powerful Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, Wayne Aspinall, did not agree with many of Solomon’s recommendations.³⁴⁹ Interior felt confident that with Aspinall as an ally, it would be able to continue to conduct business as usual in the TTPI. Interior officials did recognize the need to replace High Commissioner Goding who generally was seen as being too slow and cautious but this proved to be difficult due to the support Goding received from a powerful senator from Alaska.

President Kennedy’s death in late November 1963 brought to an end the high-level attention the TTPI experienced for the past two years. Although Lyndon Johnson was to keep key Kennedy cabinet members and advisors for some time, most came to realize that President Johnson had other more pressing items that he wished to pursue with Congress.³⁵⁰ As a result, Interior was able to go about the routine business of administering the TTPI without high level oversight that had prevailed during the Kennedy years.

Among the most important developments of the mid-1960s was the formation of the Congress of Micronesia, the first territory-wide legislative body authorized by the Department of the Interior through Secretarial Order No. 2882 signed on September 28, 1964.³⁵¹ This order, which reflected

recommendations made by the Council of Micronesia, called for a Congress of two houses: a twelve-member House of Delegates (two delegates from each of the six districts) and a General Assembly of 21 members apportioned on population.³⁵²

By establishing the COM, the U.S. addressed an important recommendation made by the 1961 Visiting Mission. From the U.S. perspective, this first pan-Micronesian legislative body also had the potential to forge a common identity among residents from six districts spread out over 2,000,000 square miles of ocean, a necessary step if Micronesian was to enter into a long-term relationship with the U.S. government as a unified entity. The COM's first elected members were sworn in on 12 July 1965 during ceremonies held at the Capitol Hill Community Theatre which had been spruced up for the occasion:

“Dr. William Vitarelli and his supporting cast of vigorous young helpers transformed the stark Capital Hill Community Theatre, both inside and out, into a place of fitting splendor and dignity.”³⁵³

The COM's first 30-day session ran from July through August 1965. Its first piece of legislation created a TTPI flag which featured a circle of six white stars on a dark blue background.³⁵⁴ COM's early meetings were held in the former NTTU restaurant/club, the second largest building in the complex:

“Both houses of the Congress held their sessions in the spacious Marianas Islands District Community Club. Situated near the top of a rolling slope a thousand feet above sea level, this building overlooks all of the Capital Hill area and the entire northern third of the island. The Community Club is a solid, cool concrete structure with high ceilings and louvered windows which make it capable of capturing and rendering more salubrious the stiff breezes which swirl across the island. The decision to hold the meetings of the two houses at the Club as the best provisional meeting place was a logical one.”³⁵⁵

COM was hailed by both TTPI officials and UN officials alike. Goding called it “a remarkable experiment in progressive self-government” while Frank Corner of New Zealand who had served as chairman of the 1964 UN Visiting Mission referred to it “as the roof-tree under which all the peoples of Micronesia will be gathered.”³⁵⁶ But in spite of this fanfare, the COM had only limited legislative powers. It had no control over the TTPI budget and its laws were subject to veto by the high



Figure 77. Inaugural ceremonies for the 1st Congress of Micronesia held in the former NTTU gym/auditorium on July 22, 1965. COM leaders Dwight Heine and John Ngiraked follow the sergeant-at-arms. Also visible are COM members Vicente N. Santos and Olympio T. Borja representing the Marianas District. Note the building's original louvered windows.

commissioner. In cases where a COM law was passed and vetoed twice, it was referred to the Secretary of the Interior for final disposition. In spite of its limitations, however, the COM was to play a pivotal role in the long-term relationships that would be negotiated by Micronesians and the U.S. government in the 1970s and 80s.

In early 1966, the TTPI began construction of a dedicated complex for the COM consisting of three identical wood and corrugated-metal buildings with concrete foundations situated on top of a rise just to the south of the Community Club.³⁵⁷ In the late 1940s, this area had served as a landscaped picnic area for high-ranking Army officials assigned to the Western Pacific Base Command. The new COM complex was accessed from the parking lot (originally constructed by NTTU for patrons of the restaurant/club) by a concrete stairway. Like the other buildings on Capitol Hill, the new COM complex was not equipped with air conditioning, but rather relied on a series of louvered windows to cool its interior spaces.



Figure 78. The former NTTU mess/club building became the provisional meeting hall for the COM in 1965. Note awning frame mentioned by Goerner.




Figure 79. COM members during a session in 1965. The louvered windows were still in use at this time.



Figure 80. A view of the new COM complex on the hill adjacent to the former NTTU mess/club building. This complex was officially opened on July 12, 1966.



Figure 81. Members of the COM's House of Delegates outside of their new legislative chamber, 1966.

Mt. Olympus

During the remainder of the 1960s, the Capitol Hill Complex served as the TTPI's political, economic and social center. As the TTPI's operating budget continued to grow, so too did the number of employees who were hired to work at its "headquarters." By the early 1970s, it became necessary for the TTPI to construct a few temporary wooden buildings to accommodate the expansion.³⁵⁸ The TTPI government also entered into lease agreements with local landowners who provided additional housing for off-island government workers. While free of charge and often located in attractive settings, these lease quarters did not possess the same prestige as did housing on Capitol Hill. Its essence was aptly captured by a Peace Corps Volunteer who worked at headquarters in the late 1960s:

"The Trust Territory government had inherited the NTTU headquarters . . . with the high commissioner living in the highest house. His subordinates, American and Micronesian, spread out below in dozens of rambling, airy concrete houses, typhoon proof, with suburban driveways, well-barbered lawns, and a view that went miles and miles out into the Philippine Sea. It was an absurdity, a place-out-of-place, the setting for a comic opera or a Doonesbury cartoon, but Capitol Hill was nonetheless a kind of high-water mark of the American power that fought its way ashore on the invasion beaches. It was bridge parties and cocktails and patios and good roads and a breezy hilltop at the end of the world."³⁵⁹

In May 1966, High Commissioner Goding, who was held in extremely low regard by the political leaders in the Mariana Islands District, was replaced by William R. Norwood, a former reporter and public relations executive from Hawaii.³⁶⁰ By this time, Saipan's Capitol Hill, as the high commissioner's "handsome complex of buildings" was known, was firmly established as the seat of territorial power.³⁶¹ It was also a mixing point for American and Micronesian employees and their families who lived and worked side by side at the headquarters complex.

Since headquarters was located on Saipan, its staff and policies came under close scrutiny of the local community. Saipan was the envy of the rest of Micronesia due to the job opportunities offered by TTPI headquarters and its relatively advanced infrastructure but there was among its indigenous residents widespread distrust of top TTPI officials and unhappiness with territorial policies that adversely affected their lives and aspirations. These included resistance to a growing desire by the people of the Marianas District to push economic development and to achieve a political status separate



Figure 82. High Commissioner William R. Norwood, second from left in front row, poses with his staff on the steps of the TTPI administration building, circa 1966. The plain block lettering above the doors would identify this building for the next quarter century.

from the rest of the TTPI.³⁶² There was also bitterness generated by discriminatory government practices such as the separate and unequal pay scales for American and Micronesian employees and what was seen as an unwillingness to allow qualified Micronesians to assume high-level government positions.³⁶³

One outspoken critic of the TTPI administration was Jose R. Cruz of Tinian who started a newspaper called the *Free Press* in late 1963.³⁶⁴ The *Free Press* was the only newspaper in Micronesia not under the editorial control of the high commissioner, and Cruz used it to target a wide range of issues relating to the TTPI's administration of Micronesia. By the late 1960s, Cruz's paper, now called *Micronesian Free Press*, referred to Capitol Hill as "Mt. Olympus" and routinely carried critiques of various TTPI policies including the TTPI's discriminatory pay scale:

“Many middle-age and old-age so-called experts love the warm tropical climate and they see the opportunity to sit back behind a desk in his comfortable office doing very little task and receiving a fat paycheck. Worst of all, wives of these employees get Civil Service jobs at Headquarters even though they never before lay their fingers on a typewriter key. [They] learn how to type on the job and get GS-3 to GS 5 or 6, while the poor but excellent Micronesian secretary gets in the neighborhood of 40 to 60 cents per hour. We have had too many of these wives employed just to keep themselves busy and to get their hands on the Trust Territory budget.”³⁶⁵

In another serialized feature of the paper in the late 1960s, titled “Profiles of the Gods and Goddesses,” Cruz criticized both the decision-making and personal lives of those in the administration he termed “rotten apples.”³⁶⁶ His views on the TTPI’s policies, and some of its key administrators, were shared by many in the Marianas District.




Figure 83. A political cartoon from the late 1960s depicting TTPI headquarters staff marching from “Mt. Olympus” to their doom.

Norwood’s arrival coincided with a renewed debate within the U.S. government regarding the overall policy for Micronesia’s future. Long term U.S. objectives remained little changed from those established in the late 1940s, i.e. retaining exclusive U.S. control of these strategic islands to satisfy

U.S. military requirements while minimizing charges of colonialism particularly among countries of the so-called third world. Both State and Defense wanted to expedite a new political status along the lines of free association proposed by New Zealand, while Interior argued for a slower, more cautious approach that would avoid granting the TTPI a status superior to the older territories of Guam and Samoa.³⁶⁷

New Zealand's recommendation for free association had grown out of its experience with the Cook Islands where the indigenous people elected to become a self-governing state in association with New Zealand. Under this arrangement, Cook Islanders were to be New Zealand citizens and could freely migrate to that country. They were also allowed to exercise complete internal self-government while deferring foreign affairs and defense responsibilities to New Zealand. Its main proponent, Frank H. Corner, suggested that this political option might be the best fit for Micronesia:

“Two of the great heads of steam in the United Nations of that time were: the demand for instant independence for all non-self-governing territories; and the Cold War constant propaganda battle, where, in the Trusteeship Council and in the Assembly's Fourth Committee, the Soviet representatives used every discussion of Micronesia to pile dirt on the United States. The best way, in my opinion, of dealing with the first was to accept that all territories had the right of self-determination; but it was the right of the people to determine the pace and the result. If one stood on the rock of the wishes of the people, the administering country was on secure ground and could prevent a territory from being bullied by the UN majority.”³⁶⁸

By the mid-1960s, the Marianas District had two political parties: the Popular Party that sought U.S. citizenship through reintegration with Guam, and the Progressive (later Territorial) Party that supported this same citizenship goal but through direct association with the United States. Local politicians routinely presented petitions to visiting UN Missions expressing their desire to break away from the rest of Micronesia and to enter into a long-term relationship with the U.S. At this time, both the United Nations and the U.S. government were opposed to any actions that would fragment Micronesia. The COM was also opposed to the Marianas District's desire to seek a separate political status with the U.S. in large measure because the district produced the lion's share of the local tax revenues. This led to growing resentment in the district directed against both the TTPI administration and the COM.

In August 1966, the COM requested the high commissioner to establish a commission to consult the Micronesian people about its future political status. Eight months later, following considerable debate within the U.S. government, State, Interior and Defense reached a tentative agreement that envisioned offering a “commonwealth” status to Micronesia which it felt was “sufficiently broad to encompass a status for the TTPI which would allow the U.S. to terminate the Trusteeship Agreement and meet the requirements of Congress.”³⁶⁹

In spite of this promising development, the U.S. was unable to reach consensus regarding the composition of a political status commission or on the status options to be offered. The main protagonists were State, which favored commonwealth, and Interior which sought a non-self-governing territorial status similar to American Samoa. Interior’s reluctance to go along with State’s position arose in large measure from its fear of crossing Congressman Wayne Aspinall, the powerful chairman of the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. Due in large part to Aspinall’s lack of support for commonwealth and for forming a political status commission, little progress was made.

Frustrated by the lack of movement, in August 1967, the COM created its own Political Status Commission which included one member from each of the six TTPI districts. It spent the next year fact finding after which it issued an interim report that considered the various status options – independence, free association, integration, or status quo – without expressing a preference.³⁷⁰

This lack of progress on reaching agreement on a long-term political status for Micronesia was also unsettling to the Joint Chiefs of Staff who:

“ . . . advised the Secretary of Defense in October 1968 that the territory continued to have the same strategic importance that it had in earlier years. They identified as specific security concerns the need to monitor and control the sea and air space of the Pacific Ocean, the need to redeploy American forces after the Vietnam hostilities ended, the availability of the Trust Territory if the United States were denied access to bases in Korea and elsewhere, the continued importance of some of the islands to defense research and development programs, and the need to continue to deny the Trust Territory to possible enemies . . . The Joint Chiefs of staff noted with concern that we do not appear to be any nearer to the achievement of the U.S. goal of moving the TTPI into a permanent relationship within the political framework of the United States than we were when the policy was announced by NSAM 145 in April 1962.”³⁷¹

While Defense worried about long-term security issues, political and business leaders in the Marianas District were working to establish a tourism industry which was viewed by many as the district's most promising economic development opportunity, particularly in light of the its past relationship with Japan. Their efforts were given a substantial boost by the 1968 opening of the Royal Taga Hotel on Saipan, the TTPI's first modern tourist accommodation, and by a commitment from Continental Airlines to begin servicing Micronesia, thus linking Saipan with Guam and Japan.³⁷² Growing economic development in the Marianas District, together with its repeatedly expressed desire to attain U.S. citizenship either through reintegration with Guam or through a direct relationship with the United States, set the Northern Marianas apart from the rest of Micronesia, a situation that was finally being realized by some U.S. government officials, particularly in the State Department.

The newly elected Nixon administration almost immediately began considering how to respond to the question of Micronesia's future political status. It started by appointing Hawaii insurance executive Edward Johnson as the TTPI's new high commissioner, replacing William Norwood.³⁷³ Following interagency debate, a decision was reached to offer territorial status to Micronesia. The State Department's willingness to forego independence and free association as possible status options removed a long-standing impasse with Interior. This led to a personal visit to the TTPI by the new Secretary of the Interior, Walter "Wally" Hickel, who sought to reassure Micronesians regarding U.S. intentions particularly with respect to the unilateral taking of land by the U.S. military.

The secretary was cordially received and he took the opportunity to propose an action plan that included a number of improvements including a revision of the dual wage system, removal of American tariff barriers that hurt Micronesian businesses, the use of U.S. military personnel to undertake infrastructure projects in the TTPI, and incentives for economic development. Perhaps more importantly, Hickel also reassured Micronesians that their land would not be taken for any government purpose without "full consultation with all parties concerned and full and adequate compensation to land owners."³⁷⁴

Hickel departed with the impression that Micronesians were not opposed to territorial affiliation provided that their lands were respected. His position on this matter was opposed by National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger who believed that the U.S. required the right of eminent domain for military purposes. When Hickel took exception with his position, noting that it was morally if not legally wrong,



Figure 84. TPI headquarters building in 1969. Note building's unpainted exterior.



Figure 85. TPI finance office on the first floor of the headquarters building, circa the early 1970s. Note original windows and floor tiles.

Kissinger responded with his infamous line, “There are only 90,000 people out there. Who gives a damn?”³⁷⁵

Later that year, the Guam option disappeared when voters on that island rejected reintegration with the Marianas District during a referendum held in November 1969. By contrast, voters in the Marianas District, who were given a range of status options to choose from, voted in favor of reunification, although a substantial block, made up primarily of Carolinian residents and some members of the business community, chose free association over reunification. Carolinians wished to maintain political relationships with their relatives in other TTPI districts, while some businessmen feared that with unification, larger companies on Guam would come to dominate the business landscape at their expense.³⁷⁶

The following year, the Congress of Micronesia rejected territorial status being offered by the U.S. and strongly reaffirmed its commitment to either free association or independence. In May, 1970, it introduced its non-negotiable “Four Principles” including:

“(a). that sovereignty in Micronesia resides in the people of Micronesia and its duly constituted government; (b). that the people of Micronesia possess the right of self-determination and may therefore choose independence or self-government in free association with any nation or organization of nations; (c). that the people of Micronesia have the right to adopt their own constitution and to amend, change or revoke any constitution or governmental plan at any time; and (4). that free association should be in the form of a revocable compact, terminable unilaterally by either party.”³⁷⁷

The local community in the Marianas District watched developments in the COM with growing concern and anger. The COM’s insistence on seeking independence or free association, together with its stand on other non-status related issues, were at odds with the aspirations of a majority of the district’s residents, and there was a growing consensus that the COM should not be permitted to negotiate the Marianas’ future political status. These sentiments were made official by an anti-COM resolution that was passed by the Marianas District Legislature in February 1971. This resolution, introduced by the Popular Party, declared that the United Nations had no legal rights over the Marianas people and expressed a willingness to “secede from the TTPI by force of arms if necessary.”³⁷⁸

In the early hours of the following day, 20 February, a fire destroyed one of the COM buildings on Capitol Hill. The intense flames that consumed the building led many to believe that the fire was the work of an arsonist, although no suspect was ever identified or arrested.³⁷⁹ Upon inspecting the ruins the next day, COM Speaker Bethwel Henry realized that the fire marked “the end of our connection” with the leaders of the Marianas District.³⁸⁰ To ensure that the TTPI and U.S. administrations were paying attention, political leaders from the Marianas District, including Vicente N. Santos and Herman Q. Guerrero, led a protest march on Capitol Hill the following day where they burned the Trust Territory Code and mutilated the TTPI flag on the steps of the headquarters building.³⁸¹



Figure 86. The still smoking ruins of the COM meeting chambers on the morning of 20 February 1971.

Developments in Micronesia during this time, including the COM’s demand for free association or independence and the increasingly strident separatist rhetoric by the Marianas District did indeed attract the attention of U.S. officials, including those in the Department of Defense who found it necessary to reevaluate their requirements in a post-trusteeship Micronesia. By late 1970, they had come up with several scenarios, including one that identified specific potential basing needs in Palau, the Marshalls and Northern Marianas.



Figure 87. A crowd gathers outside of TTPI headquarters building to burn the Trust Territory Code, April 1971.



Figure 88. Representatives of the Saipan Teachers Organization staging a protest in front of TTPI headquarters in the early 1970s. The sign reads “Get Off Mt. Olympus and negotiate with the S.T.O.”

On the recommendation of his National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, in March 1971, President Nixon appointed F. Hayden Williams to serve as his personal representative for Micronesian status negotiations with the personal rank of ambassador. Soon after, Williams set up the Office of Micronesian Status Negotiations (OMSN) in office space at the Department of the Interior.³⁸² Although located at Interior, the OMSN was funded principally by the departments of State and Defense. Not long after, Defense began focusing attention on the acquisition of land on Tinian, more than 26,000 acres in extent, 800 acres on Saipan and all of the tiny island of Farallon de Medinilla. It was becoming clear that the desire of the Marianas District to split from Micronesia and enter into close association with the U.S. provided an excellent opportunity to acquire needed land for its basing requirements. The Joints Chiefs, in particular, were eager to secure Tinian as soon as practical.³⁸³

In April 1972, Williams responded positively to a request from the Marianas to initiate separate negotiations. Williams concluded that it did not “seem that the American policy of seeking a common solution for the entire Territory is any longer feasible or desirable” and to pursue this objective “against the expressed will of the people of the Marianas would deny them their right of self-determination.”³⁸⁴ Thus began two years of bilateral negotiations between the U.S. government and the Northern Marianas that ultimately led to the Covenant that created the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands in March 1976.

Under this agreement, the CNMI enjoyed local self-government, its residents became U.S. citizens, and land was protected from alienation by non-indigenous persons. The U.S. also provided a range of federal grant assistance, including money earmarked for capital improvement projects, and assumed responsibility for defense and foreign relations. In return, the U.S. was given long-term leases to approximately two thirds of Tinian, together with the islet of Farallon de Medinilla and several hundred acres on Saipan.

Following the approval of the Covenant, the former Marianas District underwent a transition period from 1 April 1976 to 9 January 1978 during which the government was administered by Resident Commissioner Erwin D. Canham. During this time, the nascent Commonwealth drafted a constitution and made other arrangements necessary for an orderly transition to self-government.



Figure 89. Acting high commissioner Peter T. Coleman, at right, meets with ambassador Fred Zeder, center, outside of the high commissioner's residence in the 1970s. This building originally served as the residence of the NTTU chief-of-station. It shows signs of window modifications to accommodate air conditioning.



Figure 90. Children of TTPI employees gather outside of a Capitol Hill residence. The complex provided the opportunity for Micronesian and stateside employees and their families to interact both professionally and socially.

Commonwealth Period

On 9 January 1978, constitutional government was established in the CNMI with the inauguration of the Commonwealth's first governor, Carlos S. Camacho. Although the CNMI had attained Commonwealth status, it was still technically a part of the TTPI and its residents would not be granted full U.S. citizenship rights until 1986 when President Ronald Reagan issued Proclamation 5564 which declared the end of the trusteeship in the Northern Mariana Islands.³⁸⁵

For the next two years, the TTPI continued to occupy the various buildings in the Capitol Hill complex. By early 1980, however, following requests received from the Camacho administration, High Commissioner Adrian P. Winkel agreed to begin turning over unneeded buildings to the new Commonwealth government:

“Trust Territory headquarters this week began to really look like it was going out of business. Professional movers appeared with trucks to carry furniture, boxes, office machines and a steady stream of steel filing cabinets out of some buildings into others as the remaining members of a shrinking staff were being consolidated.”³⁸⁶

Among the first buildings to be transferred were the two surviving former COM buildings and the Transportation office, all of which were of wooden construction. The high commissioner also agreed to turn over seven houses immediately and every other house on Capitol Hill that became vacant thereafter.³⁸⁷

For the next six years, as the U.S. worked to complete status negotiations with the other districts, several of the buildings in the Capitol Hill complex remained under control of the TTPI. This was to change with the departure of the TTPI's last High Commissioner, Janet J. McCoy, in July 1987.

A ceremony marking McCoy's departure and the official termination of the high commissioner's office was held outside of the main administration building on 1 July 1987. Attending this very symbolic event were local and visiting dignitaries including CNMI Governor Pedro P. Tenorio, Senate President Julian Calvo, U.S. Ambassador Fred Zeder, Rear Admirals T. J. Johnson and Ronald J. Hayes, and various other TTPI and CNMI officials.³⁸⁸



Figure 91. Dignitaries gather in the steps of the headquarters building during ceremonies marking the departure of High Commissioner Janet J. McCoy and the termination of her office, 1 July 1987.



Figure 92. Raising the CNMI flag at the former TTPI headquarters building, 1 July 1987.

Admiral Haynes read a letter from Defense Secretary Casper Weinberger which praised McCoy's service and her efforts to bring the TTPI to a successful conclusion. The ceremony, which featured music by the navy band, was officially concluded with the lowering of the Trust Territory flag and the raising of the flag of the CNMI.³⁸⁹ McCoy was the 13th and last TTPI High Commissioner. Ceremonies marking her departure ended Capitol Hill's quarter century run as the TTPI's "provisional capital."

Immediately following McCoy's departure, the CNMI government took steps to occupy the recently vacated administration building on Capitol Hill:

"... the two-story building located on Capitol Hill has been undergoing repairs [over the past two weeks] and would need repair work even after Tenorio and government agencies in the Nauru Building have moved in. The whole roof is leaking and has to be waterproofed."³⁹⁰

In addition to fixing a porous roof, repairs included remodeling office space, replacing the building's antiquated telephone system (that still used a switchboard) and installing a ramp at the main entrance to allow handicap access. It is also likely that second floor offices for the governor and attorney general were expanded at this time (or shortly thereafter) by building out onto the first-floor slabs. This required the installation of precast beams and columns to support the extra weight. Renovation work was funded by a \$100,000 appropriation from the U.S. Congress.³⁹¹

By mid-August 1987, several executive branch offices had relocated to the newly renovated administration building including the governor, attorney general and public auditor. At about this same time, the CNMI Legislature and staff moved into the former TTPI Public Works building (originally the NTTU warehouses) and other agencies took over the remaining concrete buildings in the Capitol Hill Complex. Soon after Janet McCoy's departure, Pedro P. Tenorio became the first CNMI governor to move into the former high commissioner's residence.³⁹² The temporary wooden buildings constructed in the early to mid-1970s were heavily damaged by Super Typhoon Kim that struck Saipan in December 1986. Most of these buildings, including the one non-concrete building in the original NTTU complex, were torn down after this storm.

The remaining TTPI employees, now numbering around 16, relocated their offices into two residential units located in the 1300 block (Units 1312 and 1314).³⁹³ This skeleton staff now worked for the "Office of Transition" headed by architect Charles Jordan. The Office of Transition was primarily

responsible for handling matters pertaining to Palau District, which remained the sole area in Micronesia still administered under the trusteeship agreement. This office operated until September 1991.³⁹⁴

The 1990s were the economic “boom years” for the CNMI during which the tourism and garment industries supported a robust economy. During this decade, the size of the CNMI also grew thanks to a surplus of locally generated revenues. Houses in the Capitol Hill complex continued to serve as private residences principally for off-island contract employees and the former high commissioner’s house became the governor’s official residence. In the early 1990s, the Division of Public Lands (formerly the Marianas Public Lands Corporation) took over the former mess and club building which it later expanded by adding on a concrete block extension.

Other buildings in the complex have undergone renovations over the years. The most common renovation has involved making changes to the large, louvered windows that were present in virtually all of the original NTTU buildings. This window type, while well-designed for natural ventilation, did not lend itself to air conditioning which became increasingly available by the late 1970s. As a result, louvers were often covered over with plywood. In later years, original windows and louvers were removed and replaced with smaller sliding panes, a procedure that required the excess space to be filled in with hollow blocks and concrete.

By 2000, the boom years had given way to a recession thanks to the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s, the SARs epidemic, and a decline in tourist arrivals from Japan. This situation worsened over the next decade, particularly following the loss of the garment industry in 2006, forcing the CNMI government to cut expenditures significantly. The economic decline had a direct effect on the Capitol Hill complex. When housing on the hill was no longer occupied by off-island hires, residential units were taken over as office space or left vacant. Grounds maintenance was also reduced thus allowing for much of the complex’s once tidy landscaping to become overgrown with vegetation. This decline was described by a visitor in 2004 who had worked on Capitol Hill back in its heyday of the late 1960s:

“Now the governor . . . lives in the high commissioner’s residence and the island is all-American. But about a third of the houses on Capitol Hill are lived in, some of the rest limp along as minor government offices, and the rest are abandoned, boarded up, driveways cracked and littered with debris, lawns gone to weeds, and the whole place feels sad.”³⁹⁵

The economic situation has fluctuated over the 20 years since this observation was made as the CNMI government has undergone further downsizing. Today, while Capitol Hill remains the center of Commonwealth government, it is showing its age and lack of maintenance. A particular eyesore is the former Toppa Tappi Club, once the pride of the NTTU complex and temporary home to the Congress of Micronesia, now a gutted shell surrounded by a lot overgrown by vegetation.

Also showing their age are the residential units that once were the most modern on the island. None still serve their original residential function. Many have been renovated to serve as offices for various government divisions and programs, while others abandoned. Beginning in 2012, the government began a systematic program to strip unused residences to their concrete shells, as the first step in converting them to office space. Many suffered extensive termite damage to interior woodwork although others appear to have been relatively termite free.

Today, almost all of the residential units are in use as government offices, some with major modifications, as are the other original NTTU buildings. The HPO is currently developing standards to guide future development on Capitol Hill with the aim of protecting the historical integrity of the complex. Efforts are also underway to nominate the complex for inclusion in the U.S. National Register of Historic Places as a district. If accepted, the Capitol Hill Complex will be the first former CIA site listed on the National Register.³⁹⁶

Although no longer the “modern town which could shame many better-class U.S. suburbs,” the Capitol Hill complex continues to fill an important public function and to serve as a tangible reminder of the important role played by the Northern Mariana Islands in the events of the Cold War, the Trust Territory period, and in the creation of the CNMI and the Republic of the Marshall Islands, the Republic of Palau and the Federated States of Micronesia.



Figure 93. A 2024 Google Earth view of the Capitol Hill Complex.

The Field Survey

Introduction

The author undertook a pedestrian survey of the complex over several months in 2011 during which individual buildings and structures were located, measured and photographed.³⁹⁷ Background research revealed that the buildings dated to two discrete periods. The first, representing the bulk of the extant architecture, was the NTTU complex built by Brown-Pacific-Maxon under Contract NOy 13931 in 1956-57. With one exception, these buildings were built of pre-cast concrete. The second included building remnants, principally concrete foundation slabs, and asphalt paved parking areas constructed between 1962 and the late - 1970s by the TTPI government.

In addition to historic buildings and structures, the survey also encountered several post-Trust Territory features which include a residential homesteading area, a baseball field, two large office buildings, and concrete bus stops. These are considered non-contributing elements of the site. No remnants of sites dating to the World War II and immediate post-war periods were encountered during the survey.

Considerable time was spent locating and reviewing available photographs of the complex to document building chronology and original appearance. Particularly helpful to the field survey was the table of contents from the three-volume "Record Report for Contract NOy 13931" produced by BPM at the conclusion of their contract work and As Built drawings that were acquired in 2017.³⁹⁸ Building nomenclature for NTTU architecture follows the BPM "Record Report" and As Built drawings. They follow naval military terminology undoubtedly used by the contractor to help conceal the complex's true function. TTPI-era features were assigned descriptive names.

The complex may be divided into three principal areas: the main administrative complex and the two residential areas referred to as the 1200 and 1300 blocks. The administrative complex is made up of the main administration/training building, guard house, generator building, parking lots, warehouses (now joined as a single building), the former motor pool and foundation slabs of various TTPI-era office buildings. During the NTTU period, most of this area was surrounded by a chain link security fence. The 1300 block contains 46 houses (six MOQ Senior and 40 MOQ Junior), two training buildings, one chief of station residence, the former gym/auditorium building

and adjacent recreation building (which together were originally referred to as the Community Center), and the dispensary building. Access to this block, situated on the north side of Isa Drive, is provided by one main road and six secondary roads containing a single circle. The 1200 block contains 45 houses (four MOQ Senior and 41 MOQ Junior), four training buildings, one two-story apartment building, the former mess/club, and the remnants of the old Congress of Micronesia complex. Access to this block, situated on the south side of Isa Drive, is provided by one main road and five secondary roads containing four circles.

Contribution features have been numbered on 2024 Google Earth photographs of the Capitol Hill area. These photographs replace poorer quality Google Earth images used in the original 2012 report. As Built drawings and photographs of individual features follow the descriptions presented in this section. Photographs of features were taken in 2011 unless otherwise noted.

Survey Findings

The Capitol Hill complex was assigned site number SP-7-995 by the CNMI Division of Historic Preservation (HPO). This number indicates that the site is located on Saipan (SP), is associated with the post-World War II period (7), and is the 995th site entered into the HPO's Site Inventory database. A total of 137 contributing features were identified during the survey. One additional feature was discovered after the survey and designated Feature 138. They are as follows:

Administration/Training Building (Feature 1): This is a large two-story L-shaped building. One wing measures 155 ft (47.2 m) by 37 ft (11.2 m) and the second 181 ft (55.1 m) by 37 ft (11.2 m). It has overhanging eaves of six ft (1.8 m) on both the first and second floors. Main entry to the building is via a set of concrete steps leading to double glass doors. The building possesses a series of large windows which are configured in sets of four. Originally, individual windows consisted of a central sliding glass pane with screened metal louvers immediately above and below each pane to accentuate airflow. The exception was the southwest corner of the building that had no windows on either the first or second floors. There have been a number of modifications made to this building over the years. Second floor space has been expanded in two locations (onto the first-floor overhang) requiring the installation of concrete columns and beams to support the extra weight. These additions, completed in the late 1980s, are visible on the south elevation of the long wing and the west elevation of the short wing. A stairway to the second floor, providing private access

to the Governor's office, was added at the time of the extension work. Windows also have been modified over the years. In some parts of the building, principally its western elevation, louvered sections have been covered with plywood, but the original sliding panes are extant. In other parts of the building (second floor of the northern elevation) new sliding windows have been installed. Additionally, small windows have been added to the southwest corner where originally no windows were present. In recent years, metal typhoon shutters have been fitted on windows and an elevator was installed. First floor windows on the southern elevation have also been modified. This building was originally occupied by the NTTU and served as its administrative headquarters. It included the office for the chief of station and his main support staff, training rooms, rest rooms, storage areas, and possibly a dark room. With the departure of the NTTU in 1962, this building became the main administration building for the TTPI government. The former chief of station's office was occupied by the high commissioner and the other office space was allocated to principal TTPI staff, including the deputy high commissioner, special assistants, the attorney general, and director of finance. In July 1987, this building was transferred to the CNMI government and underwent extensive renovations including roof repairs, the upgrading of an antiquated telephone system and the expansion of office space. It has undergone additional renovations over the ensuing years. It now serves as the main administrative building for the CNMI executive branch with offices for the Governor, Lt. Governor, and other senior administrative officials. It was named the Honorable Juan A. Sablan Building in honor of the late Mr. Sablan who served as the TTPI deputy high commissioner from 1978-1981.³⁹⁹

Guard Post (Feature 2). This is a single-story rectangular-shaped building of pre-cast concrete measuring 25 ft (7.62 m) by 17 ft (5.18 m). It is located immediately west of the main administration building. It has a flat, gently-sloping slab roof. It was originally fitted with standard pane and louver windows on all four elevations. Remnants of the original windows can be seen on the south elevation, although the louvers have been covered. This building is listed as an attendant structure to the administration building in the BPM report. It was originally constructed to serve as a guard house for the main administrative building. It now serves as the mail room for CNMI government offices.

Generator Building (Feature 3). This is a single-story rectangular-shaped building of pre-cast concrete. It measures 14 ft (4.26 m) by 18 ft (5.48 m) and has a flat sloping concrete roof. It is

located immediately to the southeast of the main administration building. It originally housed a generator that provided backup electrical power to the administration building in emergency situations. Its original function is discernable by the large steel fuel tank that is situated on its eastern side. This tank is no longer in use, having been replaced by another tank that is located on the opposite side of the building. This structure currently houses a large electrical generator and continues to serve its original function.

Parking Lot (Feature 4). This asphalt-topped parking area with concrete curbing was built by the NTTU to service the main administration building. Its original dimensions were 126 ft (38.4 m) by 105 ft (32 m). It was expanded to the north by the CNMI government in the 1990s to accommodate more vehicles. The new parking lot measures 105 ft (32 m) by 70 ft (21.33 m).

Flagpole (Feature 5). This steel flagpole with concrete base is located just to the west of Feature 1. From the photographic evidence, it appears that this feature was a part of the original NTTU complex and has remained in continuous use since the 1950s.

Motor Pool Service Station (Feature 6). This is a single-story rectangular shaped building of pre-cast concrete measuring 85 ft (25.9 m) by 28 ft (8.53 m). It has four service bays, each 11 ft (3.35 m) wide and a covered gas pumping area 10 ft (3.04 m) in width. A modern extension has been added to its western elevation. This service station continued to serve as a gas station following the TTPI takeover but this facility was closed a number of years ago. It now serves as a substation for the CNMI Fire Department.

Parking Area (Feature 7). This is an asphalt-topped parking area (with concrete curbing) associated with Feature 6 and the NTTU motor pool. It measures 112 ft (34.13 m) by 112 ft (34.13 m) and remains in use.

Motor Pool Vehicle Shed Foundation (Feature 8). This is a narrow concrete foundation measuring 120 ft (36.57 m) long by 24 ft (7.31 m) wide. It has a raised lip (with anchor bolts) on three sides (west, north and east) and evidence that a series of support poles were originally present along its south elevation. This foundation was built by the NTTU and was associated with the motor pool vehicle shed building. It served as a covered parking and area for vehicles. It was the

only NTTU structure in the complex whose superstructure was not made of reinforced concrete. It was destroyed by Super Typhoon Kim in 1986.

Concrete Foundation (Feature 9). This is a concrete foundation that supported a wooden office building built by the TTPI sometime after 1969 and reportedly used to house the Social Security Office. It measures 236 ft (71.93 m) long by 32 ft (9.75 m) wide. The wooden superstructure is no longer extant. A small cinder block room, measuring 10 ft (3.04 m) by 8 ft (2.43 m) was built on top of this feature at its southern end. It reportedly functioned as an office vault. This building was destroyed by Super Typhoon Kim in 1986.

Parking Lot (Feature 10). This is an asphalt-topped parking area originally constructed during the TTPI period to accommodate employees working in Feature 9. It is roughly triangular in shape. Its size was not calculated. This feature now provides parking slots for Feature 11.

General Warehouse and Dehumidified Warehouse (Feature 11). These two structures of pre-cast concrete are located immediately northwest of the motor pool and 75 meters south of the administration building. The dehumidified warehouse, located on the western side originally measured 161 ft (49 m) feet by 40 ft (12.19 m). The general warehouse originally measured 140 ft (42.67 m) by 40 ft (12.19 m). Original door and window configurations are documented in the As Build drawings. In 1973 office space was built between these two structures, roughly 68 ft (20.72 m) in width, creating a single office building measuring 161 ft (49 m) by 148 ft (45.11 m). The author worked in this building in 1977-78 at which time it was occupied by the Department of Resources and Development and Public Information. A large steel warehouse (Feature 14) was built immediately to the north of this building sometime after 1969. The joined former warehouses are now known as the Honorable Jesus P. Mafnas Building and house the CNMI legislature. This building has a number of cinder block add-ons along its north, east and south elevations. The administration building, warehouses and motor pool originally were surrounded by a chain link fence topped with barb wire. This fence was removed in 1963 following the TTPI take-over of the complex.

Parking Lot (Feature 12). This is a parking lot immediately to the north of Feature 11 and adjacent to Feature 14. It measures roughly 100 ft (30.48) by 75 feet (22.86 m). It was originally constructed by NTTU and now serves as parking for Feature 11.

Sewer Feature (Feature 13). This feature comprises a square concrete “manhole” type feature with piping and valves situated immediately adjacent to Feature 12. The concrete portion measures five ft (1.52 m) by six ft (1.82 m) and extends into the ground to an unknown depth. Its concrete top is slightly ajar. It is no longer in use although water (or perhaps wastewater) can be heard running into this feature. The feature’s exact affiliation and function are not clear. It appears to represent some kind of water control device, perhaps associated with the original sewer system that serviced the NTTU complex. The foul odor in the surrounding area, suggesting that it may indeed be a wastewater-related feature.

Warehouse (Feature 14). This is a one-story Butler style steel warehouse with a concrete slab built by the TTPI sometime after 1969 and before 1976. It measures 102 ft (31 m) long by 49 ft (14.93 m) wide. It was originally insulated and air conditioned and may have had two floors. A small area at the western end of the warehouse, measuring 49 ft (14.93 m) by 20 ft (6 m), originally served as office space. The rest of the building was used for storage. It was demolished sometime after the 2011 field survey. Only its concrete foundation is extant

Parking Lot (Feature 15). This is an asphalt-topped parking area constructed by the TTPI sometime after 1969 and before 1976 to provide additional parking space for Feature 1. It is located across Isa Drive immediately south of Feature 4. It measures 230 ft (70.10 m) by 90 ft (27.43 m). It is no longer in use.

Parking Lot (Feature 16). This is an asphalt-topped parking area constructed by the TTPI sometime after 1969 and before 1976 to accommodate employees who worked in a temporary office building that was originally located to the north of Feature 1. This building originally served as the Personnel Office for the TTPI. No remains of this building were found during the survey. It is possible that its concrete foundation has been covered by lawn. Feature 16 is no longer in use. Its exact dimensions are difficult to determine as it has been overgrown by grass in some areas.

Concrete Foundation (Feature 17). This is a concrete foundation measuring 72 ft (21.94 m) by 32 ft (9.75 m) located immediately east of Feature 1. It was built by the TTPI sometime after 1969 and before 1976 and supported a wooden office building utilized by the Planning and Budget Office (See Figure 112). Its wooden superstructure was heavily damaged by Super Typhoon Kim in 1986 and subsequently torn down.

Concrete Foundation (Feature 18). This is a small eight-sided concrete foundation slab that originally supported a geodetic dome building occupied by the Trust Territory Public Information Office. This building, which from an extant photograph appears to have been built of wood, possessed roughly 1400 sq ft (130 sq m) of interior space. Its superstructure is no longer extant. It was linked to the Feature 1 by a concrete walkway. Based on photographic evidence, this feature was built prior to 1968.

Flag Pole (Feature 19). This is a flagpole in front of feature 11. Its original date of construction is unknown. An examination of aerial photography from the 1970s suggests that this feature may have been in place at that time although this cannot be confirmed.

Concrete Walkway (Feature 20). This sidewalk connects Feature 1 with Feature 11. It is roughly 200 ft (60.96 m) long by 3 ft (.915 m) wide. It was present in 1969 and may have been an original NTTU feature. A shorter sidewalk connects with Feature 20 to provide foot access to Feature 18.

Tennis Courts (Feature 21). This is a concrete-paved tennis court area comprising three contiguous courts located to the northwest of Feature 1. It measures 120 ft (36.57 m) long by 60 ft (18.28) wide. It is equipped with chain link ball stops at both ends. It was constructed as a part of the original NTTU complex. Today, it is used for pickleball.

Basketball Court (Feature 22). This is a concrete-paved basketball court measuring 85 ft (25.90 m) long by 50 ft (15.24 m) wide. It is located immediately east of Feature 21. Like the tennis courts, this feature was a part of the original NTTU complex.

Married Officers Quarters (Features 23-68 and 79-123). Married Officers Quarters (MOQ), numbering 91, comprise the bulk of the NTTU complex. They were originally rectangular-shaped three-bedroom residences with flat, gently sloping roofs. MOQs were built in two nearly identical configurations – MOQ Senior (n=10) and MOQ Junior (n = 81). MOQ Senior residences measured 81 ft (24.68 m) in length. Their width on the bedroom end was 17 ft (5.18 m) while their width on the kitchen, living room, and dining room end was 27 ft (8.22 m). The MOQ Senior model had 2 ½ bathrooms included a main bathroom, a smaller bathroom off the master bedroom, and a toilet and sink in the laundry area adjacent to the kitchen. The MOQ Junior model was 72 ft in length with widths and layout identical to the Senior Officer model. The Junior model's main differences

were a slightly smaller living room, no master bathroom, and less elaborate master bedroom cabinetry. As originally designed, both models were to have a concrete carport attached to the kitchen end but for budgetary purposes, this feature was not built. In both models, the kitchen had built-in counter space, wooden cabinets and an exhaust vent for an electric range. Adjacent to the kitchen was a utility area containing a pantry, storage closet with a hot water heater, a steel wash sink, and a half-bathroom containing a water closet and wash basin. Each kitchen possessed a serving port with sliding door that provided access to the dining/porch area. The three bedrooms and a main bathroom in both configurations were accessed by a long, narrow hallway. The master bedroom was located at the far end of the residence and had built-in closet space. The tiled (green or pink in color) main bathroom, with a water closet, bathtub, and lavatory sink, was immediately adjacent to the master bathroom. The other two bedrooms had hallway walls of plywood that did not reach the floor or ceiling in order to increase air flow provided by a series of large pane and louver windows throughout the building. These units served an exclusive residential function during the NTTU and TTPI periods. They continued to function as residences after being taken over by the CNMI government in the 1980s. Gradually, however, these houses were either abandoned or transformed into government offices. At the time of the 2011 field survey, only one was still used as a private residence. Currently, all are used for office space or are awaiting renovation work.

Commanding Officer's Quarters (Feature 69). This is a one-story residence that was built for the STS chief of station atop a small knoll on the southeast corner of the 1300 block. Access is provided by a long curving driveway. It had an unpaved security road that ran along its southern and eastern border. Originally, this unit was designed to be significantly larger than both the MOQ Senior and Junior residential models with four bedrooms and a screened in porch off the master bedroom. However, as built, it followed the floorplan of the MOQ Senior model, although it had a concrete carport attached to the kitchen end. Following the TTPI takeover, this house became the residence of the high commissioner. Louvered windows were replaced and the residence was air-conditioned in the 1970s. Several extensions were added to this building over the years, beginning in the TTPI period and continuing after takeover by the CNMI government. It became the CNMI "Governor's Mansion" in the 1980s, but is now vacant. It was last used during the administration of Governor Juan N. Babauta.⁴⁰⁰ As of 2024, a project is under planning to renovate this building so that it can once again serve as the governor's residence.

Generator Building (Feature 70). This feature is a small concrete structure which housed a generator to provide emergency electricity to Feature 69. It is located about 150 ft (45.7 m) north of Feature 69. Based on air photos, it was built sometime after 1976. It currently is in a poor state of repair and does not appear to be functional, although the generator engine is present.

Recreational Building A (Feature 71). This is a large T-shaped building located at the southern end of the 1300 block. The base of the T which originally measured 97 ft (29.56 m) by 52 ft (15.84 m) was referred to as the “multipurpose room.” It served as a basketball gym and auditorium. A wooden stage was present along the southern end of this room for school plays and other activities. Movies were also shown in this room. The upper part of the T, referred to as the “low wing,” measures 103 ft (31.39 m) by 22 ft (6.70 m). The low wing’s overhang extends out 10 ft (3.04 m) on its north elevation and four ft (1.21 m) on its western and eastern sides. During the NTTU administration this portion of the recreation building was used as a snack bar. The multipurpose room originally possessed large louvered windows on its west and east elevations but these were later blocked in. Following the TTPI takeover, the building was named the Capital Hill Community Theatre and it was used as a meeting venue for the Council of Micronesia, the precursor of the Congress of Micronesia, for its initial organizational meetings. It was also used as for the inaugural ceremonies for the new Congress of Micronesia. In 1965 the building became the TTPI Department of Education headquarters. At this time, a second floor was constructed to serve as additional office space. Sometime in the 1960s, the Capitol Hill Rural Branch of the U.S. Post Office was established in the low wing. Following the takeover by the CNMI government, this building was utilized by the Commonwealth Council on the Arts. They were later joined by the Emergency Management Office which occupied the southern and upper portions of the former multipurpose room. Feature 71 and nearby Feature 74 (Recreation Building B) were originally referred to collectively as the “Community Center” during the NTTU period.

Parking Lot (Feature 72). This is an asphalt-topped parking area immediately north of Feature 71 and west of Feature 74. It was constructed by NTTU to provide parking for the Community Center. It was equipped with concrete curbing. The lot measures 240 ft (73.15 m) by 60 ft (18.28 m). It currently serves as parking for CNMI government offices and the Capitol Hill Rural Branch Post Office.

Flagpole (Feature 73). This is a flagpole with a concrete base located to the southwest of Feature 71. It does not appear on air photos up to 1976 suggesting that it was constructed at a later date, possibly after the complex was taken over by the CNMI government. It is now used by the CNMI Emergency Management Office.

Recreation Building B (Feature 74). This is a rectangular-shaped building measuring 161 ft (49.07) by 23 ft (7.01 m). The roof is a low slope gable and it overhangs approximately eight ft (2.43 m) along its western elevation. Elsewhere on the building, the roof overhang is 4 ft (1.21 m). It is divided into two discrete sections by a breezeway that runs through its midpoint. The building is associated with an asphalt parking area and is immediately north of the Recreation Building A. It originally had a series of large pane and louver windows on both its west and east elevations. These windows have been removed and replaced with concrete wall or smaller windows. Hollow block extensions have been added to the building's east elevation to create additional office space. It housed a library, recreation room and post office during the NTTU period. It was used as office space by the TTPI administration and is now occupied by the CNMI Department of Finance.

Dispensary (Feature 75). This is a long, rectangular-shaped building originally measuring 161 ft (49.07 m) by 27 ft (8.22 m). It has a shallow slope gable roof with an overhang of four ft (1.21 m). The building originally served as a dispensary for NTTU staff and family members. At that time, it had four wards with ten beds and rooms for surgery, examination, lab work and X-ray, pharmacy, waiting lobby, and storage. As in other NTTU buildings, the dispensary had pane and louver windows to provide a maximum of air flow. These were later closed to accommodate air conditioning. In the 1970s, a wooden extension was constructed on its southern end (the author worked in this part of the building in 1980). The wooden extension was later replaced by a concrete extension roughly 58 ft (17.67 m) in length. The building is associated with an asphalt parking area and is parallel to and immediately east of the Recreation Building B. It also possesses a short driveway that originally was built to accommodate an ambulance. The building originally had a series of large pane and louver windows on both its west and east elevations. These have been filled in with concrete and a series of smaller windows installed. During the TTPI administration, this building was occupied by the Public Health Department. The author worked in the southern end of this building in the late 1970s while with the TTPI Historic Preservation Office. It is now occupied by the CNMI's Department of Finance.

Mess and Club (Feature 124). This is a large, roughly U-shaped building with maximum dimensions of 129 ft (39.31 m) by 99 ft (30.17 m). The main entry was via double doors located on the south elevation inside of the “U.” The northern section at the base of the U originally housed a bar and lounge. The western arm contained a large kitchen and adjacent dining room. Extant within the kitchen are ceramic tiles that originally covered its walls and flooring together with numerous original electrical outlets. The eastern arm contained storages areas and restrooms for men and women. The building originally possessed large pane and louver windows that provided airflow throughout the dining and club areas. A paved outdoor patio area is immediately adjacent to the building on its northern elevation that was used as a venue for outdoor entertainment during the NTTU period. The bar and lounge were known as Club Toppa Tappi. It continued to serve as a restaurant and club for about two years following the TTPI takeover under the name Mariana Islands District Community Club. In 1965, it utilized by the Congress of Micronesia. At some point prior to 1969, a generator room was built immediately to the west of this structure. Remnants of the generator building are extant. During TTPI times, the club’s large louvered windows were modified and a wooden annex was constructed on the building’s west and north sides. Lag bolts drilled into the concrete decking which anchored the walls of this annex are extant. There is also an extant concrete extension on the southwest corner of this building. It is unclear when this was added, probably sometime in the post-TTPI years. Following Typhoon Jean in 1968, the Nursing Program relocated to this building where it remained until 1970. It then became the “annex” for the Congress of Micronesia whose offices and chambers were located just to the south. Later, the building was used by the CNMI Government as an office for the Division of Public Lands. In the early 1990s, an extension of concrete block walls and a poured concrete roof was added to the structure’s northern elevation. The extension destroyed a portion of the paved outdoor patio (and covered evidence of the earlier wooden annex). This large building is now abandoned and surrounded by jungle growth. Its interior is in very poor shape.

Generator Building (Feature 125). This is concrete building that once housed a generator to provide emergency electrical power to Feature 123. It measures 40 ft (12.19 m) by 13 ft (3.96 m). The northern portion of this building of poured concrete appears to have been constructed first with the southern section, made of cinder blocks and steel pipes (which serve as support columns for a wood and tin roof) having been added at a later date. The northern section probably dates to the

NTTU period. The foundation pad for the original generator is extant at the building's northern end. This building is now abandoned.

Parking Lot (Feature 126). This is an asphalt-topped parking area (with concrete curbing) just to the south of Feature 123 and west of the Congress of Micronesia complex. It measures 280 ft (85.34 m) by 33 ft (10.05 m). It is original NTTU construction built to accommodate parking for Feature 123. For a period of a year between 1961 and 1962, this area served as a playground for students attending the dependents school then housed in the BOQ building.⁴⁰¹ It was later used by the Congress of Micronesia complex built on the rise just to the east of the parking area. It no longer functions as an active parking area but is used periodically as a parking and staging area for events such as religious processions and sporting competitions that take place on Mt. Tapochau.

Bachelors Officer Quarters (Feature 127). This is a two-story building that originally provided quarters for single NTTU personnel or those on temporary duty assignments. It measures 238 ft (72.54) by 22 ft (6.70). It has a shallow gable roof that overhangs 3 ft (.914 m) along its length and 6 ft (1.82 m) at both ends. As originally configured, the first floor had 12 apartment units, with a common bath shared by two adjacent units. The first floor also had a laundry unit, lounge, "trunk rooms" (i.e. luggage storage) for both men and women, and linen storage. The second floor also had 12 apartment units, one double unit for VIP guests, a lounge and laundry area. Both floors also had a covered 4ft (1.21 m) concrete patio area along on the building's western elevation and a 4 ft (1.21 m) walkway on the east side. In 1961, the dependents' school, named for Medal of Honor recipient Harold C. Agerholm, was relocated from World War II-era Quonset Huts on Navy Hill to the first floor of the BOQ.⁴⁰² During the TTPI period, the BOQ served as apartments for single employees. During that time, it went by the name "Denne Hill Apartment." It now serves as office space for the Department of Commerce.

Congress of Micronesia Complex (Features 128-131). This consists of a cluster of three slab-on-grade foundations connected by a concrete walkway and a set of concrete steps with steel pipe hand railing. This complex is located on the hill immediately to the south of the Club/Restaurant. It was built to house the Congress of Micronesia in 1966. The author was unable to establish an exact construction date. These slabs supported wood frame buildings that were originally connected by a covered concrete walkway. The easternmost building, which served as the chamber for the house and senate, was destroyed by a fire on 20 February 1971.

Arson was suspected but no suspect was ever identified. It was widely believed that the building was burned as a political statement by those in the NMI who wished to separate from the rest of Micronesia as a part of establishing a long-term political relationship with the U.S. The other two buildings of this complex later became office buildings. One was used by the Capitol Hill police and the second was used, for a few years, by the TTPI Historic Preservation Office. These buildings are no longer extant and are only represented by their concrete foundations. A modern concrete block building with a poured concrete roof was built on this site in the late 1990s. It is extant but abandoned.

Training Building (Features 77-78 and 133-136). These are six single-story training buildings, four across from the motor pool (Features 133-136) and two at the northern end of the 1300 block (Features 77 and 78). Each building measures 40 ft (12.19 m) by 32 ft (9.75) with a gently sloping gable roof. These buildings are identical in dimensions and roof design to those originally constructed in Marpi and Kagman as components of the three-building complexes that were used for training. These units were not mentioned in the final BPM report or depicted on the design map of the Army Hill complex. It is unclear if they were constructed during the 1956-57 project, or if they were added by NTTU at some point thereafter. The 2011 field survey encountered a duplex-like setup (i.e. two identical residential spaces comprising a bedroom, kitchen, living area and bathroom) in the units that had not been renovated to serve as CNMI office space suggesting that they had been converted for this function sometime after their original construction, possibly by the TTPI as additional residential units for single employees. Currently two (Features 135 and 136) are abandoned and four (Features 77, 78, 133 and 134) have been converted to offices for CNMI government organizations.

Road System (Feature 137). This feature consists of the road system built as a part of the NTTU project to provide vehicle access to individual buildings within the complex. The system contains one main access road, eleven secondary roads and five circles. All roads are asphalt-topped and equipped with concrete curbing and drainage features. The main access roads in both the 1200 and 1300 blocks are approximately 33 ft (10.05) in width. Secondary roads within the complex are a standard 27 ft (8.22 m) in width. Also included in this system is an unpaved road that runs to the south and east of Feature 69. It originally was originally used by NTTU personnel who periodically patrolled the perimeter of the chief of station's residence.⁴⁰³ The northern end of this security road

is no longer extant. In spite of their age, these roads are in excellent shape and had not been resurfaced to any significant extent over the years. Individual roads and circles recently were given street names as a part of a larger island-wide street naming program. For many years, these were the best roads on Saipan and the only ones equipped with concrete curbing and drainage. During the NTTU period, the main road in the 1300 and 1200 blocks were named Northern Marianas Drive and Southern Marianas Drive respectively.⁴⁰⁴

Badminton Court (Feature 138). This is a concrete slab measuring 45 (13.71 m) ft by 28 ft (8.53) located between Features 21 and 22. It was missed during the 2011 field survey due heavy vegetative cover. This feature was originally constructed to serve as a badminton court for NTTU residents of the Army Hill complex.⁴⁰⁵ It is now used as a volleyball court.

Details on Remote Training Facilities

In addition to the features identified by the field survey, the following information is offered on the training facilities built by BPM in Marpi and Kagman in conjunction with the main NTTU complex on Army Hill. Each training facility possessed three buildings: a training building, a bunkhouse, and a toilet/shower facility. The training building and toilet/shower facility were built of precast concrete. The bunkhouse was constructed of wood and corrugated metal on a concrete slab-on-grade foundation.

Training Building. These buildings, measuring 40 ft (12.19 m) by 32 ft (9.75 m), had gently sloping gable roofs and louvered windows. They are identical to the six training buildings extant within the main complex. Half of the building, measuring 40 ft (12.19 m) by 16 ft (4.87 m) had no interior divisions and served as a combination training and dining room. The other half contained a bedroom, bathroom and small office for use by the training officer, and a communal kitchen facility and pantry used for meal preparation.

Bunkhouse. These buildings measured 66 ft (20.11 m) by 18 ft (5.48 m). Walls had 4 by 6 in (10.16 by 15.24 cm) posts, framed with 2 x 4 in (5.08 x 10.15 cm) lumber and covered by corrugated sheet metal. The roof was a simple gable design constructed of wooden rafters, sheathed with plywood and covered with corrugated sheet metal. A series of twelve louvered windows were present on both sides of the building's long axis which provided ample interior airflow. This building accommodated 20 beds and possessed a recreation room at one end. Entry doors were present on both ends of the building.

Toilet/Shower. These buildings, measuring 40 ft (12.19 m) by 12 ft (3.65 m), were made of precast concrete sections and had flat gently sloping roofs and louvered windows very similar to residential units on Army Hill. They had a wash area with 8 lavatory sinks and shower room, and a toilet section with four water closets. The building was also equipped with a dark room presumably for developing photographic prints taken during training exercises.

As no systematic survey of the training sites was undertaken, it is unclear how many of the original eleven compounds are extant. The author visited two training sites in Marpi and one in Kagman. At the two Marpi sites, the walls and roofs of the training buildings had been removed with only the concrete slabs extant. The toilet/shower buildings at both sites were extant as were the bunkhouse foundation slabs. The author suspects that the training buildings were demolished by NTTU personnel at the time of the closure of STS in 1962, given the time and effort required for demolition work and the lack of concrete rubble at either site. At the site in Kagman, the training building and toilet/shower were extant but only the foundation of bunkhouse building was observed. Based on oral information provided to the author, at least one of the training compounds in Kagman was used as a TTPI residence beginning in 1963. The author recommends that a field survey of both areas be undertaken to identify and document surviving training compound remnants.

**Table 1.
List of Features**

No.	Description	Original Affiliation
1	Administration/Training Building	NTTU
2.	Guard House	NTTU
3.	Generator House	NTTU
4.	Parking Lot	NTTU
5	Flagpole	NTTU
6.	Motor Pool Service Station	NTTU
7	Motor Pool Vehicle Shed	NTTU
8.	Concrete Foundation	TTPI
9.	Concrete foundation	TTPI
10.	Parking Lot	TTPI
11.	Dehumidified and General Warehouses	NTTU
12.	Parking Lot	NTTU
13	Sewer feature	NTTU(?)
14.	Steel Warehouse	TTPI

No.	Description	Original Affiliation
15.	Parking Lot	TTPI
16.	Parking Lot	TTPI
17.	Concrete Foundation	TTPI
18.	Concrete Foundation	TTPI
19.	Flagpole	(?)
20.	Concrete sidewalk	NTTU
21.	Tennis Court	NTTU
22.	Basketball Court	NTTU
23.	Married Officer's Quarters, Senior	NTTU
24.	Married Officer's Quarters, Junior	NTTU
25.	Married Officer's Quarters, Senior	NTTU
26.	Married Officer's Quarters, Junior	NTTU
27.	Married Officer's Quarters, Junior	NTTU
28.	Married Officer's Quarters, Junior	NTTU
29.	Married Officer's Quarters, Junior	NTTU
30.	Married Officer's Quarters, Junior	NTTU
31.	Married Officer's Quarters, Junior	NTTU
32.	Married Officer's Quarters, Junior	NTTU
33.	Married Officer's Quarters, Junior	NTTU
34.	Married Officer's Quarters, Junior	NTTU
35.	Married Officer's Quarters, Junior	NTTU
36.	Married Officer's Quarters, Junior	NTTU
37.	Married Officer's Quarters, Junior	NTTU
38.	Married Officer's Quarters, Junior	NTTU
39.	Married Officer's Quarters, Junior	NTTU
40.	Married Officer's Quarters, Junior	NTTU
41.	Married Officer's Quarters, Junior	NTTU
42.	Married Officer's Quarters, Junior	NTTU
43.	Married Officer's Quarters, Junior	NTTU
44.	Married Officer's Quarters, Junior	NTTU
45.	Married Officer's Quarters, Junior	NTTU
46.	Married Officer's Quarters, Junior	NTTU
47.	Married Officer's Quarters, Junior	NTTU
48.	Married Officer's Quarters, Junior	NTTU
49.	Married Officer's Quarters, Senior	NTTU
50.	Married Officer's Quarters, Junior	NTTU
51.	Married Officer's Quarters, Junior	NTTU
52.	Married Officer's Quarters, Junior	NTTU
53.	Married Officer's Quarters, Senior	NTTU
54.	Married Officer's Quarters, Junior	NTTU
55.	Married Officer's Quarters, Junior	NTTU
56.	Married Officer's Quarters, Junior	NTTU
57.	Married Officer's Quarters, Junior	NTTU

No.	Description	Original Affiliation
58.	Married Officer's Quarters, Junior	NTTU
59.	Married Officer's Quarters, Junior	NTTU
60.	Married Officer's Quarters, Junior	NTTU
61.	Married Officer's Quarters, Junior	NTTU
62.	Married Officer's Quarters, Junior	NTTU
63.	Married Officer's Quarters, Junior	NTTU
64.	Married Officer's Quarters, Junior	NTTU
65.	Married Officer's Quarters, Senior	NTTU
66.	Married Officer's Quarters, Junior	NTTU
67.	Married Officer's Quarters, Senior	NTTU
68.	Married Officer's Quarters, Junior	NTTU
69.	Commanding Officer's Quarters	NTTU
70.	Generator House	TTPI
71.	Recreation Building A	NTTU
72.	Parking Lot	NTTU
73.	Flag Pole	?
74.	Recreation Building B	NTTU
75.	Dispensary	NTTU
76.	Parking Lot	NTTU
77.	Training Building	NTTU
78.	Training Building	NTTU
79.	Married Officer's Quarters, Senior	NTTU
80.	Married Officer's Quarters, Junior	NTTU
81.	Married Officer's Quarters, Junior	NTTU
82.	Married Officer's Quarters, Junior	NTTU
83.	Married Officer's Quarters, Junior	NTTU
84.	Married Officer's Quarters, Junior	NTTU
85.	Married Officer's Quarters, Junior	NTTU
86.	Married Officer's Quarters, Junior	NTTU
87.	Married Officer's Quarters, Junior	NTTU
88.	Married Officer's Quarters, Junior	NTTU
89.	Married Officer's Quarters, Junior	NTTU
90.	Married Officer's Quarters, Junior	NTTU
91.	Married Officer's Quarters, Junior	NTTU
92.	Married Officer's Quarters, Senior	NTTU
93.	Married Officer's Quarters, Junior	NTTU
94.	Married Officer's Quarters, Junior	NTTU
95.	Married Officer's Quarters, Senior	NTTU
99.	Married Officer's Quarters, Junior	NTTU
97.	Married Officer's Quarters, Junior	NTTU
98.	Married Officer's Quarters, Junior	NTTU
99.	Married Officer's Quarters, Junior	NTTU
100.	Married Officer's Quarters, Junior	NTTU

No.	Description	Original Affiliation
101.	Married Officer's Quarters, Junior	NTTU
102.	Married Officer's Quarters, Junior	NTTU
103.	Married Officer's Quarters, Junior	NTTU
104.	Married Officer's Quarters, Junior	NTTU
105.	Married Officer's Quarters, Junior	NTTU
106.	Married Officer's Quarters, Junior	NTTU
107.	Married Officer's Quarters, Junior	NTTU
108.	Married Officer's Quarters, Junior	NTTU
109.	Married Officer's Quarters, Senior	NTTU
110.	Married Officer's Quarters, Junior	NTTU
111.	Married Officer's Quarters, Junior	NTTU
112.	Married Officer's Quarters, Junior	NTTU
113.	Married Officer's Quarters, Junior	NTTU
114.	Married Officer's Quarters, Junior	NTTU
115.	Married Officer's Quarters, Junior	NTTU
116.	Married Officer's Quarters, Junior	NTTU
117.	Married Officer's Quarters, Junior	NTTU
118.	Married Officer's Quarters, Junior	NTTU
119.	Married Officer's Quarters, Junior	NTTU
120.	Married Officer's Quarters, Junior	NTTU
121.	Married Officer's Quarters, Junior	NTTU
122.	Married Officer's Quarters, Junior	NTTU
123.	Married Officer's Quarters, Junior	NTTU
124.	Mess/Club	NTTU
125.	Generator Building	NTTU
126.	Parking Lot	NTTU
127.	Bachelor Officer Quarters (BOQ)	NTTU
128.	Parking Lot	NTTU
129.	Congress of Micronesia building foundation	TTPI
130.	Congress of Micronesia building foundation	TTPI
131.	Congress of Micronesia building foundation	TTPI
132.	Congress of Micronesia concrete stairway	TTPI
133.	Training Building	NTTU
134.	Training Building	TTPI
135.	Training Building	TTPI
136.	Training Building	TTPI
137.	Asphalt Road System	NTTU
138.	Badminton Court	NTTU



Figure 94. A 2024 Google Earth view of the headquarters area depicting feature numbers.



Figure 95. A 1969 view of the headquarters area. All of the buildings visible are NTTU period with the exception of Feature 18.




Figure 96. A 1976 view of the headquarters area showing new TTPI buildings.



Figure 97. A 2024 Google Earth View of the northern end of the Capitol Hill Complex.



Figure 98. A 2024 Google Earth View of the northcentral section of the Capitol Hill Complex.



Figure 99. A 2024 Google Earth view of the northern half of the 1200 block in the Capitol Hill Complex.



Figure 100. A 2024 Google Earth view of the southern end of the Capitol Hill Complex.




Figure 101. As Built first floor plan view of original NTU administration building (Feature 1)




Figure 102. As Built second floor plan view of Feature 1.



Figure 105. Feature 1 looking northeast. Note former guard house (Feature 2) at far left.



Figure 106. Main entrance to Feature 1. Note wheelchair ramp that was added during 1987 renovation work.



Figure 107. Southwest elevation view of Feature 1. This photograph was taken during renovation work to install an elevator to the second floor. Note exposed columns and beams that were added to support the new office space on the second floor in the late 1980. Original pane and louver windows have been replaced on this wing.



Figure 108. Northeast elevation view of Feature 1. Note window modification on first floor. Windows on second floor appear to be original although the louver sets have been covered with plywood. Metal storm shutters have been mounted on all windows. The concrete foundation in foreground is Feature 17.



Figure 109. Feature 1, second floor office extension.



Figure 110. Feature 1, second floor office extension and stairway built in the 1980s.




Figure 111. As Built plan view of the NTTU guard building (Feature 2).




Figure 112. As Built elevation views of Feature 2.




Figure 113. As Built plan view of the original NTTU generator building (Feature 3).




Figure 114. As Built elevation views of Feature 3.



Figure 115. Feature 2 exhibiting original pane windows (with louvers covered). Note metal storm shutters.



Figure 116. Feature 2, north elevation. This elevation has had most of the original windows blocked in.



Figure 117. Original NTTU generator building, Feature 3. Old fuel tank at right.



Figure 118. Main entrance, Feature 3. Current fuel tank visible at right.




Figure 119. As Built plan view of former NTTU motor pool service station (Feature 6).




Figure 120. As Built elevation views of Feature 6.



Figure 121. Feature 6. Looking west. Note that northernmost service bay has been walled off.



Figure 122. Feature 6. Looking south. Note original tapered columns and beams and low-slope gable roof.



Figure 123. West elevation of Feature 6. Note concrete block extensions to the original building.



Figure 124. South elevation of Feature 6. Windows, which are not original, have been equipped with metal storm shutters.




Figure 125. As Built elevation and plan views of original NTTU Motor Pool Vehicle Shed (Feature 7).



Figure 126. Foundation slab of Feature 7.



Figure 127. Concrete slab of Feature 9, a TTPI-era government office building. Looking northeast.



Figure 128. Concrete block room located at the east end of Feature 9. It originally functioned as a vault.




Figure 129. As Built plan view of NTTU dehumidified warehouse (Feature 11a).




Figure 130. As Built elevation views of Feature 11a.




Figure 131. As Built plan view of NTTU general warehouse (Feature 11b).




Figure 132. As Built elevation views of Feature 11b.



Figure 133. Feature 11a-c. The original dehumidified and general warehouses were made a single building in the early 1970s with the addition of central office space. The two original NTTU warehouses (Features 11a and b) can be seen at either end of the combined building. The building is now occupied by the CNMI legislature.



Figure 134. East elevation of Feature 11b showing concrete block extension added in the 1970s.



Figure 135. West elevation of Feature 11a. Windows and concrete block extension are not original.



Figure 136. Northwest corner of Feature 11a showing original tapered columns and gently sloping gabled roof. Also visible is a small cinder block extension. Windows at right are not original NTTU period construction.



Figure 137. South elevation of Feature 11a showing original outline of the NTTU dehumidified warehouse.



Figure 138. Concrete block extension on west elevation of Feature 11a built in the early 1970s.



Figure 139. Feature 13. A sewer manhole associated with original NTTU complex



Figure 140. Feature 14. This steel “Butler” style warehouse was built by the TTPI government sometime after 1969. It was subsequently demolished after the 2011 survey. Only its concrete slab is extant.



Figure 141. Feature 17, a TTPI-period building immediately adjacent to Feature 1, as it appeared in 1978. Also note Feature 1's original first floor overhang (at left) prior to office expansion in the late 1980s.



Figure 142. Feature 17. The wooden superstructure of this building was destroyed by a storm in 1986.



Figure 143. Feature 18, a TTPI-era geodesic dome while under construction circa 1967.



Figure 144. Feature 18. Only its concrete slab of the geodesic dome is extant.



Figure 145. Feature 21, a NTTU-period tennis court with chain link ball stops at both ends.



Figure 146. Feature 22, a NTTU-period basketball court pictured during a municipal ceremony in 2024. Its original chain link fence was replaced during a recent renovation project.




Figure 147. As Built plan view of a Married Officers Quarters (MOQ), Junior.
The concrete carport off the kitchen end was not constructed to save cost.




Figure 148. As Built elevation views of a MOQ, Junior.




Figure 149. As Built plan view of a Married Officers Quarters (MOQ), Senior. The concrete carport off the kitchen end was not constructed to lower cost.



Figure 150. As Built elevation views of a MOQ, Senior. The same plans, with the addition of the concrete carport, were used to construct the chief of station's residence (Feature 69).



Figure 151. A MOQ, Junior in the 1300 block (Feature 50). This was the best-preserved example of this feature type documented by the survey. Note original pane windows. Original aluminum louvers are present above and below the panes, covered with painted plywood. This building was subsequently stripped for renovation with the loss of all original window, door and interior details.



Figure 152. Feature 50 kitchen entrance. Not sloping, flat-slab roof. Kitchen on left side with utility area and half-bath to right. Hot water line with original black insulation is visible running just below roof slab. Kitchen door appears to have its original frame with a louver area above door.



Figure 153. Feature 50 showing dining room/porch details. Note original aluminum louvers on bottom of the two-window set. Others are also present but covered with painted plywood. Original outdoor light fixture is also present.



Figure 154. Feature 122, a MOQ, Junior showing the bedroom end. The three metal rods protruding from the wall were used to hold plywood shutters that were put over windows during tropical storms.



Figure 155. Feature 50 with original sliding pane windows and lower aluminum louvers. Upper louvers are also present.



Figure 156. Feature 50 with original louvered kitchen window. Also note stove vent and insulated water piping that runs on outside of wall.



Figure 157. MOQ, Junior (Feature 123) kitchen showing original cabinet details but painted white. Also original are the pane windows with the upper metal louvers covered with plywood and exposed electrical conduit and outlets.



Figure 158. MOQ, Junior (Feature 113). Half-bath at left and main bathroom. Wall tile in main bathroom is original. Colors included pink and light blue.



Figure 159. Feature 50. Tongue and groove wall separating living room from kitchen and laundry with its original stain and varnish finish. Note small closet and double light fixture which are both original.



Figure 160. Feature 50. Serving window connecting kitchen with dining area. This detail possesses its original stain finish. Lifting handles have been removed but the original screw holes remain.



Figure 161. Feature 50 showing original bedroom wall partition designed to maximize air flow.



Figure 162. MOQ, Junior (Feature 128). Master bedroom cabinet details. Exterior of cabinets have been repainted white. Original dark stain finish is visible inside.



Figure 163. MOQ, Senior (Feature 65). Master bathroom details. Also present is a shower stall at right. Wall tiling suggests that the bathroom was originally fitted with a large pane and louver window. The original window was modified by covering the lower half with plywood and inserting a smaller window with glass louvers (of the kind popularly used in the 197s and 80s). The size of the lower portion of the original window is delineated by the green edging tile.



Figure 164. Feature 65. Master bedroom cabinet details. Original dark varnish stain finish has been repainted white.



Figure 165. MOQ, Senior (Feature 53) showing master bathroom module. It was originally fitted with a large pane and louver window



Figure 166. MOQ, Junior (Feature 123). This unit was renovated to serve as office space with minimal changes.



Figure 167. MOQ, Junior (Feature 121). This unit has been stripped to its concrete shell in advance of renovation.



Figure 168. MOQ Junior (Feature 119) newly renovated for the Public School System. Original window spaces have been made smaller with concrete blocks. An extension was added to the back of this unit (Figure 170).



Figure 169. Feature 119 showing sizable concrete block extension (at right) and window alterations.




Figure 170. As Built plan view of Feature 71, Recreation Building A.




Figure 171. As Built elevation views of Feature 71.




Figure 172. As Built plan view of Feature 74, Recreation Building B.




Figure 173. As Built elevation views of Feature 74.



Figure 174. North elevation of Feature 71 showing modifications. Also visible are Features 72, a parking lot and 74, Recreation Building B (at left). These three features comprise the original NTTU Community Center.



Figure 175. South elevation of Feature 71. The parking area is not an original feature.



Figure 176. East elevation of Feature 71 showing the “multi-purpose” room at left and a portion of the “low wing.” The original large windows in the multi-purpose room have been closed. Note concrete block extension at far left



Figure 177. Feature 71, low wing detail. Note tapered vertical and horizontal support elements and wide roof overhang.



Figure 178. West elevation of Feature 74, Recreation Building B. Its original windows are no longer extant. Note tapered beams and columns and the covered walkway through the mid-point of the building. Feature 72 is in foreground.



Figure 179. North and west elevations of Feature 74 showing tapered vertical and horizontal support members and low-slope gabled roof.




Figure 180. As Built plan view of Feature 75, the NTTU dispensary.




Figure 181. As Built elevation views of Feature 75.



Figure 182. West and north elevation views of Feature 75 showing tapered vertical and horizontal support members. Feature 76, the original dispensary parking lot, is visible in foreground.



Figure 183. North elevation of Feature 75 with original driveway used for ambulance service. This elevation has not been modified with the exceptions of signage and paint.




Figure 184. As Built plan view of Features 77, 78, 133, 134, 135 and 136, Training Buildings




Figure 185. As Built elevation views of the Training Building.



Figure 186. Entrance end of Feature 136. Original door, center right, was converted to a window.



Figure 187. Feature 136. Bathroom and kitchen details. This original training building was modified to serve as a duplex residence during the TTPI period.




Figure 188. As Built plan view of Feature 124, NTTU mess/club building.




Figure 189. As Built elevation views of Feature 124.




Figure 190. As Built elevation views of Feature 124.



Figure 191. Feature 124 south elevation view. This building is abandoned and overgrown in vegetation that obscures the original main entrance doors.



Figure 192. Feature 124 north elevation view showing CNMI-era expansion.



Figure 193. Feature 124 showing the surviving portion of the original paved deck area. The extension at far left was added by the CNMI government in the 1990s. The original building section is also visible but its large windows have been modified. The COM annex was built immediately adjacent to the original building on top of the deck. The covered hallway at far right is a relatively recent addition to the original building.



Figure 194. Kitchen of Feature 124. Note tiled walls (originally aqua blue) and wires for a modern drop ceiling.



Figure 195. Dining area of Feature 124. Original pane and louver windows have been replaced.



Figure 196. Original bar and dance area of Feature 124. Plywood represents post-NTTU ceiling and partitioning.



Figure 197. Bathroom in Feature 124 showing original tiling, lavatory sink and stall partitions.



Figure 198. Feature 124 showing a concrete block extension built to house a government office in the 1990s.



Figure 199. Feature 125, a generator building for the original NTTU mess/club. It was expanded by the TTPI.




Figure 200. As Built first and second floor plan views of the Bachelors Officer Quarters (Feature 127).




Figure 201. As Built elevation and section views of Feature 127



Figure 202. South and east elevation views of Feature 127 showing south end stairs to second floor.



Figure 203. North elevation view of Feature 127 showing steps to second floor, tapered support elements, and low-slope gable roof with substantial overhang. Railing is not original





Figure 204. As Built plan and elevation views of NTTU training area bunk house found in Kagman and Marpi.




Figure 205. As Built plan and elevation views of NTTU training area toilet facilities found in Kagman and Marpi.



Figure 206. Bunkhouse slab in Marpi. Its wood and tin superstructure is no longer extant.



Figure 207. Toilet facilities building in Kagman.

The Capitol Hill Complex: An Evaluation of National Register Significance

Introduction

For a property to qualify for listing on the National Register of Historic Places it must meet at least one of the National Register Criteria for Evaluation by being associated with an important historic context and retaining historic integrity of those features necessary to convey its significance. The four Evaluation Criteria include:

Criterion A. Properties associated with events that have made a significant contribution to the broad patterns of our history.

Criterion B. Properties associated with the lives of persons significant in our past.

Criterion C. Properties embodying the distinctive characteristics of a type, period, or method of construction, or that represent the work of a master, or that possess high artistic values, or that represent a significant and distinguishable entity whose components may lack individual distinction.

Criterion D. Properties that have yielded, or may be likely to yield, information important to prehistory or history.

Additionally, properties must be at least 50 years old to be considered for National Register listing unless a case for exceptional significance can be made.

Contextual Summary

The Capitol Hill Complex is associated with the context tentatively titled “The Northern Mariana Islands and the Cold War, 1947 to 1990.” Key islands in the Northern Marianas were seized by the United States military in the summer of 1944 in a series of fierce battles with Japanese troops. Saipan and Tinian subsequently became important forward airbases that supported a campaign of strategic bombing against the Japanese home islands. Although the United States and the Soviet Union were allies during the war, their relationship deteriorated rapidly in the months following Japan’s

capitulation in August 1945 leading to a “Cold War” that continued for the next three and a half decades. The Cold War has been defined as

“ . . . the period of conflict, tension and competition between the United States and the Soviet Union and their allies from the late 1940s until the early 1990s. Throughout the period, the rivalry between the two superpowers was played out in multiple arenas: military coalitions; ideology, psychology, and espionage; military, industrial, and technological developments, including the space race; costly defense spending; a massive conventional and nuclear arms race; and many proxy wars.”

To confront the new challenges of the Cold War, the Truman administration reorganized the nation’s foreign policy and military establishments. This included the passage of the National Security Act of 1947 (PL 80-235) which merged the War and Navy departments into a Department of Defense and created the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the nation’s first peacetime intelligence organization. The CIA was patterned on the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) which dropped agents into Nazi-occupied Europe in World War II. During the first years of its existence, the CIA directed the majority of its financial and human resources into covert paramilitary operations at the expense of espionage. Its covert operations during the early years were directed by the super-secret Office of Planning Coordination headed by former OSS officer Frank Wisner.

As a part of its larger Cold War strategy, it was U.S. policy to retain the former islands of Japanese Micronesia, including the NMI, to serve as a barrier against Soviet expansion as well as to protect against the possible resurgence of a hostile Japan. The military proposed to build a series of mutually-supporting air and naval bases throughout Micronesia to ensure that these strategically-located islands, captured in costly battles with the Japanese, would never again be used by a foreign power to threaten the security of the United States.

Although exclusive control of the region became a bedrock tenant of U.S. foreign policy, a contentious debate broke out between Navy and Interior regarding what form this control should take. The military argued for outright annexation of Micronesia and the imposition of a military-administered government similar to naval rule on Guam during the pre-war years. Interior officials, on the other hand, pushed for civilian rule (with their department serving as the administering agency) under a United Nations trusteeship. President Truman ultimately rejected annexation and military rule in favor of a “strategic”

trusteeship agreement that protected U.S. military and security interests while minimizing charges of colonialism by the Soviet Union and its allies. The Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (TTPI), as former Japanese Micronesia came to be called, was the sole strategic trusteeship established by the U.N. and was initially administered by the U.S. Navy.

Early plans to maintain air and naval facilities in Micronesia were scrapped as military assets in the Pacific were redirected to the Atlantic Ocean during the early post-war years to meet the growing Soviet threat to Western Europe. The military role in Micronesia was reduced further when, on 1 July 1951, the Department of Interior assumed administrative control of the TTPI. Elbert Thomas, President Truman's pick as the first civilian high commissioner, appointed Chicago businessman and adventurer, Henry Hedges, as the district administrator of the Saipan District. With this transfer, Interior emerged victorious in its six-year bureaucratic struggle to bring the TTPI within its administrative orbit.

Two events, however, were to dramatically change the trajectory of both U.S. and Micronesian history. The first was the 1949 Communist victory over Chiang Kai-shek during the Chinese Civil War, an event which forced Nationalist forces to seek refuge on Taiwan. The second came the following year with the outbreak of the Korean War and the subsequent entry of the People's Republic of China into that conflict a few months later. The U.S. interpreted these events as a systematic attempt by China and the Soviet Union to expand communist influence throughout East Asia. The loss of China (an important World War II ally) to communist forces, in particular, led to recriminations within the U.S. government and to the rise of McCarthyism which was to significantly affect American life in the 1950s.

Truman resisted calls to launch air attacks against the Chinese mainland to avoid having the Korean conflict expand into a larger war in Asia. In an effort to take pressure off U.S. ground forces, however, Truman approved CIA plans to initiate covert paramilitary operations against China. Although most covert operations were undertaken in conjunction with the Chinese Nationalist government, the CIA implemented a separate program known as HTMERLIN that sought to train and equip guerrilla forces without Chiang Kai-shek's knowledge. This so-called "Third Force" was made up of anti-communists who were not allied with nor had loyalty to the Nationalist government. The CIA believed, wrongly as it turned out, that this Third Force represented a substantial pool of anti-communist resistance

fighters, which, if given proper training and equipment, could pose a significant internal threat to the Communist regime.

In early 1950, the CIA selected Saipan to serve as a secret training locale for the Third Force and other covert operations in Asia. The northern end of the island was set aside for this purpose while the former Tanapag Naval Air Station was selected to serve as the Agency's administrative and residential headquarters. For the first few months, the Asian Refugee Foundation served as the front for CIA operations on the island but it was replaced by the Far Eastern Foundation in early 1951.

The first Third Force group, recruited in Hong Kong and routed through Guam under bogus employment contracts, trained on Saipan and subsequently was air-dropped into Manchuria in 1952. It was never heard from again. A second group, also trained on Saipan a few months later, played a key role in one of the CIA's worst fiascos of the Cold War period – the shoot down in November 1952 of a Civil Air Transport aircraft over Manchuria that resulted in the death of two pilots and the capture and imprisonment of two young CIA agents. One of the agents, John Downey, had selected the team and helped train it on Saipan in the lead up to the disaster. This failure led to a thorough review of training protocol and to the implementation of new procedures that ensured that groups of trainees were strictly segregated during their time on Saipan and prohibited CIA operatives from flying future insertion, resupply and extraction missions over the Chinese mainland.

Undeterred by this failure, the CIA pressed on with other covert programs in the Far East. To ensure the security of its activities in the Saipan District, the CIA sought and secured a presidential order that returned Saipan and the neighboring island of Tinian to Navy rule. This change officially went into effect on 1 January 1953 when Interior officials were replaced by Navy personnel. Seven months later, all of the islands north of Saipan were also placed under naval rule, leaving only the southernmost island of Rota under civilian control. These decisions made in Washington significantly affected the indigenous communities in the NMI both in the short and long terms.

By mid-1953, the Far Eastern Foundation gave way to the Navy Technical Training Unit or NTTU which was created to serve as the pseudo-military front for CIA training operations on the island. For the next three years, NTTU, like its predecessors, operated out of former NAS Tanapag which came to be called "Lower Base." At some point after NTTU was established, probably in 1954 or early 1955, a decision was made to build it a new stormproof administrative and residential headquarters on

Army Hill. The project was assigned to the conglomerate firm of Brown-Pacific-Maxon (BPM) under the Bureau of Yards and Docks' contract NOy13931 "Post-War Construction Marianas Area."

BPM undertook its construction projects in cooperation with Pacific Island Engineers which was responsible for developing typhoon- and earthquake-resistant designs suitable for tropical climates. This umbrella contract, under which scores of projects worth more than 200 million dollars were completed, allowed the CIA to discretely complete the NTTU complex as a part of a larger program of military-related construction without raising undue suspicions.

The NTTU Restoration Project, as it was officially designated by the Navy, commenced in 1956 and reportedly cost nearly 30 million dollars to complete. It was undertaken by 500 Filipino workers who lived in a largely self-contained, segregated compound situated on the outskirts of Garapan Village. Construction continued through early 1957 and resulted in a modern community that could easily be mistaken for a tidy California suburb. Living conditions in the NTTU complex, with its utilitarian but comfortable residences, landscaped yards, paved roads, gymnasium, and a commodious restaurant and club, contrasted sharply with those of Saipan's indigenous residents who occupied substandard housing largely built from materials salvaged from abandoned military facilities.

The Saipan Training Station, as the facility was called by the CIA, accommodated hundreds of recruits from a variety of Asian nations who were trained in isolated facilities located in the Kagman and Marpi areas of Saipan. During this time, NTTU served as an important source of employment for local civilians but the secrecy surrounding its operations effectively cut Saipan and Tinian residents off from the rest of the TTPI and prohibited economic development of any consequence. It also resulted in the isolation of Rota to the detriment to its small Chamorro population. NTTU's base and training programs were kept secret from periodic UN Visiting Missions through the efforts of the Saipan Naval Administration which in addition to protecting NTTU was also responsible for tending to the needs of the indigenous community.

In 1957, the Saipan Training Station played a brief but important role in STCIRCUS, a top-secret operation that trained Tibetan agents who served as the CIA's eyes and ears in their home country. The first six-man team underwent five months of intensive training in Marpi before being air-dropped back in Tibet. Although the program would continue for more than a decade, it became apparent that Saipan's tropical climate and low elevation were unsuitable for the trainees. As a result, subsequent

groups of Tibetan recruits were trained at Camp Hale in Colorado which provided temperature and altitude conditions more closely resembling those found in Tibet.

By the time President Kennedy assumed office, UN scrutiny of the TTPI was intensifying. In 1961, a United Nations Visiting Mission released a critical report that noted a number of problem areas including the split in administrative control between Interior and Navy, limited educational and economic opportunities for TTPI residents, and a growing separatist movement in the Marianas District which the Mission believed resulted from employment and infrastructure benefits not available in other parts of the TTPI. By the end of 1961, a decision was reached to terminate CIA operations, end naval rule, and transfer the TTPI headquarters from Guam to Saipan effective 1 July 1962. The exact reasons behind the closure of the Saipan Training Station remain unclear, although it is likely that President Kennedy's dislike of the CIA and the need to address United Nations' recommendations were key factors.

With the departure of the CIA, the former NTTU complex officially became the new governmental headquarters for the TTPI on 4 July 1962. Although billed as "provisional," the complex served as headquarters from the transfer until the final dissolution of the TTPI government more than two decades later. Over the years, several temporary office buildings were erected to accommodate growing space requirements of the central government. Housing on Capitol Hill, as this area came to be known, was highly sought after by TTPI employees and it became home to scores of American and Micronesian contract employees in the mid- to late 1960s.

In keeping with decisions made by the Kennedy administration, the TTPI government, supported by steadily increasing annual budgets from the U.S. Congress, concentrated on education and the teaching of English to ready Micronesians to vote on their future political status, an event that was initially planned for 1968. The desired outcome of this process, specified in National Security Action Memo 145, was for Micronesia to become a viable territory in permanent association with the United States. This was seen as a necessary step both to silence UN criticism and to ensure that long-term U.S. security interests in the western Pacific region.

Toward that end, the High Commissioner, with Interior's blessings, permitted the formation of the Congress of Micronesia (COM) which was viewed as a necessary agent in creating a pan-Micronesian political identity. The COM maintained its offices and legislative chambers on Capitol Hill (first in the

old mess/club and later in a new three-building complex), and became a training ground for a generation of Micronesian political leaders. The COM, however, was never popular with a majority of Marianas District residents who, in addition to concerns about issues of taxation and economic development, felt that the COM's interest in pursuing freely associated status threatened their plans to quit the Trust Territory and establish a bilateral relationship with the United States. By the early 1970s, relations between the Marianas District and the COM reached rock bottom as evidenced by a suspicious fire that destroyed a portion of the COM complex. It was widely believed that the fire was a politically motivated act of arson but the guilty party was never identified.

During the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Capitol Hill complex served as the focal point of political development with many Micronesians assuming senior positions in the TTPI administration. Capitol Hill also served as a visible symbol for indigenous critics of the TTPI government who referred to it as "Mount Olympus" and its ranking administrators, almost exclusively mainland Americans, as "gods and goddesses" whose flawed, anti-Marianas District policies ran counter to the best interests of the indigenous communities. In spite of the criticism, Capitol Hill remained a desirable residential area for TTPI contract employees, both American and Micronesian. One group that distained "Capitol Hill Americans" were U.S. Peace Corps Volunteers who were encouraged to eschew its relative luxury and to live at the level of the average indigenous resident.

Although it was original U.S. policy to keep the TTPI together, in 1972 the Marianas District initiated separate political negotiations with the United States. This represented a long-standing desire by a majority of indigenous residents to secure economic benefits that accrued from U.S. citizenship. That the U.S. government agreed to bilateral negotiations stemmed from what one historian called a brief "window of opportunity" resulting from a number of factors including a U.S. shift in Asian policy as reflected in President Nixon's visit to China in 1972 and a continued Soviet presence in the Pacific that caused the U.S. military to place high value on denying them any base in Micronesia.

Over the next two years, NMI and US negotiators hammered out an agreement leading to the creation of the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI) that encompassed all of the islands in the Mariana Archipelago north of Guam. The Covenant, as this agreement is known, was ratified by NMI voters and the U.S. Congress and signed into law by President Ford in March 1976. This agreement provided local self-government, U.S. citizenship for CNMI residents, and a range of federal

financial assistance all under the umbrella of U.S. sovereignty. In return, the NMI agreed to lease two thirds of Tinian and the tiny island of Farallon de Medinilla for use by the U.S. military.

With the signing of the Covenant, the NMI formed the CNMI government which was headquarters at the Civic Center in Susupe. At this time, many CNMI residents terminated their employment with the TTPI to assume positions in the CNMI government thus leading to a significant reduction in the size of the headquarters staff on Capitol Hill. Over the next several years, as status negotiations between the U.S. and the other jurisdictions of the TTPI (Palau, the Marshall Islands, and the central core group of Chuuk, Pohnpei, Kosrae and Yap) moved forward, TTPI headquarters staff from around Micronesia began departing for the respective home islands.

By 1980, the TTPI began the piecemeal transfer of buildings in the Capitol Hill complex to the CNMI government. This continued for the next several years as an ever-shrinking TTPI headquarters staff continued to handle transition matters relating to the termination of the Trusteeship and the establishment of the freely associated entities which included the Republic of the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia and the Republic of Palau.

By 1987, the main administration building was transferred to CNMI control and was soon occupied by the second elected CNMI Governor Pedro P. Tenorio and some of his senior staff and departments. It has been used by successive governors over the past quarter century. The former NTTU warehouses, joined into a single building in the early 1970s, now serves as office space and meeting chambers for the CNMI Legislature. Other NTTU buildings such as the recreation buildings and dispensary are now occupied by CNMI executive branch offices. All of the temporary wooden buildings constructed during the TTPI utilization of the complex are no longer extant with the exception of their slab on grade concrete foundations.

Over the past decade, the former NTTU residences, more than 90 in number, were either abandoned or renovated and used as office space. The former NTTU chief of station house was used as the official residence for the governor through the early 2000s. It has been abandoned for many years but a renovation project is currently in the works. The government no longer provides grounds maintenance for the entire complex and portions of the Capitol Hill area are now shabby in appearance. The complex has long since lost its status as the island's most exclusive residential area but all of the concrete buildings originally constructed for NTTU are extant. Although neglected, these sturdy,

utilitarian buildings continue to serve a useful and significant function nearly 70 years after their construction.

Significance Justifications

The author considers the Complex to be eligible for National Register listing under Criterion A and Criterion C. The Complex possesses both local and national significance.

Criterion A. The Capitol Hill Complex is significant under Criterion A due to the key role it played in the U.S. prosecution of the Cold War by first serving as an administrative and residential headquarters for a secret training base run by the Central Intelligence Agency (1956-1962) and then as the provisional capital of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (1962-1987), the sole “strategic” trust created in the aftermath of World War II.

Saipan was selected in early 1950 to support HTMERLIN, a top-secret program to train and equip Chinese guerrillas who were completely independent of the Nationalist government. To keep this “Third Force” program secret from Chiang Kai-shek, the CIA made arrangements to use Saipan as the initial training locale due to its relative isolation and its proximity to Guam which offered major supply and logistical resources. Soon after, it had Saipan and Tinian returned to military control to ensure the secrecy of its Saipan operations.

The HTMERLIN program was emblematic of early CIA Cold War strategy that stressed paramilitary operations at the expense of more traditional espionage functions. These action-oriented programs, while popular with CIA planners during the early Cold War period, met with virtually no success and normally resulted in the death or capture of operatives shortly after their insertion behind enemy lines.

Saipan played a direct role in one of the most traumatic episodes in CIA Cold War history – the shoot-down of an aircraft over Manchuria conducting a resupply mission of a Saipan-trained team. This incident resulted in the death of two Civil Air Transport pilots and the capture and long imprisonment of two young CIA agents. It also proved to be an embarrassment to the U.S. government when, 20 years later, President Nixon was forced to admit that the men in captivity were CIA operatives.

In spite of HTMERLIN’s lack of success, additional recruits from China and, later, other Asian countries, continued to be trained on Saipan throughout the 1950s. Although training programs were

custom tailored to the needs of the group, it appears that all groups brought in to Saipan followed a standard routine: trainees were flown into Saipan, usually at night, and then transported to Marpi or Kagman in covered trucks where they remained sequestered in their respective training areas for the duration of their stay on the island. Once training was completed, they were flown back to U.S. airbases in Japan and Korea for re-insertion on the Asian mainland.

In 1956 construction started on a new weather-proof headquarters for NTTU on Army Hill. The two-year project resulted in a modern residential and administrative center that accommodated over 100 CIA personnel and their families. In addition to supporting covert Cold War operations over a six-year period, the Complex also provided the local Chamorro and Carolinian population a revealing glimpse of American suburban life and access to a variety of employment opportunities which were non-existent in other parts of the TTPI. The complex, with its neat, airy buildings surrounded by landscaped lawns and connected with a paved road system, stood in stark contrast to substandard living conditions that existed elsewhere on the island. It also served as a tangible sample of what might be possible should indigenous residents achieve close political association with the U.S.

In 1961, facing increasing scrutiny from the United Nations, the Kennedy administration terminated CIA operations on Saipan and returned the Saipan District to civilian control effective 1 July 1962. Due to the availability of the complex, Saipan was also named the TTPI provisional capital. This marked the beginning of a major policy shift for the TTPI that the U.S. believed necessary to continue effective long-term control of Micronesia while avoiding charges of colonialism in the UN. These changes, articulated in National Security Action Memorandum 145 (NSAM 145,) assumed that Micronesia would never be a viable entity and that, if properly educated, its residents would choose to become a territory permanently associated with the United States.

Over the next quarter-century, the complex served as the focal point for governance and political development in the TTPI. It was here that Americans and their Micronesian counterparts worked, lived and socialized side by side. It was here also that the Congress of Micronesia was headquartered. This organization played a central role in Micronesian political development and in the long-term political agreements ultimately negotiated by the various Micronesian island groups and the United States government. These agreements, including the Covenant with the Northern Mariana Islands, fulfilled a longstanding U.S. Cold War objective of bringing these strategically-placed island groups into long-term political association to ensure that they were not acquired by other foreign powers.

Criterion C. The Complex tentatively may be considered eligible under Criterion C since it was built in an architectural style that is characteristic of a type, period and method of construction. Preliminary information suggests that the complex was designed by Pacific Island Engineers (PIM) which was contracted by the Bureau of Yards and Docks simultaneously with the construction firm of Brown-Pacific-Maxon. These two conglomerate firms worked in tandem to rebuild the post-war military and civilian infrastructure primarily on Guam but also in the Northern Mariana Islands and Yap.

PIM was made up of three partnered firms: Fredrick R. Harris, Inc. of New York, and Blanchard & Maher and Keller & Gannon of San Francisco. It was tasked with developing a new generation of military housing to replace the ubiquitous Quonset Hut that had been built in large numbers during World War II. PIM utilized a wide range of experts to assist with developing design solutions appropriate for the Marianas region. This included identifying aggregate and concrete mixtures that could be pre-cast to form typhoon- and earthquake-resistant buildings.

The buildings in the complex, with a single minor exception, are composed of pre-cast concrete elements that were fabricated on Guam and then shipped to Saipan via barge. The individual elements were then trucked to Army Hill and assembled on-site using cranes. The only concrete elements cast on site were slab-on-grade building foundations.

These designs were utilitarian but comfortable. All buildings, with the exception of the warehouses, had numerous, large windows, usually arranged in sets of two, three or four, which included a central sliding pane element supplemented by screened aluminum louvers which were located immediately above and below the pane section. These window designs were prevalent through the mid-1950s after which they were replaced by designs that included fewer windows of a smaller size. This change resulted from the introduction of air conditioning which lessened the need for natural airflow.

Single family housing units came in two nearly identical varieties, one for junior officers and the other for senior officers. While they had the same floor plan and identical number of bedrooms, quarters for senior officers possessed a small bathroom that led off the master bedroom and had a slightly larger living room. All residential units originally were equipped with rattan furniture much of which was later inherited by the TTPI.

The apartment building (referred to as the BOQ) for unmarried or temporary employees and several of the other buildings in the complex utilize tapered vertical frame members of reinforced concrete and their horizontal frame members are also tapered. Major buildings not utilizing tapered vertical and horizontal frame members include the main administration building and the mess/club. In keeping with the time of their design and construction, all buildings featured overhanging eaves. Later designs (circa late 1950s to early 1960s) eliminated the overhang. With respect to roofs, buildings either had flat, sloping slabs or roofs of low-slope gable configuration.

Based on photo documentation, none of the buildings in the complex had exterior paint. The only painted exterior elements were the thin wooden window screen frames. The lack of paint, while giving the complex a rather drab appearance, was practical from a maintenance standpoint, as it eliminated the need for periodic scraping and repainting. All buildings were assigned numbers. Most of the former residential units still maintain their original numeric designation.

It is unclear from the research conducted to date whether all of the buildings in the complex were specially designed for the NTTU Restoration project or whether they may have been previously developed designs that were mixed and matched for this project. Additional research will be necessary to confirm this point. The author suspects, based on a review of documentation of surviving early 1950s military construction on nearby Guam, that these buildings were specifically designed for NTTU. In any event, the buildings in the complex represent a style of military construction dating to a short period between the late 1940s and the mid-1950s, designed for local conditions and utilizing advances in concrete technology.

Integrity

In addition to meeting one or more significance criteria, a property must also possess integrity to be eligible for National Register listing. Integrity, for purposes of the National Register, consists of the following aspects: location, design, setting, materials, workmanship, feeling and association. The author suggests that the complex possesses sufficient integrity for it to qualify for Register listing under Criterion A.

The field survey revealed that all buildings originally constructed for the NTTU complex are extant with the exception of a vehicle shed associated with the former motor pool. The temporary wooden

office buildings constructed after the TTPI takeover in the 1970s, on the other hand, are gone with the exception of their respective foundation slabs. Intrusive additions are limited to recent office buildings, a baseball field and a small residential subdivision (built on the northern edge of the complex) but these do not detract from or mask the essential layout of the former NTTU headquarters. Vegetation that has grown up over the past 40 years, however, has obscured the view of the entire complex which was once visible when yards and other public areas were mowed and large trees few in number.

With respect to Criterion C, it should be noted that all of the buildings have undergone some level of modification since their original construction. One of the principal modifications has been to reduce the size (and in some cases the number) of the numerous large windows that originally were present in nearly all of the buildings. Building interiors have also undergone substantial modifications over the years. Termite damaged woodwork in residences that were abandoned for varying periods of time (before being renovated to serve as offices) has been removed and replaced. Add-ons to buildings have also occurred, notably to some residential units and the former mess/club building. Some of the buildings have had their exteriors painted.

In spite of the changes over time, the complex retains its essential features that enable it convey its historical identity.

Endnotes

1. Russell (2012).
2. Dujmovic to Russell (2012). At the time of this communication Nicholas Dujmovic served as the CIA's deputy chief historian. He was sympathetic to the author's research and provided as much guidance and advice as his position allowed. He is now the director of the Intelligence Studies Program at Catholic University of America, Washington, D.C. The author made a series of FOIA requests to the CIA for records associated with the STS beginning in 1983. In replies prior to acknowledging the existence of the STS, the CIA routinely stated that it could "neither confirm nor deny the existence or nonexistence of records responsive" to my requests.
3. The sole NTTU building no longer extant is the motor pool's vehicle shed that was of metal construction. Its concrete foundation survives. The large steel warehouse dating to the TTPI period documented during the 2011 survey subsequently was removed. Its concrete foundation is extant.
4. Capitol Hill appears on the current USGS map of Saipan and has been adopted by the CNMI government. Some, however, believe that it should be Capital Hill. The author reviewed the TTPI magazine, *Micronesian Reporter*, to investigate the name's usage history. The first reference to this new place name was found in the January/February 1963 edition which used Capitol Hill (Volume XI, Number 4:1). For the next four years, the magazine's editors used Capitol Hill and Capital Hill interchangeably. Beginning in 1968, Capitol Hill was used exclusively. Capitol Hill was also used in the TTPI newsletter *Highlights* produced by the Office of the High Commissioner during the 1960s and 70s.
5. According to the 2020 U.S. census, Capitol Hill Village had a population of 979.
6. Alig (1965; 1967); Camba (1967:10).
7. Alig (1967).
8. Interview of Antonia P. Deleon Guerrero, June 12, 2011.
9. Bowers (2002:96).
10. Anonymous (1945:1).
11. Interview of Antonia P. Deleon Guerrero, June 12, 2011
12. George Orwell, "You and the Atomic Bomb," (October 19, 1945). Orwell used this term to describe a world living in shadow of the threat of nuclear war. It was first used to describe the geo-political tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union by Bernard Baruch, financier and Presidential advisor in 1947. Lippmann (1947) gave his term wide currency.
13. Peattie (1988:1-3).

14. Carano and Sanchez (1964:178).
15. Spennemann (2007:7).
16. *Ibid.*, 154-175; Hiery (1999:227).
17. Peattie (1988:43-44).
18. *Ibid.*, 44-47.
19. *Ibid.*, 58.
20. Miller (1991:75); Tohmatsu (1998:70). The Washington Naval Treaty of 1922 prohibited the fortification of Guam and the SSM for ten years.
21. Government of Japan (1922:1).
22. Peattie (1988:100-103).
23. Russell (1984:60-68).
24. Tohmatsu (1998:110-112).
25. Evans and Peattie (1997:445).
26. Harries (1991:195).
27. Executive Order 8683 (February 14, 1941).
28. Crowl (1960:2).
29. *Ibid.*
30. *Ibid.*, 22-24.
31. *Ibid.*, 13.
32. Miller (1991:360).
33. Griffin (1999:133-134).
34. Crowl (1960:61-62).
35. *Ibid.*, 39.
36. *Ibid.*, 264.
37. *Ibid.*, 265.

38. Russell (2017:48).
39. LeMay and Yenne (1988:120-127).
40. Anonymous (1945:1).
41. Sablan (2011); Saipan Permanent Installations Map (February 3, 1945). The author was advised by NARA that the main files for the Western Pacific Base Command, unlike those of the South Pacific Base Command and the Central Pacific Base Command, are not among its record groups. It is likely that they no longer exist.
42. Anonymous (1945:1).
43. *Ibid.*, 1.
44. Meller (1999).
45. “Five Ships Due to Carry Home-Bound Men Off Saipan before Month’s End: 16,288 Wait,” (October 19, 1945:1).
46. Anonymous (1946). The Saipan Loran Station 337 was operational November 1944 and upgraded to cinder block buildings in 1952. It was deactivated in January 1978 (Dixon, et al. 2019:37).
47. Forrestal to Truman (1945).
48. Truman (1945). During the first two years following the end of the war, the Navy fought a tenacious battle with the Army for long-term control of the Pacific. This conflict in the Pacific arena involved the future regional roles, missions, and eventually budgets of the two services. The Army was particularly keen to retain control of Saipan which it hoped to use as an advance airbase. See Friedman (2009:7-97).
49. Ickes to Truman (1945:1).
50. *Ibid.*, 2.
51. *Ibid.*
52. Willens and Siemer (2005:15).
53. *Ibid.*
54. Friedman (2009: 215).
55. *Ibid.*, 217-218. The Cold War (circa 1946 to 1991) was a sustained period of political conflict, military tension, proxy wars, and economic competition between the communist bloc – primarily the Soviet Union and its satellite states and allies – and the democratic

countries of the West, primarily the United States and its allies. It came to include China, as well.

56. Ickes (1946: 22-23; 67).
57. *Ibid.*, 67.
58. *Ibid.*
59. Friedman (2009, 188).
60. *Ibid.*, 137.
61. *Ibid.*, 202.
62. Executive Order No. 9875 (July 22, 1947).
63. Freidman (2009, 250). The first three high commissioners were naval officers.
64. Weiner (2008:24-26).
65. Letter, May 14, 1949 from Harry S. Truman to Secretary of the Navy
66. Warner (1994:142).
67. *Ibid.*, 141; “Navy Activity Shifting to Atlantic Waters,” January 31, 1949.
68. Anonymous (1973:4).
69. Warner (1994:216).
70. *Ibid.*, 215.
71. Anonymous (1973:5). With respect to the use of OPC and CIA, Anderson noted the following: “For the first two years of its existence, from 1948 to 1950, OPC was regarded as quite separate from the CIA, even though it was ‘housed’ within the Agency. This distinction blurred as the two organizations began to be integrated in late 1950, and disappeared altogether with their full merger in 1952” (2020:xi).
72. Leary (2002:70-71).
73. Weiner (2007:32).
74. Anonymous (1973:4). Author names for this article were redacted in the sanitized copy released by the CIA in 2006. There was no love lost between OPC and OSO. The OPC looked upon OSO staff passive as “librarians” or “washerwomen gossiping over laundry,” while the OSO viewed the OPC as amateur “cowboys” whose reckless actions threatened OSO secret intelligence networks (Prados 2006:65). These two offices did manage to cooperate effectively

during the Korean War. On 1 August 1952, they were merged into a combined directorate that came to be known as the Clandestine Services (Anonymous 1973:1).

75. *Ibid.*
76. Prados (2006:47).
77. Anderson (2020:178).
78. Prados (2006:45).
79. Kurtz-Phelan (2018).
80. Leary (2002:3-21).
81. Leary (2002:85).
82. *Ibid.*, 82. In 1950, the CIA assumed control of Chennault's financially ailing airline through a series of obscure corporate moves that made CAT a subsidiary of American Airdale Corporation. Henceforth, CAT, now restructured as CAT, Inc. with headquarters in Hong Kong, would be involved in a wide variety of covert CIA missions in Asia (Leary 2002:67).
83. Fried (1997). The First Red Scare occurred in 1919-1920. The second, often referred to by the political term "McCarthyism," began in the early post-World War II years in response to a fear of Communist subversion. Mao's victory over Nationalist forces in China contributed significantly to this destructive phenomenon.
84. Peebles (2005: 99).
85. Prados (2006:126-127).
86. Jeans (2018:xxiv); Prados (2006:161-165).
87. Waller (2011:232).
88. Briscoe (2013a:70).
89. CIA Director's Log (May 10, 1950).
90. Conboy and Morrison (2002:47).
91. Huston (1988:35); Compo (2014:1). Louis Compo (1929-2023) was the son of Captain (and later Rear Admiral) George L. Compo who served as the military governor of the Saipan District from August 1947 to June 1949. Louis worked for the Vinnell Company on Saipan for approximately one year between 1947 and 1948. He kindly shared with the author copies of color photographs he took while working on Saipan and provided basic information about the Vinnell Company.

92. Huston (1988:34); Compo (2014:1).
93. CIA Director's Log (May 10, 1950).
94. CIA Director's Log (May 19, 1950).
95. Donaldson (1996:16).
96. United Nations (1950).
97. Peebles (2005:75).
98. Leary (2002:129).
99. Dujmovic (2006:2)
100. Warner (1994:32); Smith considered covert operations his "dish of tea" Prados (2006:68). Smith resigned as DCI at the end of the Truman administration and was replaced by Allen Dulles in January 1953. Dulles, the first civilian DCI, had unprecedented access to the White House and to the Secretary of State, who was his brother, John Foster Dulles (Warner 1994:xxvii).
101. Commander in Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet (1950). This memo has two hand-written annotations of interest: "Not to be used in history" and "Interior does not have copy." CIA code words, known as cryptonyms, are made up of two parts: a two-letter diagraph for signals security, followed by a randomly chosen word (Thomas 2006:36). Diagraphs designate geographical or functional areas. Cryptonyms are used as code names for operations, individuals, organizations, and facilities. OQKODIAK was the CIA cryptonym used for its secret Saipan facility (Memorandum, Pratt 1968:5).
102. Lowndes (1950:1). A large ammunition storage area was established by the U.S. military in 1945 at the northern end of Saipan in anticipation of the invasion of Japan. It covered approximately 1,900 acres (769 hectares). Much of this ordnance was still in deteriorating storage facilities in May 1949 when a series of fires caused numerous detonations (Anonymous 1949:1-3). Tons of unexploded bombs, rockets, mortar and artillery shells, and fuses were scattered over a wide area. Limited clean-up operations were undertaken in early 1950 but much of the Marpi area remained extremely dangerous and led to Lowndes' order. Following NTTU's departure, it remained off limits. Marpi was not opened to the public until September 8, 1968 after additional clean-up work performed under the direction of demolition expert Steve Aiken (Kluge 1967:11-19; *Highlights* October 8, 1968:4).
103. Commander in Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet (1950).
104. *Ibid.*
105. *Ibid.*
106. Anonymous (1950:10).

107. Spoehr (2000:98-99); Johnson (1999:1). A firsthand account of brass mining by residents of San Roque Village in the late 1950s and early 1960s is provided by Juan L. Babauta in Ray, et. al (1996). According to Babauta, San Roque residents sometimes encountered NTTU trainees during trips north of the village during unauthorized hunting and brass collecting forays. They ran the constant risk of being apprehended and jailed by NTTU security personnel if they were caught in the restricted area. There was also a firm originally contracted by the TTPI government in November 1951– Micronesian Metal and Equipment Company – that undertook scrap metal salvage operations on Saipan and Tinian. Referred to as “Micro Metals” by the community, its staging area in the Puntan Muchot area was the origin of the name Micro Beach. This firm was a significant source of jobs for the indigenous community during the 1950s.
108. Employment records (names redacted), Trust Territory Prior Service Trust Fund, Saipan. According to James B. Johnson, two advance CIA personnel visited Saipan in 1950. He stated that they arrived shortly after the closure of Tanapag Naval Air Station. Mr. Johnson politely but firmly refused to reveal any further details on this topic to the author (Interview of Johnson, March 16, 1997). His recollection of the timing of their arrival was subsequently confirmed by primary source documents which the author acquired in 2011.
109. Employment Records, Trust Territory Prior Service Trust Fund.
110. Gaynor (1968:2); Pratt (1968:7). With respect to TPFOCUS, Edwards states that diagraph TP designated Korean War operations (2010:166).
111. Briscoe (2013a:71); Edwards (2010:153-154).
112. Leary (2002:138). Delury (2022:170) refers to this front organization as Far East Industries.
113. CIA Director’s Log (September 20, 1951); Delury (2022:173).
114. “Navy to Shift Rule of Pacific Islands to Interior Department” (June 23, 1950).
115. Elbert D. Thomas (1883-1953) was undoubtedly the most distinguished of the civilian TTPI high commissioners. After graduating from the University of Utah in 1906, he served as one of the first Mormon missionaries to Japan from 1907 to 1912. During his mission work, he learned Japanese fluently and came to have a high regard for the Japanese people and their culture. After returning to the U.S., Thomas earned a PhD from UCLA and served three terms as a Democratic senator representing Utah. During the war, Thomas made monthly Japanese language broadcasts to Japan urging the people to resist the militarists. Truman appointed him to serve as the first civilian TTPI high commissioner in 1951 following his failed bid for re-election, a loss that was credited to McCarthyism.
116. TTPI High Commissioner to Secretary of the Navy, March 20, 1950. The deputy high commissioner was J.A. McConnell.
117. *Ibid.*
118. *Ibid.*

119. HICOMTERPACIS (April 17, 1951).
120. *Ibid.*
121. Benavente (1951). A companion speech, also very positive in tone, was given by the Saipan Chief Commissioner at this same event (Sablan 1951). It may be assumed that these leaders felt obligated to write speeches that were complimentary of the Navy. Several years later, Benavente expressed his preference for naval rule to a visiting newsman, in light of the higher wages it paid in comparison with Interior. He did state that the Navy “spoiled the people by giving them everything free for three years after the war” with the result that “no one wants to go back to the farms” (Trumbull 1959:23).
122. Executive Order No. 10265 (June 29, 1951); Truman (1951).
123. “Samoa and Trust Territory Transferred to Department of the Interior” (1951).
124. *Ibid.*
125. “South Pacific Gets Ex-Seabee Back as Boss” (June 5, 1951); “Five Administrators Named to Govern Trust Territory,” (June 25, 1951).
126. Interview of Manuel T. Sablan December 12, 2011. Mr. Sablan stated that he was assigned to assist Hedges (1901-1969) following his arrival on Saipan in June 1951. Sablan later served as chief of the Saipan Constabulary. According to a contemporary observer, “Hedges was the type of man who gave the impression he would love wherever he was, and whatever he was doing. Clad in his usual working costume of wide-brimmed hat with a band of shell beads, flowered Hawaiian shirt, khaki shorts, and Japanese sandals, ‘Hank’ looked like ‘Mr. South Seas’” Trumbull (1959:58).
127. “A Chicagoan is Making Saipan a Cattle Island,” (January 6, 1952).
128. Leary (2002:138).
129. Delury (2020:171).
130. Smith (1995:215).
131. Delury (2020:95).
132. CIA Director’s Log (September 10, 1951).
133. CIA Director’s Log, (November 9, 1951).
134. CIA Director’s Log (November 26, 1951). The staff agent, John Douglas Noble, Jr. (1913-2002), served as Guam’s Commissioner of Public Safety from 1952 to 1954. Noble retired from the CIA in 1969 following a twenty-year career with the Agency. Dujmovic notes that CIA terminology for its personnel has changed over time. Staff agents and contract agents of

the late 1940s to early 1950s are now referred to as case officers and non-official cover officers respectively (2011:240-241).

135. SECNAV (1951). Tinian was never utilized by the CIA.
136. Randolph (1951:2).
137. Marshall (1951a:1).
138. Leary (2002:85). Delury states that these small groups were referred to as Jedburgh teams or “Jed teams” after a successful OSS operation by the same name that dropped trained allied agents into Nazi-occupied Europe during World War II (2022:75).
139. Dujmovic (2006:2).
140. Peebles (2005:102).
141. *Ibid.*
142. *Ibid.*, 103; Dujmovic (2006:3).
143. Dujmovic (2006:2-3). Downey was known to the Chinese operatives because he trained them on Saipan. When he was captured, a Chinese security officer pointed to him and said in English, “You are Jack. Your future is very dark” (Dujmovic 2006:3). Fecteau was released in December 1971. Downey remained imprisoned until March 1973, shortly after President Richard Nixon publicly acknowledged his CIA connection.
144. Burns (2010:1-3). The CIA produced an hour-long documentary about the event which was premiered to CIA employees at the Agency’s Langley, Va. Headquarters in 2010. It was not open to the general public but at least one reporter participated in the screening. According to one CIA insider, “Downey and Fecteau’s capture was one of the most glaring examples of the CIA’s failed covert policy against China in the early 1950s” (Lilly 2004:81).
145. Burns (2010:3). Another post-operational concern was whether the CIA had ignored warnings that Team Wen had been turned by the communists based on an analysis of message signals received from the team in the months leading up to the fatal flight (Dujmovic 2006:3).
146. Dujmovic (2006:2).
147. Lilley (2004:82-83).
148. Leary (2002:140).
149. *Ibid.*, 142.
150. Report of Proceedings by the United States Senate (April 17, 1952:11).
151. McGranery (1952:1).

152. Under Secretary of the Interior (1952:1)
153. *Ibid.*, 3.
154. Executive Order No. 10408 (November 10, 1952).
155. Kimball (1952:1).
156. Chapman (1952) Elbert Thomas after learning of the plan to transfer the northern islands to naval control, announced that he planned to resign once this transfer had been completed. Thomas died suddenly in February 1953. “Trust Island Commissioner Dies,” (February 13, 1953). His replacement, Frank E. Midkiff (1887-1983), was appointed by President Eisenhower in March of 1953. He was a longtime resident of Hawaii and served as the president of the Kamehameha schools from 1923 to 1934. Midkiff resigned as high commissioner in September 1954 after his request for ambassadorial status by was denied by the Eisenhower administration.
157. Letter, Chapman (1953).
158. “Navy Commander Takes Saipan Post,” (February 16, 1953).
159. *Ibid.*
160. “Saipan, Tinian Shift Hints Secret Project,” (January 12, 1953).
161. *Ibid.*
162. *Ibid.*
163. Delury (2022:187-189).
164. *Time* (1953:22).
165. *Time* (1953:22).
166. *People Today* (1953:8).
167. Chief of Naval Operations (1953). This notice assigned financial responsibility for NTTU to the Bureau of Aeronautics. The Far Eastern Foundation (FEF) was replaced by the Naval Technical Training Unit (NTTU) following the Navy’s administrative takeover, although there appears to have been an overlap of the two organizations lasting about four months. Redacted employment records of the Prior Service Trust Fund indicate that the NTTU began hiring employees in 1953 with the first documented employee being hired in May of that year. FEF continued hiring employees through May of 1953, which was also confirmed during an interview of Jose Q. Deleon Guerrero (June 12, 2011). Prados noted that the cover organization “Western Enterprises” was dropped in 1953, after which the CIA began using a new cover, the “Naval Technical Training Center, a variant of the naval

- cover assignments that OSO officers had sported from the beginning of the program” (2006:133). This may explain the cover change at the STS that same year.
168. Interview of Don Brennan November 5, 2010. Brennan, an active-duty Marine, was detailed to the CIA and served as NTTU’s security officer (1958-1960). He underwent an extensive background check before being cleared for his tour of duty with the CIA on Saipan.
 169. Interview of Francisco C. Ada in Willens and Siemer (2004:3). Based on the author’s interviews with former local employees of NTTU, although they were aware of the secrecy surrounding NTTU’s mission and operations, they remained ignorant of the CIA’s involvement until well after the STS was decommissioned.
 170. Goerner (1966:141). The Navy referred to the CIA as the Sponsoring Agency, Interested Agency, or simply Agency in most of its official communications. NTTU was also commonly referenced. The CIA, however, was rarely referenced in writing.
 171. “Navy sets new rules on travel to Saipan, Tinian” (1953:2).
 172. District Land Officer (January 14, 1960).
 173. Kahn noted “no country unfriendly to the United States has ever been represented on one of these missions, but even so some of the reports, considering the diplomatic language all such documents are couched in, have been highly critical” (1966:41).
 174. Itinerary United Nations Visiting Mission on Saipan and Tinian (January 1956). Lorenzo DLG Cabrera, who worked for the Saipan golf course in 1956, recalled that the course’s registration book was hidden from view during the Visiting Mission’s lunch there since it included the names and affiliation of NTTU patrons. During the Mission’s meeting with local leaders, Gregorio P. Castro, a landowner in the Marpi area of Saipan, attempted to raise his concerns regarding the loss of his property to the NTTU. As his English was not fluent, he relied on a translation by Olympio T. Borja. According to Consolacion C. Togawa who was present at this meeting, Mr. Castro’s concerns were not relayed accurately to the Mission, reportedly to protect NTTU operations (Togawa, September 15, 2011). Castro later filed a court case over this matter but did not prevail (Castro v. United States, 1974).
 175. Interview of Lorenzo DLG Cabrera, August 12, 2011.
 176. Interviews revealed that friendships were formed between local residents and NTTU personnel during work and social interaction, some of which were maintained for decades. Robert Schmitz, during his tenure as STS chief of station (May 1961 to July 1962), instituted weekly golf matches for 14 teams, each consisting of two Americans and two Saipanese employees, who competed for trophies, including a perpetual trophy dubbed the “Schmitz Golden Goblet” (Schmitz 1986:86). These matches were intended to strengthen employee morale. It is the author’s impression that NTTU was less concerned with security when it came to indigenous community members given their reticence about asking questions, a trait developed during the previous Japanese administration and wartime period.

177. Weiner (2007:74).
178. “Progress Report on NSC 146/2, United States Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Formosa and the Chinese National Government” (The Operations Coordinating Board, July 16, 1954:2).
179. *Ibid.*, 6.
180. *Ibid.*, 24.
181. Jeans (2018:192). Jeans also states that when Cai learned of the impending program termination, he considered establishing a sugar refinery on Saipan to employ some of his soon-to-be demobilized Third Force personnel (2018:193).
182. Dulles to Jones (1953). The State Department also concurred with the proposed EO but noted “the return of part of the Trust Territory to administration by a military agency will no doubt result in speculation and comment in the United Nations and it is not unlikely that some Delegations may be critical of this action” (Morton 1953).
183. Nucker (1957:2). For seven months following the execution of the Executive Order, Rota was administered informally by TTPI based in Hawaii. On 23 February 1954, the Rota District of the TTPI was officially created by an executive order issued by the high commissioner and approved by the Office of Territories (Letter, Lausi to Nucker, February 23, 1954).
184. Law (1954:2).
185. U.S. Navy Development of Guam, M.I. (Compiled by Commander Naval Forces Marianas, Base Development, September 1950:19).
186. *Ibid.*, 19.
187. *Ibid.*; Caro (2002:404-406). The relationship between Johnson and Brown continued through the 1960s. During the Vietnam War, Brown and Root was often referred to as “Burn and Loot” by anti-war opponents.
188. Goerner (1966:85). Goerner was given this cost estimate by a top official in the Pacific Bridge Company, one of the three firms that formed BPM. This amount would equate to approximately \$275,000,000 today.
189. Brown-Pacific-Maxon (1957). This work was designated Project 324 under Contract NOy 13931.
190. Mason Architects (2009:24). The Bureau of Yards and Docks engaged Pacific Island Engineers and Brown-Pacific-Maxon at the same time and these two firms collaborated for more than seven years. Pacific Island Engineers utilized expert engineers at renowned universities to meet early requirements including aggregates and concrete specifications appropriate for typhoon- and earthquake-resistant buildings (*Ibid.*, 24). There is the possibility that some of the designs in the Complex may also have been developed by

another partnered firm Fisk – Johnson and Perkins – Ossipoff – Preis which was given a Navy contract in late 1952.

191. “Designs from the late 1940s through the mid- 1950s generally have more numerous, larger window openings than the designs from the late 1950s which were constructed circa 1960 (This is probably due to the increased reliance on air conditioning in housing of later dates). Earlier designs depended more on the cooling effects of natural ventilation, hence larger openings to admit more airflow.” Mason Architects (2009:36).
192. Goerner, (1966:123).
193. Brown, Pacific, Maxon (1957).
194. Petri (2010:1); Interview of Rosa S. Cabrera, August 12, 2011. Petri was a Coastguardsman who served on Saipan in 1955-56 during the construction of the NTTU Complex. Cabrera was employed by NTTU from 1954-62 as a clerk in the shipping and receiving office at Lower Base. She kindly provided the author a digital file of her NTTU identification tag which appears in this volume.
195. Brown, Pacific, Maxon (1957); Goerner (1966:141).
196. McCollum (n.d.:2-3).
197. McCollum (n.d.:1,8). McCollum also noted that the newly built facility on Army Hill was initially referred to as ‘New Base’. (n.d.:3). The term Lower Base appears to have been used exclusively by 1960.
198. Interview of Consolacion C. Togawa, September 15, 2011. Togawa informed the author that she encountered BPM workers at the Saipan Style Center on a weekly basis during 1956. The Saipan Style Center was one of the largest retail stores on Saipan during this period.
199. “Saipan Constabulary Accused of Maltreating BPM Employee” (May 4, 1956).
200. Interview of Lorenzo DLG Cabrera, August 12, 2011.
201. “Saipan Constabulary Accused of Maltreating BPM Employee” (May 4, 1956).
202. *Ibid.*, 13.
203. Although no bylines were listed, the author suspects that the *Guam Daily News* employed one or more Filipino reporters in the mid-1950s who may have taken special interest in the treatment of their countrymen by BPM. A *Guam Daily News* reporter was allowed to visit Saipan to investigate the matter. His draft article, reviewed by the Navy, included the headline “Flipping Lid off Secret Navy Project” which was subsequently changed. COMNAVMAR was also concerned by a request from the Associated Press (AP) representative in Manila asking for incident details. Naval officials worked to “tone down” the story believing that Manila would discredit the Navy unless the AP could be induced to treat it as a “local incident” (COMNAVMAR 1956:1). Similar intervention was

- undertaken with the AP representative in Honolulu. A thorough investigation of the incident was conducted by the Navy (both COMNAVMAR and NAVAD) in response to a formal request from the Philippine Foreign Ministry made through the U.S. State Department. The investigation concluded that Misa had assaulted an American employee of BPM and that his injuries had been sustained when he forcibly resisted Insular Constabulary personnel during his arrest and imprisonment. No follow up stories on this incident appeared in local or regional papers.
204. “Filipino Priest was Not Ousted, Says BPM Boss” (August 23, 1956).
 205. *Ibid.*, 2. The BPM compound, built on land originally owned by the “Batitang” Lizama family, was dismantled in 1960 under a Bureau of Yards and Docks contract. The salvaged materials were used to build homes for indigenous residents of Saipan. Memorandum, September 21, 1960 from Naval Administrator, Naval Administration Unit #935 to Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.
 206. Goerner (1966:117).
 207. *Ibid.*
 208. *Ibid.*, 118.
 209. McCollum (n.d.:1).
 210. Interview of Lino M. Olopai, July 15, 2010. Olopai was employed by NTTU on its security force from 1957-1962.
 211. Interview of David M. Sablan, June 2011; Interview of Don Brennan, November 5, 2010. According to Lansdale (July 1961), “the CIA maintains a small ship of approximately 500 tons’ displacement and 140 feet in length. The vessel is used presently to provide surface transportation between Guam and Saipan. It has an American Captain and First Mate and a Philippine crew, and is operated under the cover of a commercial corporation with home offices in Baltimore, Maryland. Both the ship and the corporation have a potentially wider paramilitary application both in the Far East and elsewhere.” The ship’s captain was Rudolf Charles Wittmann (1901-1972) who was recruited out of Pittsburgh in 1951. He arrived on Guam that same year. The MV *Four Winds* subsequently was purchased by the Saipan Shipping Company in 1963 from the Bruen Shipping Company which very likely was a CIA-owned firm (“Skipper – Four Winds,” January-April, 1963:19). The ship sank at anchor in Tanapag Harbor during Typhoon Jean in April 1968. Its hull was still visible at low tide when the author first arrived on Saipan in 1974. The Whispering Palms Golf Course in Chalan Kiya was built by the U.S. Navy in 1946 and still operates today. It is the oldest course in the western Pacific region. See Denfeld (2024) for a history of this facility.
 212. Schmitz (1986:84).
 213. The consumption of alcohol was specifically mentioned during interviews with several former CIA employees and family members assigned to the STS. As observed by one NTTU veteran,

- “but for many, [Saipan’s] beautiful sunsets, beaches, balmy warm nights, and swaying palm trees got tiring very soon. Human nature, being what it is, led to other problems such as excessive drinking, extra-marital relations, and even occasional brawling” Samoriski (n.d.:3).
214. Interview of Lino M. Olopai, July 15, 2010. Surviving employment records indicate that indigenous residents were paid between 40 and 80 cents per hour by NTTU. According to a Navy report, 300 indigenous residents of Saipan were employed by NTTU in 1961 (Naval Administrator, May 9, 1961).
 215. Lansdale to Taylor (Circa July 1961).
 216. Goerner (1966:141).
 217. Interview of Lino M. Olopai, July 15, 2010. One of Olopai’s responsibilities was to place flare pots (kerosine fueled wicks) at this facility prior to the arrival of incoming flights to illuminate the runway.
 218. Conboy and Morrison (2002:47); Schmitz (1986:85).
 219. McCollum (n.d.:2).
 220. Conboy and Morrison (1990:47).
 221. *Ibid.* On his second tour at the STS, McCollum was responsible for training a young Vietnamese woman in tradecraft and intelligence collection. Her female companion was trained as a radio operator. Upon completion of their five-month training program, these two women were successfully infiltrated into North Vietnam “and provided “much good intelligence” for several years (McCollum n.d.:8). The ultimate fate of these women was not mentioned.
 222. *Ibid.*
 223. *Ibid.*, :31-32.
 224. *Ibid.*, 47.
 225. Leary (2002:142).
 226. *Ibid.*, 39.
 227. *Ibid.*, 55.
 228. *Ibid.*, 55.
 229. Dunham (2004:202).
 230. Conboy and Morrison, (2002:48).

231. *Ibid.*
232. *Ibid.*
233. Ngawang Wangyal was known popularly as “Geshe Wangyal.” He was of Kalmyk origin born in the Astrakhan province of southeast Russia in 1901. He was chosen at the age of six to enter the monastery as a novice monk and later earned the Tibetan Buddhist academic degree “*Geshe*.” When Communist Chinese forces invaded Tibet in the early 1950s, Geshe Wangyal escaped to India and by 1955 he was in the United States working as a priest among Kalmyk Americans in New Jersey, New York and Pennsylvania. Following his service with the CIA on Saipan, Wangyal established a Buddhist monastery in New Jersey where he served as the head teacher until his death in 1983. He taught many students of Western background and contributed to the spread of Tibetan Buddhism in the U.S. (Conboy and Morrison 2002:50-52).
234. Peebles (2005:162).
235. Dunham (2004:208). The name “Dursa” was inspired by the skeletons of Japanese soldiers killed during the World War II battle for Saipan that the Tibetans encountered during their training exercises in the Marpi area. According to the recollections of one trainee, “But what I remember was a rock cliff overlooking the ocean where, we were told, many Japanese had committed suicide by leaping to their deaths. That made me think about home. Khampas were committing suicide back in Tibet . . . By then, Tibet was Dursa, too” (Dunham 2004:208). Although provided some historical information by their trainers, the Tibetans remained ignorant of the name and location of the island on which they trained.
236. Conboy and Morrison (2002:54).
237. *Ibid.*
238. Peebles (2005:163).
239. *Ibid.*, 164.
240. Conboy and Morrison (2002:84). Camp Hale was referred to by CIA trainers as “The Ranch,” a play on Camp Peary’s nickname, “The Farm” (*Ibid.*, 110).
241. Nucker (1957:1).
242. COMNAVMAR to CNO (September 24, 1957:2)
243. CINCPACFLT (1957:1).
244. COMNAVMAR to CINCPACFLT (November 5, 1957:1).
245. CNO (1958:1).

246. Franke to Seaton (May 3, 1958:1).
247. Seaton (1959:1).
248. CINCPACFLT to CNO (November 28, 1958:1).
249. CINCPACFLT to CNO (December 11, 1959:1).
250. Dujmovic to Russell (2012:1).
251. Bantz (1959:1).
252. Findley (1959:1).
253. Findley (1959:1).
254. Donaho (1960:1).
255. Findley to Donaho (April 12, 1960:6).
256. Findley to Donaho (April 12, 1960:7).
257. Anonymous (1960:4). This was Antonio Arriola Diaz, known to the community as *Tun* Antonio Badu (Rechebei email to author, May 16, 2024).
258. Willens and Siemer (2000:22).
259. *Ibid.*
260. *Ibid.*
261. *Ibid.*
262. Findley to Webster (June 1, 1960:1).
263. Goerner (1966).
264. *Ibid.*, 171.
265. *Ibid.*, 85.
266. *Ibid.*, 85.
267. *Ibid.*, 86.
268. Schmitz (1986:84,88). Schmitz stated that the invitation was extended to Goerner by the NTTU personnel officer without his knowledge. Spencer Laird Taggart (1911-2000) was born in Utah and served as a Mormon missionary in Czechoslovakia in the mid-1930s during which time he

became fluent in the Czech language. He served in the OSS during World War II. In 1948, he headed the CIA's station in Prague at the time of the communist takeover (Lukes 2012:156, 200-202). He served as chief of station at the STS from 1959 to 1961. His deputies were Walter P. Kuzmuk and Norman Larum. It is unclear, given his central-European experience and expertise, why he would have been given a Far East assignment. His successor, Robert John Schmitz (1915-2004), was born in Wisconsin and also served as an officer in the OSS during World War II. He was assigned to the STS as chief of station in May 1961 and served there until the base's closure on July 1, 1962. He established an unlikely friendship with Fred Goerner that continued until the Goerner's death in 1994 (Goerner 1992:1; Schmitz 1986:88).

269. Goerner (1966:115)
270. *Ibid.*, 121. Schmitz recounted that whenever he was feeling low, he would read Goerner's account of his visit to Army Hill, and "enjoy a hearty laugh" (1986:88)
271. Schmitz (1986:88). Goerner's *Argosy* article was titled "I'll Find Amelia Earhart!" (1964:23-25; 96-102).
272. Schmitz (1986:88).
273. Drain (1960:1). JMARC guerrillas were reportedly trained in Guatemala.
274. CIA: Maker of Policy, or Tool," (April 26, 1966).
275. UN Report (1961).
276. *Ibid.*
277. *Ibid.*, 30-31.
278. *Ibid.*, 9.
279. Findley to Donaho (April 12, 1960:8).
280. U.N. Report (1961, 10-11).
281. *Ibid.*, 14.
282. Willens and Siemer (2000:6).
283. *Ibid.*
284. Goding was from Alaska and had been with the Department of Interior since 1944. Kahn described Goding as a "tall, gruff, grizzled, hearty man" and noted that "In Goding We Trust" became a common quip among TTPI employees (1966:38). He maintained a close relationship with Alaska's senators including E. L. "Bob" Bartlett who later protected Goding when, beginning in 1964, Interior attempted to have him replaced due to his resistance to change. Goding was the last presidentially appointed high commissioner. His

successors were appointed by the Interior secretary in accordance with a recommendation made in the Solomon Report.

285. *Ibid.*
286. “Visiting U.S. Officials” (May 21, 1961).
287. Law (1961:1).
288. Findley to Donaho (June 7, 1961:1). Lloyd Gordon Findley (1907-1989) was a career naval officer in Civil Affairs. He was assigned to Saipan in the military government section between 1946 and 1948. He subsequently transferred to the Civil Affairs section at CNO where he remained until 1962. His numerous memoranda during this period, particularly following the arrival of the CIA on Saipan, are very informative.
289. *Ibid.*, 2.
290. Carver to Connally (June 9, 1961:1-2).
291. “Interior Department to Take Over Saipan July 1” (January 12, 1961).
292. Carver to Connally (July 12, 1961).
293. Herrick for the record (1961:1).
294. Udall to Connally (July 21, 1961).
295. Findley to Donaho (August 8, 1961:1).
296. *Ibid.*, 2.
297. *Ibid.*, 3.
298. Mariana Islands District Administrator (1962).
299. Willens and Siemer (2000:4).
300. *Ibid.*, 6.
301. *Ibid.*, 28.
302. Hendrick to Donaho (1961:1).
303. Law to Walley (1961:1). Jeans states that DON secretary Connally wrote to Kenedy in December 1961 urging him not to transfer the TTPI headquarters to Saipan or removing the Navy from its policy-making role in that government (1990:26).
304. Connally to Udall (December 20, 1961).

305. Findley to Donaho (January 4, 1962:1).
306. *Ibid*:1.
307. *Ibid*:2. Southern Air Transport was acquired by the CIA in 1960 and was used to carry passengers and cargo. It was referred to by NTTU as the “November Flight.” It was described as a commercially owned chartered flight that provided logistical support to the CIA. It usually arrived on Saipan on Thursday mornings at 6:30 am and returned to Guam about an hour later. NTTU personnel were permitted to use the November Flight for R and R trips to Guam once every 28 days or more often as space was available (Anonymous 1961:27).
308. Findley for the record (January 8, 1962).
309. *Ibid.*, 2.
310. Willens and Siemer (2000:32). Taitano described his 1961 encounter with Navy and CIA officials in a 1993 interview with Willens. No mention of this encounter was found in the available primary source documentation.
311. Interview of Ruth Van Cleve cited in Willens Siemer (2004:20).
312. Maga (1990:25). According to Maga, the CIA issued a special report to President Kennedy warning that a shift in Micronesian policy would threaten the cover of the STS. He provided no reference for this statement.
313. Schmitz (1986:85).
314. “CIA: Maker of Policy, or Tool?” (April 25, 1966).
315. Kennedy to Taylor (April 22, 1961).
316. This document is referred to as the Taylor Report, portions of which are still classified. As a part of his work, Taylor directed Air Force General Edward G. Lansdale (1908-1987) to complete a survey of CIA facilities in Southeast Asia. Lansdale’s memorandum to Taylor on this subject titled “Resources for Unconventional Warfare, S.E. Asia” (undated but apparently from July 1961) was made public in 1971 as a part of the leaked Pentagon Papers. In it, he provided a succinct overview of the STS. Lansdale earned his reputation as a covert operative who helped the CIA to suppress the Hukbalahap Rebellion in the Philippines in the early 1950.
317. “Interior Department to Take Over Saipan July 1,” (January 12, 1962).
318. National Security Action Memorandum No. 145, (April 18, 1962).
319. Willens and Siemer, Volume 8 (2004:30).
320. NSAM 145, paragraph 2.

321. Executive Order 11021 “Administration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands by the Secretary of the Interior,” May 8, 1962. Section 1 of this EO contained the following qualifying language regarding U.S. security interests: “That the authority to specify parts or all of the trust territory as closed for security reasons and to determine the extent to which Articles 87 and 88 of the Charter of the United Nations shall be applicable to such closed areas, in accordance with Article 13 of the trusteeship agreement, shall be exercised by the President.”
322. “Saipan Planning Committee,” (1962:5)
323. *Ibid.*
324. Beasley to Bell (February 26, 1962). This memo stated that “the facilities now located on Saipan which are being made available without exchange of funds make the move of Trust Territory headquarters particularly advantageous at this time.” Willens and Siemer point out that this decision, which would significantly affect Saipan, was made without consultation with leaders in the Northern Mariana Islands (2000:35).
325. Ruth Van Cleve quoted in Willens and Siemer, (Vol. 8, 2004:21).
326. “High Commissioner’s Banner Waves over Northern Marianas,” (1962:4); “Saipan Transfer Set for 10 A.M. Today,” (July 1, 1962). It may be assumed that Hopwood School was selected as a venue rather than the former NTTU complex on Army Hill to ensure a maximum local turnout.
327. *Ibid.*, 4.
328. *Ibid.*, 6.
329. President Kennedy quoted in *Micronesian Reporter*, Volume X Number 4, (1962:8).
330. “Transfer of Headquarters,” (1962:1).
331. Kluge (2005:100).
332. “Origin of the Congress,” (1965:20).
333. “Spy School Becomes a Pacific Capital,” (December 2, 1962).
334. *Ibid.*
335. *Ibid.*
336. The first published reference to the CIA’s involvement on Saipan appears in 1964 (Goerner 1964). Two years later, two additional published accounts also connect the CIA with NTTU operations. They include Goerner’s *The Search for Amelia Earhart* and an article by Robert Trumbull titled “Pacific Territory Gets a Modern Capital, Courtesy of the C.I.A.” which ran in

The New York Times on March 14, 1966. It is probable that Trumbull's article was based on Goerner's book.

337. "Mr. Udall Keeps Heavy Schedule," (1962:3).
338. "Statement by the President," (August 23, 1962).
339. *Ibid.*
340. Trumbull, 1966.
341. "Council of Micronesia's Special Session," (1963:8).
342. *Ibid.*
343. Willens and Siemer (2000:38-39). Maga states that Kennedy referred to the TTPI as the "Rust Territories" given Interior's predilection for the continued use of deteriorating World War II facilities it had inherited from the Navy (1990:15).
344. *Ibid.*, 38.
345. *Ibid.*
346. Willens and Siemer (2005:24).
347. Willens and Siemer (2000:44).
348. Willens and Siemer (2005:26).
349. Willens and Siemer (2000:48).
350. *Ibid.*, 57.
351. "Origin of the Congress," (1965:17).
352. *Ibid.*
353. *Ibid.*, 19.
354. "A Review . . . Congress of Micronesia," (1962:1). Flag designs were produced during a TTPI-wide competition. The winning entry was submitted by Gonzalo Santos of the Marianas District. It was tentatively adopted by the Council of Micronesia that same year. It was re-approved by both the Congress of Micronesia and the high commissioner in 1965.
355. "Origin of the Congress," (1965:20).
356. Kahn (1966:53-58).

357. The author was unable to find a specific reference to its date of construction. It is visible an April 1968 aerial photo of Capitol Hill.
358. Aerial photographs indicate that several temporary buildings were constructed after 1969.
359. Kluge (2005:100).
360. Willens and Siemer (2000:60).
361. Kahn (1966:38-39).
362. Willens and Siemer (2000:102).
363. *Ibid.*
364. Kahn (1966:58). Cruz was a member of the 1st Congress of Micronesia and a strong proponent for reintegration with Guam.
365. *Micronesian Free Press* (March 28, 1969:11).
366. *Ibid.*
367. Willens and Siemer (2000:72-73).
368. *Ibid.*, 64.
369. *Ibid.*, 113.
370. *Ibid.*, 124.
371. *Ibid.*, 125.
372. *Ibid.*, 103.
373. *Ibid.*, 145.
374. *Ibid.*, 46.
375. *Ibid.*, 148.
376. *Ibid.*, 103.
377. *Ibid.*, 173.
378. *Ibid.*, 193. The United Carolinian Association, representing roughly 1/6 of the total district population, challenged this position by stating “not all Saipanese people agree that the Marianas District should get out of the TT and permanently align itself with the U.S.” “Marianas and Headquarters,” (1971:43).

379. "Marianas and Headquarters," (1971:43).
380. Willens and Siemer (2000:193-194).
381. *Ibid.*, 194.
382. *Ibid.*, 215.
383. *Ibid.*, 227.
384. *Ibid.*, 246.
385. The Proclamation also terminated the trusteeship in the Federated States of Micronesia and the Republic of the Marshall Islands. Both jurisdictions signed compacts of free association with the United States in 1979.
386. "TT to Turn Over Vacated Buildings to Commonwealth," (February 14, 1980).
387. *Ibid.*
388. "The Sad and Happy Ending of High Commissioner's Stay in Micronesia," (July 3, 1987).
389. *Ibid.*
390. "Moving Day Coming for CNMI Staffers. Former TT HQ New Home for Government," (July 31, 1987).
391. *Ibid.*
392. Interview of Donna Cruz, July 13, 2011. In addition to Governor Pedro P. Tenorio, the former High Commissioner's residence was occupied by Froilan C. Tenorio, and Juan N. Babauta. Subsequent governors chose to reside in their own homes. This house is currently unoccupied and in a dilapidated state.
393. "No Ceremony for 17 at TT," (July 3, 1987).
394. Palau District was the last jurisdiction of the TTPI to conclude its political status with the United States. It approved its compact of free association in 1986 but did not fully ratify it until 1993. It became the Republic of Palau, one of three freely associated states to emerge from the TTPI.
395. Kluge (2005:100).
396. This is the Observatory Hill site, a cluster of buildings in the Foggy Bottom area of Washington, D.C. that served as the World War II headquarters for the Office of Strategic Services, the precursor of the CIA. "Birthplace of CIA and U.S. Spycraft just made the NRHP," January 26, 2017.

397. The author utilized the Imperial System when recording building measurements as this system was used to design and build the complex. Metric equivalents have been included.
398. The “Record Report for Contract Noy 13931” was produced by BPM at the conclusion of contract work and held in the files of the Navy Technical Library on Guam. Although the Library reportedly misplaced the report, the author acquired a copy of its table of contents from a researcher who had viewed the report in 2009.
399. Juan Atalig Sablan (1936-1996) had a distinguished public service career during which he served as district administrator of the Truk (now Chuuk) District of the TTPI and as TTPI Deputy High Commissioner (1977-1981). The author had the privilege of working with Mr. Sablan when the TTPI Historic Preservation Office was placed under his direct supervision in 1979. During this period, Mr. Sablan provided critical support to the historic preservation program including the decision to treat the planned termination of the TTPI as a federal undertaking for purposes of complying with Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, as amended, thus ultimately allowing the Republic of Palau, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and the Federated States of Micronesia to be eligible for continued participation in this meaningful program.
400. Juan Nekai Babauta served as the sixth Governor of the CNMI from 2002 to 2006.
401. Memorandum, NAVAD to CNO (May 9, 1961:11).
402. *Ibid.* The dependents’ school was originally housed in a repurposed World War II-era Quonset Hut on Navy Hill. It was relocated to the first floor of the BOQ in early 1961 due to deteriorating conditions at the Navy Hill facility. Thereafter, NAVAD children were bussed to Army Hill to attend the school. Civilian teachers, however, were reportedly replaced by the wives of NTTU personnel (Robinson to Russell, April 15, 2024).
403. Interview of Lino M. Olopai, July 15, 2010.
404. Anonymous (circa 1960:37).
405. *Ibid.*

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Back cover photograph. An aerial view of the Capitol Hill Complex, 1987 (University of Hawai'i at Manoa Library).



The Capitol Hill Complex, completed in 1957, originally functioned as the residential and administrative headquarters of the Naval Technical Training Unit. This pseudo-military organization served as a front for the Saipan Training Station, a facility run by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency from 1950 to 1962. Following the station's closure, the complex became the provisional capital of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, a United Nations organization created after World War II to administer former Japanese Micronesia. With the final termination of the Trust Territory in 1987, the complex was transferred to the newly-established Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands. This volume documents the significant role the Capitol Hill Complex played in both U.S. Cold War history and the political, economic, and social history of the Northern Mariana Islands over the past seven decades.